Sociology 915 Reading Interrogations #11. Structure & Agency November 18 1. Matt Desmond Emirbayer and Mische advance an attractive model for theorizing about agency termed the ‘chordal triad of agency’ that distinguishes three elements of agency corresponding to three distinct temporal orientations: the iterational, projective, and practical-evaluative elements. Immediately after introducing these terms, the authors remind us, “We should stress from the outset that these are analytical distinctions; all three of these constitutive dimensions of human agency are to be found, in varying degrees, within any concrete empirical instance of action” (p. 971). Although the authors point out that these three agentic dimensions are not always harmoniously realized, they do suggest that they are always simultaneously present in all forms of human action. However, the article is not set up in such a way that agency is understood as multiply realized along past, present, and future orientations; rather, one specific temporal orientation results in one specific type of agency (in various sub-forms), which is then demonstrated by giving examples of empirical research. This suggest that agency should not be understood as possessing a triadic and synchronic existence but rather a context-specific phenomenon, which is very similar to Sewell Jr.’s (very clever I think) claim that agency comes from structure. My question, then, is follows: Though Emirbayer and Mische develop analytical categories of agency based of temporal distinctions, can we also not infer that these distinctions are empirical and practical as well? Is agency multiply-realized or does one of the agentic-orientations take precedence in certain social situations? I believe the easy way to answer these question is to concede with Emirbayer and Mische that all human action possesses all three elements. After all, even the most calculating actor relies on certain habits when she is doing the calculating. And sometimes the easiest answer is the right one, but then this leaves open two questions: (1) What kinds of social situations ‘require’ foregrounding a certain agentic element? I think Emirbayer and Mische do a good job answering this question. But they really don’t pay enough attention to the question of social situationing and makeup (not context, but class, identity, gender, race, etc.) affects agentic-orientations. In other words, (2) How do different positions within the social space result in different elements of the chordal triad becoming dominant? The authors hint at this question at the end of their paper, but do not offer grounded distinctions between, say, working class and upper class agencies, male and female agencies (these are oversimplifications of course), etc. Sociologists have widely noted that poor and working class individuals possess an iteratioanl outlook while middle class families possess more of a projective outlook (take Bourdieu’s notion of the ‘taste of necessity’ in Distinction (1984) for example), and this would suggest thatInterrogations #11. Structure & Agency 2the ‘chordal triad of agency’ is certainly not multiply realized with an equilibrium between elements. Perhaps though, this is the work that Emirbayer and Mische leave us to do. And if this is the case, allow a generative question on the relationship between temporal orientation and social theory. Much social theory advocates for change on the foundations of consciousness-raising. For example, many liberal feminists suggest that ‘becoming aware’ is half the struggle. Likewise, although Habermas in Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2, begins with the premise against the ‘philosophy of consciousness,’ his theory which seeks ‘responsible hearers’ to launch validity claims against forms of speech and thus reveal types of symbolically distorted communication (again, another oversimplification for the purposes of illustration), he nonetheless requires hearers to embody a certain conscious orientation to language. These theories assume a temporal projective and practical-evaluative agentic existence, not so much an iterational one. Now, the question then arises: How can social theory lead to sustainable agentic change, that is, change not in the realm of policy or structures, but change in the form of an idea that moves people in a different way who then move policy or structures, which takes into account varying temporal ontologies? Does Habermas really expect a welfare mother who working a menial job who has no time on her hands and no time to think about time to make a validity claim when her political leaders tell her she is lazy? What can the ‘chordal triad of agency’ teach us about how to better our social theory for the sake of its applicability? I realize that this last thought is pretty convoluted. It is an idea that has only recently been floating around in my head. I would suspect that certainly Marx, whose theories did change societies, can teach us a lesson here. Ricky Leung Emirbayer and Mische's article highlights incorporating the temporal dimension into the analysis of agency. I am particularly interested in empirical approaches about organizations (p. 983 and p.993). With an organization or institutional field, how a temporal perspective enables us to see taken-for-granted beliefs, scripted knowledge or rationalized myths? A second point emphasized in this essay concerns the "double constitution of agency and structure: temporal-relational contexts support particular agentic orientations, which in turn constitute different structuring relationships of actors toward their environment" (p. 1004). However, the authors also emphasized that agency and structure are "never so deeply intertwined ... that these different analytical elements cannot be examined independently of on another" (p.1004). So, it is correct to say that the authors favor an analytical distinction between "structure and agency"? The authors also complained thatInterrogations #11. Structure & Agency 3Sewell does not offer any "theorization of differences in agentic capacity that are not inseparably bound to structural qualities" (p. 1005). I am not sure what the authors mean here. Also, do they want to highlight the differences between actions, agency and agent, and emphasize that it is important to understand the constant interactive process between structures and