Presidents and Policy OutcomesForecasting Presidential electionsThis year’s modelsSam Wang (Princeton biophysicist)Andrea MoroPresidents and policy previewFederalist Papers and the prezPresidents and Policy Outcomes•Last time: modeling presidential elections•Overview of 2nd half of courseForecasting Presidential elections•Can citizens forecast the winner?–NES question, 1956-84, about 69 pct of respondents correctly forecast the winner; best predictor of correct prediction: vote preference for the actual winner•Campbell’s model: nat’l & state economics, state history, Sept. vote intentions strongly predict observed results at state level•Erikson’s model: weighted avg. of national economic quarterly data and avg NES candidate net likes/dislikes balance strongly predicts national vote sharesThis year’s models•PS, October 2004 issue–Earliest prediction: Jan. 29, 2004 (Norpoth) – Bush 54.7 pct of 2-party vote, 95 pct probable > 50 pct–Median forecast (7 models): Bush 53.8 pct, ranging from 49.9 (Aug. 27, 2004) to 57.6 pct (May 21, 2004)•Think of these as campaign-neutral predictions so that deviations can be attributed to candidates’ campaign efforts down the stretchSam Wang (Princeton biophysicist)•http://synapse.princeton.edu/~sam/pollcalc.html •Median outcome, decided voters: Kerry 252 EV, Bush 286 EV (±40 EV MoE)•Popular Meta-Margin among decided voters: Bush leads Kerry by 0.9% •Electoral prediction with undecideds and turnout: Kerry 323 EV, Bush 215 EV •Popular vote prediction with undecideds and turnout: Kerry 50.3%, Bush 47.7%, Nader/other 2%Andrea MoroPresidents and policy preview•Presidents and legislation–Negative agenda power: the veto and veto threats–Positive agenda power•Priming and framing–Action-forcing powers and presidential initiative–Proposal powers and first-mover advantages•Presidents and implementation–Nominations, appointments and removals–Recissions and impoundments: budgetary gatekeeping–Executive ordersFederalist Papers and the prez•Fed 47: fusion of executive, legislative and judicial functions == tyranny–these functions are partially distinct in the U.S. structure•Fed 48: exec, leg and judiciary need some measure of power to check one another–state executives were too weak during the Articles period•Fed 51: executive needs ambitions, powers and federalism to maintain independence of legislature•Fed 70: energy in the
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