UW-Madison SOC 915 - Session 5 Wealth (re)distribution - Capital Grants

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Interrogations for Equality Seminar Session 5. Wealth (re)distribution: Capital Grants October 1, 2009 Gina Schouten Ackerman and Alstott argue that stakeholding would constitute a great improvement in the equality of opportunity (“to shape [one’s] outcomes as she thinks best”) enjoyed by members of our society (The Stakeholder Society 24). There are a couple of issues pertaining to equality of opportunity in a stakeholder society that I hope we will have a chance to discuss more fully. I first wonder whether equality of opportunity is enough. Though equal opportunity is an intuitively appealing ideal, it seems that the appeal only exists after we have all attained a certain threshold of well-being. I would argue that we have a duty of justice to ensure that nobody suffer very severe deprivation, even if we are quite sure that the sufferer is responsible for that deprivation. Suppose a citizen squanders her stake and is otherwise unable to meet her basic need. Suppose, in addition, that she is responsible for being in such dire need. It seems at least plausible that we ought to take steps to ease her suffering as a matter of justice, and not merely as a matter of charity. This suggests that there is a threshold beneath which we should not afford individuals the “freedom to fail.” It might also suggest that stakeholding is an appealing mechanism of redistributive justice (if at all) only after other comprehensive social services are already in place. Secondly, it seems to me that we have some good reasons to doubt that stakeholding will constitute such a large step toward equality of opportunity. In our current social environment, isn’t there a legitimate worry that stakeholding would actually exacerbate inequality of opportunity? Wouldn’t we essentially be providing the privileged with greater means by which to enhance their advantage, while providing the less privileged with a sum of money which they are likely to be ill-prepared to convert into advantage (due to, for example, inequality in educational outcomes, particularly learning outcomes from “what-to-do-with-your-stake” classes)? Moreover, aren’t the less privileged likely to have urgent demands on their stake which prevent them from investing it in their human capital? If so, we may have reasonable reservations about the equal opportunity effects of implementing stakeholding absent other interventions. Ed Connery There is a definite internal consistency to the proposal for a stakeholder society. Focusing on the perspective that – as is rightly pointed out – money matters, one can find good reason to believe that an equitable distribution of this critical resource at the start of adulthood might represent a move toward individual empowerment and fuller participation in the life of the nation. Furthermore, there is considerable merit to the notion that a tangible, monetary stake in the life of the community could significantly improve the sense of a shared future and a genuine interest in the common good. It may even serve as a sort of educating and edifying motive for the nation’s youth \to keep their noses clean and place them firmly upon the grind stone.Sociology 915 & Philosophy 955. Reading Interrogations. Week 5 2 And yet, the proposal is committed to an unwarranted assumption that drags down the entire concept like a pair of cement boots. At the very heart of this proposal rests the assumption that contemporary, American, middle-class values and norms are desirable and justifiable prerequisites for participation in the life of the community. Ackerman and Alstott make this quite clear in their assertion that underprivileged youth will continue to improve their chances for success in life and lessen the impact of widespread social tensions because “as they prepare to claim their stakes, more poor children will conform to middle-class values….” (Stakeholder Society, p30) The proposal found in The Stakeholder Society is rife with assertions that contemporary middle-classness – defined primarily be property ownership – is the ideal toward which society and individuals should strive. It seems ironic that the argument claims to promote individual dignity and liberty when, in fact, the exaltation of middle-class values is an explicit endorsement of a social scheme that defines one’s value on the basis of property. This stands, for me, in stark contrast with a more basic assumption that any and everyone should be presumed equal and allowed to participate simply by virtue of her/his natural, individual worth as a human. Though I hesitate to accept basic income as an ultimate solution it seems to stand on much higher moral ground by aiming to sustain life-long empowerment of individual lives and aspirations; rather than the manner in which stakeholding asserts the primacy of American middle-class norms combined with a one-time shot at either propertied success or “blowing it.” There is nothing necessarily invalid in Ackerman and Alstott’s assertion that a certain set of norms is desirable and worth cultivating, enabling, and reinforcing. A large part of childrearing, socialization, and education are based on the notion that there are forms of knowledge, patterns of behavior, and social values worth recreating in the next generation. There is nothing obviously wrong with a community protecting and recreating its defining cultural markers. However, in this circumstance, I cannot accept the assumption that contemporary middle-classness per se is a value system worth propagating. I would suggest that American middle-class identity has no objective, demonstrable claim to the position as the most desirable cultural norm. There are any number of alternative values and norms that could compete for moral superiority and/or lay claim to serving the interest of justice more meaningfully. Jeffrey Grigg In his recent speech to Congress, Barack Obama proposed making health care mandatory for all citizens (this was shortly before Joe Wilson [R-SC] shouted “You lie!”). The reasoning he uses to explain his position is very pragmatic, but in principle he proposes restricting the ability of people to gamble with their health: “Now, even if we provide these affordable options, there may be those -- especially the young and the healthy -- who still want to take the risk and go without coverage. There may still be companies that refuse to do right by their workers


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UW-Madison SOC 915 - Session 5 Wealth (re)distribution - Capital Grants

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