New version page

FSU INR 4083 - Bargaining Model

Upgrade to remove ads

This preview shows page 1-2 out of 6 pages.

Save
View Full Document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 6 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 6 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience

Upgrade to remove ads
Unformatted text preview:

Exam 2 Study GuideBargaining Model 1. What is the bargaining range? (be able to understand all of the parts of the bargaining model) Why do states agree to settlements in the bargaining range? How does the balance of power influence the bargaining range? - The bargaining range is an area on the bargaining model that both players would prefer than to actually go to war.- Expected utility: P=probability, U=utility. P(win) x U(win) + P(lose) x U(lose)=expected utility. If expected utility is greater than not fighting then they will fight. If expected utility is greater than fighting, the states will agree to something in the bargaining range. - States agree to settlements in the bargaining range because war is costly and they believe that that anything in that range is better than fighting. - The more powerful state now has more bargaining power and more of a chance to win. The bargaining range would shift in the more powerful state’s favor. The range is the same because the cost of war is the same.2. Why do states go to war despite the fact that a bargaining range exists that they would prefer to war? - Bargaining Failures3. According to Fearon (1995), what are the three causes of bargaining failures? - Incomplete information. (Single moment of time)- Credible commitment problems (multiple moments of time)- Indivisibilities4. How does incomplete information influence the likelihood of war? Why is it difficult to know how likely an adversary is to go to war? - Uncertainty about model parameters, don’t know the other country’s resolve (willingness to go to war), mutual optimism (both sides believe they are the stronger of the two), incentives to misrepresent.- States have incentives to misrepresent/bluff by sending costly signals.5. How do commitment problems influence the likelihood of war? What is a preventive war? - Credible commitment problems arise when states cannot credibly promise to not use military force. Promises are only credible when it is in the self-interest of the actors to carry them out. Commitment problems are time-inconsistency problems.- A preventive war is a war that is started to preserve the status quo or stop a rising power.6. What is a credible threat? Why is credibility hard to achieve? - A credible threat is a threat that is costly and hard to back away from. - Credibility is hard to achieve because power changes over time.7. What is resolve? How is this part of the information problem? - Resolve is the willingness to endure costs in order to gain/keep something you desire.- Countries do not know the other countries resolve. 8. What is brinksmanship? What is bluffing? - Brinksmanship is the practice of pushing dangerous events to the “brink” of disaster in order to achieve the most advantageous outcome.- Bluffing is trying to deceive someone as to one's abilities or intentions. 9. What factors make wars less likely? How do they do this? - War is less likely when war is costly (or mechanisms exist that make war more costly), More information is available (or mechanisms exist that make states more transparent), Commitmentsare credible (or mechanisms exist that enhance credibility). - War can be more costly if sanctions are placed on the country or both sides know it will be a long, bloody war. More available information allows both sides to know more about the other’s military power, resolve, and more accurate predictions of who would win and who would lose. Treaties and alliances have to have costs associated with them for not following through. 10. What does Fearon (1995) mean when he says war is inefficient? - Both sides would have been better off if they could have achieved the same final resolution without suffering the costs (or by paying lower costs). - War is costly. Audience Costs 1. What are audience costs and how do they influence the possibility of war? - The domestic price a leader would pay for making foreign threats and then backing down.- Leaders who rely on their audience to stay in power are more likely to make credible threats. 2. What is a costly signal? How do they convey information? - A costly signal is an action that shows a state’s resolve is high and increases the costs of backing down. - Actions speak louder than words. The more costly the move, the louder the signal.3. According to Fearon (1994), what type of regimes are able to generate audience costs? - Democracies are able to generate audience costs because politicians rely on the population to be reelected. 4. What critiques of audience costs do Snyder and Borghard (2011) make? - Leaders prefer ambiguous threats, not obvious clear cut threats. - Domestic audiences care more about policy substance than about consistency between the leader’s words and deeds.- Targets of democratic threats do not perceive audience costs dynamics in the same way that audience costs theorists do.Diversionary Theory 1. What is the unitary state assumption? - The treatment of states as coherent actors with a set of interests that belong to the state. 2. What are some examples of the diversionary theory? (i.e. Falklands War) - Clinton’s bombing of Afghanistan during the impeachment process.- Gulf War and Iraq War.3. What is the rally-round-the-flag effect and why does it occur? - The rally-round-the-flag effect is the tendency for people to become more supportive of their government during times of international crisis. - It is a psychological mechanism that creates a greater attachment to the group one is associated with. 4. What is the diversionary incentive and why might leaders use it? How do the benefits of war influence the size of the bargaining range? - The diversionary incentive is an incentive for leaders to create an international conflict to divert attention away from domestic problems. - Leaders will use it to gain support or popularity by scapegoating foreigners and blaming domestic problems on them. - If a leader starts a war to increase his/her popularity then the cost of war goes down for that state. 4. What is gambling for resurrection? - Starting or continuing a war to gain support and appear to be competent. If the leader loses the war then the public already viewed them as incompetent, but if the leader wins then they appear competent and gain support.5. What are the weaknesses of diversionary theory? What is strategic conflict avoidance? - Missing strategic interaction. States don’t act, they interact. - Strategic conflict avoidance: potential targets of


View Full Document
Download Bargaining Model
Our administrator received your request to download this document. We will send you the file to your email shortly.
Loading Unlocking...
Login

Join to view Bargaining Model and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or
We will never post anything without your permission.
Don't have an account?
Sign Up

Join to view Bargaining Model 2 2 and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or

By creating an account you agree to our Privacy Policy and Terms Of Use

Already a member?