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Fall 2015 Exam 2 Study Guide This exam guide is subject to change prior to 7pm on Wednesday October 21 2015 Be sure to be able to explain the concepts involved in the following questions and their significance N B There will be nothing on the exam from Power Transition Theory Bargaining Model What is the key observation about war from Fearon 1995 If war is so costly why fight Or in other words why do states engage in conflict knowing that one state will eventually loose and both will suffer until that end As long as war is costly there must be some bargaining range that states would prefer rather than actually fighting Why is war ex post inefficient Both sides would have been better off if they could have achieved a resolution within the bargaining range because war is costly Also agreements in the bargaining range contain outcomes that are preferable to war for both sides What does Fearon 1995 say about existing neorealist theories of war He says they are incomplete Conflict of interest states has conflicts of interest all the time however only occasionally are they settled with conflict Anarchy how does anarchy prevent states from reaching an agreement Preventative war attack now to prevent loss later No why not reach a long term peace agreement War occurs due to uncertainty why not just communicate What is the bargaining range Why does the bargaining range exist The bargaining range is the area on the bargaining model that both players would prefer rather than actually going to war Are between each players expected utility of war It exists because it is believed that anything in the bargaining range is better than war What is each actor s preferred outcome To reach an agreement within their preferred bargaining range What are the three forms of bargaining failure Incomplete info single moment of time Credible commitment problems multiple moments of time Indivisibilities What are information problems Why not reveal information What are commitment issues Credible commitment problems arise when states cannot credibly promise to not use military force This is often due to changes in a states power over time It increases the likelihood of war because a state cannot commit to stick to an agreement it makes today when in the future it may be more powerful and have more bargaining leverage Commitment problems make the bargaining range change over time which makes war more likely Mechanisms that lead to commitment problems 1 Change in states power over time 2 Shift in power between domestic factions 3 Cost of preserving the status quo Issue indivisibility What does Fearon 1995 say about this mechanism When there are not possible divisions within the bargaining space Example issue of Jerusalem being claimed as capital and holy city by multiple faiths According to Powell 2006 what are the various mechanisms that can create commitment issues 1 change in states power over time 2 shift in power between domestic factions 3 cost of preserving the status quo What does Powell 2006 mean when he says the cost of maintaining the status quo can lead to war Domestic Politics and Conflict What are audience costs The domestic price a leader would pay for making foreign threats and then backing down Leaders who rely on their audience to stay in power are more likely to make credible threats Audience costs increase the cost of backing down from a conflict public cares about reputation and anything that can tarnish it What are the primary implications of audience costs Democracies should be less likely to bluff If a democracy makes a threat believe it Non democracies will have trouble sending costly signals If a democracy makes a threat the other state is more likely to back down because a democracy will likely follow through with that threat as they are more vulnerable to audience costs What are the main criticisms of audience costs from Snyder and Borghard 1 Leaders prefer ambiguous threats not obvious clear cut threats 2 Domestic audiences care more about policy substance than about consistency between leader s words and deeds 3 Targets of democratic threats do not perceive audience cost dynamics in the same way that the audience cost theorists do What is the primary causal concept from Crisher and Souva 2015 What is the problem with strategic conflict avoidance Not all states will try to strategically avoid conflict some will engage in conflict Particularly states that believe they can win and are powerful will probably engage in conflict Leaders and Institutions What is the selectorate The winning coalition the selectorate is all people that have a say in choosing the government in the US this would be eligible voters The winning coalition is the members of the selectorate whose support is essential to keep the incumbent leadership in office What is the loyalty norm People stay loyal in the winning coalition as they are afraid that if they leave they may no longer receive benefits from being in the winning coalition as well as possible not being accepted back into another winning coalition in the future Implications of selectorate theory on conflict behavior How does selectorate theory explain the democratic peace Democracies don t fight each other because they would both put all they have into the conflict and it would be costly with the eventuality that one side will loose and in turn a leader will fall from power due to audience costs so they lack the incentive to fight each other It is better to negotiate and not risk loosing your place in power How does Schultz 1999 help explain the democratic peace He explains the democratic peace from two perspectives However he finds evidence to defend the second perspective which is that of institutions and information Part 1 democracies are better at solving the information problem as they are more transparent Democracies can make more credible threat statements they have higher audience costs and their leaders pay a bigger price for making a threat and backing down therefore making challenges more credible Part 2 conflict happens because of bargaining failure Bargaining failure occurs because of uncertainty about resolve and capabilities Democratic leaders are more accountable than non democratic leaders This accountability increases audience costs Audience cost capabilities allows for costly signals which can mistake information and commitment problems Part 3 more information is good Conclusions when two democracies square off they adopt non hostile


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FSU INR 4083 - Exam 2 Study Guide

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