PHIL 201: FINAL EXAM
55 Cards in this Set
Front | Back |
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surface freedom
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the ability to satisfy one's desires without interference (e.g., the ability to practice the religion of one's choice)
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causal possibility
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being able to happen or occur, given the particular circumstances and laws of nature.
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determinism
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the view that (given the antecedent conditions and laws of nature) there is only one causally possible future
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ultimate responsibility
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the origins of an action are "in me, not in something outside of me beyond my control.
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True
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Suppose that the world is deterministic. On Hobbe's account of "free," Sam waves her arm freely. T/F: According to the conditional anaylsis of "can", Sam could have not waved her arm instead.
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False
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Consider Tracy, who is perfectly motionless in a full body cast. T/F: According to the conditional analysis of "can," Tracy could have kicked her legs.
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True
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Consider Chris, who has an incredibly strong fear of snakes. Chris freely picks up a lizard next to a snake. T/F: According to the conditional analysis of "can," Chris could have picked up the snake instead.
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True
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T/F: One objection to the conditional analysis of "can" is that it is logically incoherent: being able to do otherwise requires an infinite series of choices.
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A. Humans sometimes have free will.
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Which claim must libertarians and soft determinists accept?
A) humans sometimes have free will
B) Incompatibilism is true
C) Determinism is true
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B. Incompatibilism is true
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Which claim must hard incompatibilists and hard determinists both accept?
A) humans sometimes have free will
B) incompatibilism is true
C) determinism is true
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C) Determinism is true
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Which claim must soft determinists and hard determinists both accept?
A) humans sometimes have free will
B) incompatibilism is true
C) determinism is true
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B) incompatibilism is true
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Which claim must libertarians and hard determinists both accept?
A) humans sometimes have free will.
B) incompatibilism is true
C) determinism is true
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False
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T/F: The conclusion of the consequence argument is equivalent to the claim that determinism is false.
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False
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T/F: According to the classical compatibilist( using the conditional analysis of "can"), if determinism is true, I cannot now change what I do right now.
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True
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According to the classical compatabilist (using the conditional analysis of "can"), I cannot now change the past.
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True
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According to Hobbes, having a power or ability right now doesn't require that one exercise it right now.
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Libertarians
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Who thinks incompatibilism is true?
A) libertarians
B) soft determinists
C) both
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Libertarians
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Who thinks that free will requires Ultimate Responsibility?
A) libertarians
B) soft determinists
C) both
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soft determinists
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Who thinks that alternate possibilities does not require open futures?
A) libertarians
B) soft determinists
C) both
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Libertarians
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Who is the luck objection a problem for?
A)libertarians
B)soft determinists
C)both
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surface freedom
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freedom to perform types of actions; freedom from interference in performing actions
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free will
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power or ability to make decisions and perform actions for which one may be held morally responsible
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responsibility
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that in virtue of which one is held accountable for her decision or action
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Not UR
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UR? movements of a puppet
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Not UR
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UR? remote control airplane
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Not UR
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UR? Hypnotized person, "brainwashed person.
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UR
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UR? decision and action of a person who deliberates independently of natural or social manipulation
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UR
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UR? decision and action that proceeds from a will, character, or motive for which the agent is ultimately responsible.
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determinism
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with the laws of nature and initial configuration of the universe, there is only one causally possible future
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laws of nature
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rules according to which natural change occurs
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antecedent conditions
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past states of the universe
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causally possible
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in these particular circumstances, it may occur
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logically possible
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regardless of particular circumstances, there is no contradiction in conceiving.
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alternate possibilities
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although i made this choice or decision, I could have done otherwise.
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conflict between free will and determinism
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If determinism is true, 1) there are no alternate possibilities and 2) no one has ultimate responsibility for what they decide to do
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compatibilism
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the view that free will and determinism don't conflict (it's possible that free will and human actions and choices are determined)
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incompatibilism
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the view that free will and determinism conflict. (it's not possible that humans have free will and humans actions and choices are determined)
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causal regress of determinism
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To get my action to be different, the cause of it (my choice) would have to be different and the cause of that would have to be different, and the cause of that would have to be different, and so on.
*therefore if determinism is true, I cannot do otherwise
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libertarianism
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the view that
1) incompatibilism is true
2) humans sometimes have free will
3) determinism is false
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hard compatibilism
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1) incompatibilism is true
2)humans have no free will
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hard determinist
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the view that
1)incompatibilism is true
2)determinism is true
3) humans never have free will because determinism is true
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soft determinist
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the view that
1) compatibilism is true
2) humans sometimes have free will
3)determinism is true
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indeterminism condition
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the agent that is possible to act and act otherwise (chose different possible futures) given the same past circumstances and laws of nature
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Luck Objection to Indeterminism
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1) consider an agent who now faces a choice: tell truth or lie
2) if agency is indeterministic, then there is no causal connection between the choice and the agent who makes it (no connection to desires, motives, powers, or character.
3) Therefore the agent's choice (and the action that…
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events
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occur at particular times; and certain kinds of changes to the circumstances involved in an event transform it into a new event
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agent
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continue to exist through time
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agent-causal libertarian
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-free actions are agent-caused
-event-caused actions are unfree
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True
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The example of the nervous assassin shows that although an action is undetermined, the action may still be voluntary
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false
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"because i wanted to get her attention" is an explanation in terms of causes of my waving at the waitress
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true
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according to the simple indeterminist, a free action cannot have a complete explanation of causes
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true
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the agent causalist and simple indeterminist agree that free action requires indeterminism
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true
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If there were something that prevented me from acting (being in a cast) Hobbes would say that I am not free to wave my arm
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true
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if there were no causal connection between the decision and the action ( that is, if the last arrow were erased and my arm still moved) Hobbes would say that the action is not free
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true
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if there a compulsion( compulsive hand waving) that produced the decision, Hobbes would say that the decision is not free
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false
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simply because every arrow depicts a deterministic causal connection , Hobbes would say that the action is not free
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