Interrogations for Equality Seminar Session 3. Class & Economic Inequality September 17, 2009 Ben Kilbarger I like Glaser's "Class as a Normative Category". I'm interested to hear others' thoughts on the metrics of hierarchy, and if this is really an exhaustive list of what egalitarians should be trying to make (more) equal. Political theorizing often seems like disconnected conceptual alphabet soup, and I like the way Glaser attempts to give structure to a mess of really important, but often poorly contextualized concepts. While his remarks are very helpfully clarifying (at least to me, but I confess a penchant for systematization), I find myself wondering about the concepts themselves. This is a broad metaphysical/practical question that underlies a lot of our discussions in the course (not just his paper or this week). Just what, for example, is race? I feel like everyone has their own favored definition, and most of us are quick to insist that it's a social construct. But oughtn't we just get rid of it, then? Or do we plan to use it until such time as it's not useful anymore, and then do away with it? In defining it, are we trying to get at what it actually is, or use it in the way it's historically been used so that we can work toward eradicating the ill effects that have followed from its use? And then we'll ditch it for good? I'm similarly confused about class. Why does Glaser talk about standard-of-living class as opposed to standard-of-living simpliciter? What do we gain with this class talk? My worry, more refined, is that we sometimes seem a bit schizoid about these kind of terms. We want to insist that they're constructs, and then we want them to do a whole lot of normative work. Really they don't amount to anything, really, but we want to use them to do all kinds of work, and they're really important in lots of other ways, but harmful in others, and really, really they don't amount to anything in the world, actually, except that they do and they're really really important and we've got to focus on them. Less snarkily: what's the metaphysical status of terms like class, race, gender, and how should that status inform their use in our (construed broadly, as in, all people) ongoing discussion about equality? Gina Schouten Glaser argues that “…distribution strata enjoy an egalitarian-normative priority over differentiator categories” (Class as a Normative Category, 4). That is, he distinguishes between social differentiators (such as race and gender), and distribution strata (standard-of-living class, status group, and power position), and argues that the latter three distribution strata exhaust the types of hierarchies that are objectionable on egalitarian grounds, while the former group contains criteria according to which individuals are differentiated in these hierarchies. The social differentiators matter, Glaser argues, only insofar as they serve to channel individuals into hierarchies based on the distribution strata of class, status, and power. Glaser’s reason for limiting the distribution strata of egalitarian interest to class, status, and power is that “…theseSociology 915 & Philosophy 955. Interrogations, week 3 2 categories get as close as we can to naming the goods whose unequal distribution egalitarians believe to detract from human flourishing” (2). I have some concerns about the suggestion that egalitarians need only be interested in race and gender insofar as race and gender serve as differentiators that filter individuals into class, status, and power hierarchies. It seems to me that race and gender can affect human flourishing directly, and not merely as mediated by the three proposed distribution strata. For example, we might think that blacks experience their race, and women their gender, as something which marks them inescapably and profoundly, whereas whites and men are able to experience their lives as raceless and genderless. In other words, there may be an inequality in the extent to which members of different races and genders experience their membership in those groups as a differentiator, independently of the role that membership plays in sorting them into class, status, and power positions. And it seems at least initially plausible to think that those inequalities in “genderedness” and “racedness” might affect human flourishing. Furthermore, if race and gender membership can affect flourishing in a way that it unmediated by class, status, and power, then it starts to look like the metrics of reducibility, eliminability, and transitivity might no longer serve to differentiate race and gender from the three distribution strata that Glaser identifies. With regard to reducibility: Contrary to what Glaser says, “genderedness” and “racedness” might be metrics across which egalitarians should seek to equalize individuals. With regard to eliminability: It seems reasonable to think that egalitarians should in fact seek to eliminate race and gender, as well as class, power, and status differences. And with regard to transitivity: If “genderedness” and “racedness” affect flourishing directly, then it is plausible to think that egalitarians should work to equalize individuals across those dimensions not just for the sake of equalizing them with respect to class, status and power; in addition, the equalization of individuals with respect to “genderedness” and “racedness” ought to be sought as an end in itself. Justin Lonsbury Glaser’s discussion of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) reminded me of Paulo Freire’s insight that oppressed groups internalize visions of their oppressors, leading to a perpetuation of oppressive relationships rather than their amelioration. If poor blacks seek only to emulate the rich, or at least those who have achieved more wealth through new business opportunities, creating a new South African BEE-geoisie will do little to remove class divisions that perpetuate unequal access to resources. Internalizing images of the new black capitalists as successful black people will also narrow visions of what is possible and deflate movements to achieve a more egalitarian order. Glaser does a fine job of discussing non-economic reasons why egalitarians might support the BEE, and I agree with him that a lot of empirical work needs to be done to judge the extent to which the expanded South African business class can create trickle down