Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeStatic theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeStatic timeChristian Wüthrichhttp://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/wuthrich/146 Philosophy of PhysicsClass 3, 4 October 2007Christian Wüthrich Class 3Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeContemporary B-theorytime not unreal, but exists as dimension of staticfour-dimensional continuum—“spacetime”—in virtue ofwhich properties of objects can changechange: the having of different properties at different“locations” in this additional dimensionunlike McTaggart, moder n B-theorists believe that timedoes not essentially include a moving now—and thusescapes McTaggart’s argumentB-theorists hold that common beliefs that time passes andthat there is an objective difference bw past, present andfuture are falseChristian Wüthrich Class 3Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of change⇒ positive and negative task for B-theorist:negative: offer reasons for thinking that above mentionedbeliefs are falsepositive: account for our experiences and our false beliefsabout timeChristian Wüthrich Class 3Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeThe natural viewCharacterization (The natural view)The natural view of time holds that only the present is real, thefuture is non-existent and as yet open/unfixed, while the past isfixed without existing in the same way as the present.Furthermore, the present is advancing, i.e. time passes.Questions:What kind of reasons could be given for the claim that past isfixed, while the future is not?What kind of reasons could be given that the future does notexist?What kind of reasons could be given that the past is not real inthe same sense as the present?What kind of reasons could be given that time passes?Christian Wüthrich Class 3Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeThe presence of experienceThesis (Confinement doctrine)“¨[T]he objects we perceive may not be present but the sensoryexperiences we have when we perceive them surely are.Conscious experiences are confined to the present.” (Dainton,29)Question. How can the B-theorist account for this confinement?Christian Wüthrich Class 3Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeChristian Wüthrich Class 3Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeChristian Wüthrich Class 3Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeExperiencing passageWe experience passage bc of the wayin which memories accumulate.Korsakoff syndrome: degenerativebrain disorder caused by the lack ofvitamin B1in the brain, inducesmemory lossPermanent anterograde amnesia:sufferer doesn’t remember anythingafter onset of amnesia for more thanbrief period of time⇒ memory-impoverished conditiondisables experience of passageSimilar memory effects lead us tobelieve that our lives unfold indirection of future.Christian Wüthrich Class 3Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeTruth and truthmakersDefinition (Truthmaker)A truthmaker for a true proposition or statement about the worldis the concrete entity by virtue of which the proposition is true.Usually, truthmakers are considered to be facts about the worldthat obtain.Definition (Falsemaker)Falsemakers, i.e. whatever makes a statement about the worldfalse, are the existent reality by virtue of which the statement isfalse. Sometimes, falsemakers are considered to be theabsence of facts about the world that would render theproposition true; this absence is a fact itself, albeit a “negative”one.Christian Wüthrich Class 3Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeA-statementsExamples:B-statement: “Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon is in 49BCE.”A-statement: “Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon is in the past.”What’s the truthmaker of the A-statement? Tensed A-factthat Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon took place in thepast?If truthmakers of A-statements are tensed A-facts, then welive in an A-world.Question: how can a B-theorist react?Christian Wüthrich Class 3Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeRussell’s old tenseless theoryThesis (Russell (1915))“A-statements do not require A-facts as truthmakers becausethey are equivalent in meaning to B-statements.” (Dainton, 32)non-starter: A-statements cannot be translated intoB-statements without loss of meaningthis can be seen must clearly in fact that A-statementshave time-varying truth-values, whereas B-statementshave time-invariant truth-valuesChristian Wüthrich Class 3Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeNew tenseless theoryJack Smart, “Time and becoming” (1980); Hugh Mellor, Real Time, (I: 1981, II: 1998).A-statements, though inequivalent to B-statements, haveB-truthmakersDefinition (Type-token distinction)A type is a category of being, while a particular instance of atype is a token. E.g., “Socrates” is a token of the type “humanbeing”. In general, types have many tokens and particularindividuals are tokens of many types.type: proposition; token: particular statement of propositionrestate the problem: a given A-statement type, i.e. anA-proposition, has different truth-values at different times,s.t. no A-proposition can have a single B-truthmakerChristian Wüthrich Class 3Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeidea: if we manage to assign a B-truthmaker to each token ofeach A-proposition, then the problem is solved without recourseto A-truthmakersi.o.w.: the truth or falsity of an A-proposition is exhaustivelydetermined by truth or falsity of all its (temporal) tokensthis can be fully done in B-terms, using various strategies suchas thetoken-reflexive account: for every A-proposition about any event,any of its token is true iff the token is as much earlier or laterthan the event as the proposition claims the present is than theevent (cf. Dainton, 33)right-hand side of iff is purely in B-termsChristian Wüthrich Class 3Static theories vs. the natural viewA-truthmakingB-theories of changeworse, the following A-paradox emerges: if on a particularday I falsely claim that Jim races tomorrow, then this claimshouldn’t change its truth-value when a month later, Jim infact does race tomorrow; but this happens if A-statementshave A-truthmakers