http://nms.sagepub.comNew Media & Society DOI: 10.1177/1461444807081228 2007; 9; 827 New Media SocietyLincoln Dahlberg contestationRethinking the fragmentation of the cyberpublic: from consensus tohttp://nms.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/5/827 The online version of this article can be found at: Published by:http://www.sagepublications.com can be found at:New Media & Society Additional services and information for http://nms.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts: http://nms.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: http://nms.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/9/5/827 Citations at UNIV OF MARYLAND on November 5, 2009 http://nms.sagepub.comDownloaded fromRethinking thefragmentation of thecyberpublic: fromconsensus to contestationLINCOLN DAHLBERGUniversity of Queensland, AustraliaAbstractRecently there has been some debate between deliberativedemocrats about whether the internet is leading to thefragmentation of communication into ‘like-minded’ groups.Thisarticle is concerned with what is held in common by both sidesof the debate: a public sphere model that aims for all-inclusive,consensus seeking rational deliberation that eliminates inter-group ‘polarizing’ politics. It argues that this understanding ofdeliberative democracy fails to adequately consider theasymmetries of power through which deliberation and consensusare achieved, the inter-subjective basis of meaning, the centralityof respect for difference in democracy, and the democratic role of‘like-minded’ deliberative groups.The deliberative public spheremust be rethought to account more fully for these four aspects.The article draws on post-Marxist discourse theory andreconceptualizes the public sphere as a space constituted throughdiscursive contestation.Taking this radicalized norm, it considerswhat research is needed to understand the democratic implicationsof the formation of ‘like-minded’ groups online.Key wordsdeliberative democracy • fragmentation • internet • publicsphere • radical democracy827new media & societyCopyright © 2007 SAGE PublicationsLos Angeles, London, New Delhi and SingaporeVol9(5):827–847 [DOI: 10.1177/1461444807081228]ARTICLE827-848 NMS-081228.qxd 26/9/07 6:25 PM Page 827 at UNIV OF MARYLAND on November 5, 2009 http://nms.sagepub.comDownloaded fromNew Media & Society9(5)828INTRODUCTIONThere has been much academic discussion and increasing research onthe possibility of the internet facilitating the idea of a public sphere (e.g. Becker and Wehner, 2001; Dahlgren, 2001; Gandy, 2002; Gimmler, 2001;Graham, 2002; Noveck, 2000; Papacharissi, 2002, 2004; Sparks, 2001;Tanner,2001). Generally speaking, the public sphere is constituted by open, reasonedand reflexive communication. More specifically, drawing upon JürgenHabermas, whose work is the starting point for much internet public spheretheory and research, the public sphere is based on the thematization andcritique of moral, ethical and pragmatic validity claims, accompanied byinclusive, sincere and respectful reasoning.1This sphere is seen as central tostrong democracy, enabling the voicing of diverse views on any issue, theconstitution of publicly-oriented citizens, the scrutiny of power and,ultimately, public sovereignty.In contemporary, large-scale, dispersed and complex societies, time–distance‘defying’ media are required to support such communicative action.A varietyof critical theorists have shown that the modern mass media (print andbroadcasting) have largely failed in this role (see Boggs, 2000; Curran, 2000;Gandy, 2002; Habermas, 1989 [1962]; Kellner, 2004; McChesney, 1999;Savigny, 2002). In contrast, the internet has been seen as offering citizens theopportunity to encounter and engage with a huge diversity of positions, thusextending the public sphere (Blumler and Gurevitch, 2001; Gimmler, 2001;Kellner, 2004; Papacharissi, 2002).Through email, discussion sites, webpublishing and webcasting, a great variety of actors articulate and critiquevalidity claims locally, nationally and internationally. However, thoseresearching the possibility of the internet expanding democratic culture alsopoint to significant factors limiting open and reflexive debate online,including inequalities in access and participation, unreflexive communication,corporate domination of online attention and state surveillance andcensorship (Dahlberg, 2001, 2005b; Gomez, 2004; Hoar and Hope, 2002;Murdock and Golding, 2004;Wilhelm, 2000). Furthermore, a number ofinternet-democracy commentators question whether the myriad of diverseviews that exist online are actually intersecting, and thus the extent to whichonline interactions actually involve any significant problematization andcontestation of positions and practices.These commentators argue that muchonline interaction simply involves the meeting of ‘like-minded’ individuals,leading to a fragmented public sphere of insulated ‘deliberative enclaves’where group positions and practices are reinforced rather than openlycritiqued. In contrast, other commentators argue the opposite: that onlineparticipants readily seek out and deliberate with actors holding markedlydifferent views, thus expanding the public sphere.In this article I will focus on this fragmentation question and associateddebate in order to not only think of how to develop a better understanding827-848 NMS-081228.qxd 26/9/07 6:25 PM Page 828 at UNIV OF MARYLAND on November 5, 2009 http://nms.sagepub.comDownloaded fromof the specific problem being addressed, but also (and more significantly) as away to contribute to the ongoing development, interrogation and rethinkingof public sphere theory. I begin by re-presenting the arguments of each sideof the fragmentation debate, arguing that more empirical research is neededto decide the dispute. However, I also argue that any such research would beof limited value to understanding the internet–democracy relationshipbecause certain assumptions that underlie the debate are flawed.These flawedassumptions result in a failure to consider adequately the asymmetries ofpower within which deliberation and consensus are achieved, the inter-subjective basis of meaning and rationality, the centrality of respect fordifference in democracy and the democratic role of ‘like-minded’ deliberativegroups.This article argues that these flaws result directly from the limitationsof