Page 1TitlesPage 2TitlesPara-Sites of Capitalism Can the Mosquito Speak? Page 3TitlesPara-Sites 0/ Capitalism Can the Mosquito Speak? Page 4Titles39 Can the Mosquito Speak? Para-Sites of Capitalism Page 5TitlesPara-Sites of Capitalism Can the Mosquito Speak? 4:1 Page 6TitlesPara-Sites of Capitalism Can the Mosquito Speak? Page 7TitlesPage 8TitlesI Para-Sites of Capitalism Can the Mosquito Speak? 47 Page 9TitlesPara-Sites of Capitalism Can the Mosquito Speak? 49 Page 10Titles5:1 Can the Mosquito Speak? Para-Sites of Capitalism Page 11TitlesPara-Sites of Capitalism Can the Mosquito Speak? Page 12TitlesAbbreviations and Acronyms I I I , , I , L Page 13Titlesx . Unholy trinity Globalism and Neoliberalism - Page 14TitleshI L Page 15TitlesFrom Liberalism to Keynesianism , I 1. I I \ Page 16TitlesI I I I ( i I I I ! , I - Page 17Titles\ I ie = Page 18Titles'Nf!' 'I i Ii I , I 1 - Page 19Titles"Iii 1m ~ ~ f· t \ l I ! I I .. Page 20Titlesi Hegemony and Policy Discourse r/f.' ~~~ . l , I' .. Page 21Titlesit .. Page 22Page 23TitlesGlobalism and neoliberalism . 21 Counterrhegemony lil Page 24TitlesThe Rest of the Book Page 25TitlesGlobalism and neoliberalism . 25 Page 26TitlesBretton Woods: Emergence of a Global - Page 27Titles26 . Unholy trinity Bretton Woods: Emergence of a Global - Page 28TitlesI Political-economic Context Page 29Page 30TitlesDiscourses of Economy Page 31Titles34 . Unholy trinity i Page 32Titlesr/~ , ! 36 . Unholy trinity Bretton Woods· 37 The USA: From Isolation to Global Hegemony Page 33TitlesI I. ! The Conference Page 34Titles1 i , Page 35Titles( I !. Page 36TitlesBretton Woods· 45 * 44 . Unholy trinity Page 37Page 38TitlesThe Bretton Woods Model Page 39TitlesRatification . Page 40TitlesFormalizing Dominance Page 41TitlesI \ Page 42Titlesrr :,"![ , I,. f' ,. " f I ~ ~ ~~ . r ff The Washington-Wall Street Hegemony I"!! ~~ ~ ~ ii Page 43Titles, Page 44Titles204 . Unholy trinity The Washington-Wall Street Alliance Page 45Titles~ ~ Iff ... ~~ , J ~:' tl, l~: ' V l! Page 46TablesTable 1Table 2Page 47Titles'1------'" ~- .. t· I h l .. ~ ~.~ TablesTable 1Page 48TitlesIi Destabilizing the Alliance i Page 49Titles:l: ~ ~ , ~ A ~ ii~, .. l. rl • ,I r . • {~ :~; iii '.:. ~r l' !l' i: ii· ~ \1. ~{ r {: Ii:; f ii ,. '~i I~~: .. , .. , 't ,., ' ' . .;',:. ~;: . r' ~:'.: Page 50TablesTable 1Page 51Titlesi!i Counter-hegemonic Alliance ..... Page 52Page 53Titles~ ~~i.! ": ~i .. J.1" ~ I ~: i! ~ I' ~: !I Ii Ii. rrrIii::,"![, I,.r Ii"f'CHAPTER6,The Washington-Wall StreetAlliancef"[,-f;,."!r/1§THISbook has argued that the IMP,the World Bank and the WTOimpose a virtually synonymous set of neoliberal economic polideson countries the world over. The polides are imposed as conditionsfor loans in times of crisis, as qualifications for debt relief, as partof development assistance for countries much in need, and as re-quirements for membershipinvital international trade agreemerits.Indeed, as Rowden (2001) documents, since the late 1990s, the threeorganizations have actively cooperated to create a coherent, unifyingpolicy position, increasingly centred on what they take to be theirmost conVincing theme - free trade. We now have whiit amounts toa single global institution governing the world economy, whose threeparts spedalize in stabilization (IMP), structural adjustment (WorldBank) and trade liberalization (WTO). The expansionary arm of thisinstitutional complex is the WTO, an undemocratic organization thatis rapidly accumulating vast new powers to regulate the trade in com-modities and services, trade-related investments and the internationaluse of intellectual products. In whose interest does this institutionalcomplex act? After an exhaustive study of the synthetic relations inthe IMP-World Bank-WTO system, Rowden' (2001: 6) concludes:the IMP and World Bank.loan conditions have coincided with WTOmembership requirements to undermine the ability of states to regu-late their own economies, promote domestic industries and protect theshort and long-term public interest. At the same time, the combinedeffectsof theirjoint-promotion of trade liberalizationhave increasinglyenabled private sector actors, primarily MNCs, to enjoy unprecedentedfreedoms in the process of deepening and broadening the globalizationof the international economy.While agreeing with the critical sentiment behind this statement, weIq~1II'.fIJ~~~~~.r ff,1;)Ii'l':il~Washington-Wall Street alliance· 201think we can add to it, by spedfying the institutional structure ofneoliberal globalization, by inspecting further its ideological make-up,and by indicating the interests we find it representing.I"!!I'I~~HegemonyIn Chapter 1 we outlined at some length a theory of hegemony anddiscourse that might make sense of the tangle of powers, interests,institutions and ideologies that combine to form international eco-nomic policy. Expanding on Gramsd's notion of hegemony, we saidthat powerinthe policy aren~ most essentially consists in controllingthe prevailing conception of economic good sense, as with leadingnotions of optimality, inevitability or, more generally, practicality. Thisprevailing good sense, we said, is pr04uced by communities of expertsin leading institutions and is protected by an aura of responsibility. Wesuggested that rather than emerging from these institutions glisteningwith the pure essence of sdentific neutrality, policy discourses actuallyoriginate in political-economic beliefs..In tracing how policies cometo be widely adopted, Illost importantly by global governance institu-tions, we thought that investigation should focus on clusters of relatedeconomic and political institutions. These clusters of institutions arethe agents· that concretely carry out' the production of sdentificallylegitimated policy prescriptions on behalf of power interests. Whichinstitutions these are, how they interact within relations of power,and how they achieve hegemonic extent by exerting discipline overfields of influence were the basic questions that needed addressing.Aninstitutional analysis, we thought, might bridge the otherwise yawn-ing gap between highly generalized political and economic interests,policy regimes and specific policy practices.Our survey of the histories and current practices of three globalgovernance organizations suggests that hegemonic economic policy isformed through interactions among three kinds of institutional actor- bureaucratic, economic and political - with two other sets of institu-tions -