Conflict in the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin“We do not say we share their oil resources. They cannot say they share our waterresources. This is a right of sovereignty. We have the right to do anything we like.”Suleyman Demirel, Turkish Prime MinisterJuly 1992ContentDescriptionGeographyPrimary PlayersWater Use Agreements in the RegionIssues of Water Quality and QuantityPossible SolutionsQuestions for DiscussionRequired ReadingsSupplementary ReadingsDescriptionThe topic focuses on the hydropolitics of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin stemming fromrecent significant alterations in the traditional uses of the waters by the three major riparian nations. Iraq has historically practiced heavy use of the waters of both rivers foragricultural irrigation, with little diversion of waters from Syria or Turkey. In recent decades, however, both Turkey and Syria have undertaken significant projects to alter, store, and use flows from both rivers. Turkey’s projects have been much more significant to the region and have established its position of power to use or abuse the waters of these rivers with relative impunity. Iran, although a riparian, is not given significant focus due to their limited role in the current politics of the basin.GeographyBoth the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers originate in the mountains of eastern Turkey with the majority of their headwaters generated from annual rainfall and snowmelt. Approximately 98% of the waters of the Euphrates are generated within Turkey (Lupu, 2002), with the remaining percentage contributed as the river flows through Syria. A negligible amount is contributed to the annual flow of water in the river as it passes through Iraq, and a significant portion of the waters of the river actually evaporate due tothe extreme desert heat. The Tigris receives almost half of its waters initially from Turkey, a negligible amount as it forms borders between both Turkey and Syria, and then Syria and Iraq, and is then fed nearly half its remaining waters from tributaries in Iraq, many of which originate in the mountains of western Iran. The rivers join at the Shatt al-‘Arab north of Basra and flow together for a little more than 100 miles to the Persian Gulf.Primary PlayersTurkeyTurkey is the upper riparian and also holds the advantage of having the strongest economy, military, and the most political clout as the country with the closest ties to the Western nations and as a member of NATO. The construction of numerous dams, hydroelectric plants, and irrigation canals on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers over the past 30 years as part of the Southeast Anatolian Development Project (known as the “GAP”) has given Turkey the ability to unilaterally control all water flow of the Euprhates and almost half of the flow of the Tigris. The extensive quantities of water being harnessed through the dozens of projects that constitute the GAP have the overarching goal of increasing the standard of living and economic development in the southeastern portion of the country. The GAP has created jobs for the people of this region, generated power, and increased cultivated lands significantly. The secondary benefit or goal of this project can be presumed to be the assimilation and appeasement of the large Kurdish population in this region through increased economic prosperity and development. Although Turkey has been cooperative in sharing their development plans as the GAP has progressed, they generally maintain their view of absolute territorial sovereignty over the waters of both rivers flowing from their border.SyriaSyria is the middle riparian and historically relied on waters from the Yarmuk, Banyas and Orontes Rivers to satisfy the majority of its water needs prior to the 1970s. Syria has drastically increased its use of the Euphrates through construction of the Tabqa Dam in 1973, and a series of dams in recent decades, to supply irrigation waters for a vast region of Syria. They are driven by the need to cultivate more lands in order to feed a population that continues to grow at a steady rate. Although they share a small portion of the Tigris, Syria has made no significant claims to use its waters. They believe in the “shared resources” approach to the waters of both rivers and negotiate from that stance.IraqIraq is the lower riparian and has historically been the heaviest user of waters of both rivers for irrigation of agricultural lands. They invested heavily in construction along both rivers in the 1950s and 1960s to harness these resources for power production and irrigation and continued to invest capital in water storage projects in recent decades. The altered river flow and increased water use by the other two riparians, coupled with their continued need and heavy use of freshwater resources, has placed them in the most precarious position of the three major players. They have viewed themselves as having a historical use claim to the waters of both rivers.Water Use Agreements in the RegionThe lack of formal agreements between the riparians, along with a lack of clarity within existing agreements, has prevented significant progress with respect to resolving issuesof distribution of water resources. The sole existing agreement between Turkey and Iraq is the 1946 Treaty of Friendship and Neighborly Relations that restated the earlier commitment made by Turkey, while Iraq was under British mandate, not to change the flow of the Euphrates or construct waterworks projects without consulting Iraq (Lupu, 2002). The only other significant agreements regarding water allocations in the region have been between Turkey and Syria in 1987, in which Turkey agreed to maintain a minimum flow of 500 cubic meters per second from its dams on the Euphrates (Lupu, 2002) in exchange for Syrian cooperation with Kurdish rebels within its borders, and a bilateral water sharing agreement reached between Iraq and Syria in 1990. Turkey does not generally recognize their 1946 agreement with Iraq as being relevant, but more or less honors the terms of their bilateral agreement with Syria. Numerous meetings of the Joint Technical Commission, involving representatives from all three nations, were conducted between 1981 and 1992 with little resolution over the issues at hand due in large part to Iraq insisting that the Tigris be considered its own sovereign right to control and refusing to negotiate the basin as a whole (Altinbilek, 2004). Rigid stances such as