Political Realism and Human InterestsRichard K. AshleyInternational Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, Symposium in Honor of Hans J. Morgenthau.(Jun., 1981), pp. 204-236.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8833%28198106%2925%3A2%3C204%3APRAHI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-LInternational Studies Quarterly is currently published by The International Studies Association.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. 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ASHLEY Department of Political Science Arizona State University Although political realism is often understood as a more or less homogeneous tradition fixed on certain essential concepts, John Herz's provocative piece prompts an attempt to examine realist scholarship in a way that reveals some deep antinomies: some internal tensions that make realist scholarship, at least potentially, an evolving, open-ended "dialogue." Specifically, Jiirgen Habermas's categories of knowledge-constitutive in-terests-practical, technical, and emancipatory-are employed to distinguish two op- posed aspects of the realist dialogue: practical realism and technical realism. Practical realism is guided by a practical cognitive interest in sustaining intersubjective under- standing within the context of tradition. Its corresponding approach to inquiry and grounding is hermeneutic. Technical realism is guided by a technical cognitive interest in coming to grips with objective laws so as to expand powers of technical control over an objectified reality. Its approach to inquiry and grounding is essentially positivistic. Against this background, Herz's contribution to the realist dialogue is that, unique among realists, he brings a strong commitment to an emancipatory cognitive interest-an interest in self-reflection as the basis for the autonomous expression of will and consciousness in the human species' "self-formative process." Interpreted in this light, Herz is seen to employ a two-sided discursive strategy, each side addressed to one of realism's two aspects, the practical and the technical. However, though brilliant in conception, Herz's argument is unlikely to be persuasive if realist scholars are at base positivist scientists oriented by a technical interest in control. In this sense, Herz's piece represents a critical "test" of realism, its essence, and its developmental potential. I. Introduction The word "realism," in the context of international relations, summons forth a whole host of images and concepts. "Power politics," "balance of power," "anarchy," "the national interest," "the security dilemma9'-the concepts spring to mind, all with their visual images, and all rich with historical examples. The INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. 25 No. 2, June 1981 204-236 O 1981 I.S.A.Ashley / REALISM, HUMAN INTERESTS 205 pictures are far from idyllic. They are drawn, though, with stark clarity. The pictures portray a politically fragmented world of pervasive insecurity, recurring violence, generalized expectations of war, and self-animating strategic logic against strategic logic. So deeply ingrained is the associated Hobbesian imagery, in fact, that one need not ask how a realist will respond to recent writings that resurrect Kantian themes of emergent holistic imperatives in a world becoming "one." One knows the answer. Realists will decry as idealistic, dangerous, or dangerously idealistic those programs and practices, as advocated by "ecological holists" and others, that would transcend the fragmented world of power politics. It is therefore something of a surprise to read the words of John Herz, who proclaims that he is a realist, on the one hand, and who warmly embraces themes more Kantian than Hobbesian, on the other. Yes, I am a realist, Herz says, but I am a global humanist, too. Yes, I am a realist, he repeats, but in the face of mounting global threats that cannot find answers in the fragmented political order of the past, it is the height of dangerous idealism to slavishly seek guidance in the timeworn concepts of yesteryear's realism. The "existing givens" of political reality have changed, no matter how much one might wish that they had not; and political realism is nothing if it does not base its arguments on the real facts, the "existing givens." So arguing, Herz advances a position that departs radically from the imagery we usually associate with realism. He appeals for an "attitude of universalism." He urges the surpassing of "national interests" by "global interests" in world views. He urges that states yield "portions of their cherished sovereignty" to supranational agencies. In all of this and more, his argument bespeaks a holistic view that is almost the antithesis of the more atomistic world conception one associates with realism. The initial sense of surprise manifests a deeper dissonance-a discomforting tension born of the fact that Herz's arguments strain one's preunderstandings of political realism as a tradition. It is a tension that can be resolved in either of two ways. One way is simply to deny Herz the status of a true realist. With Kenneth206 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY Thompson (1979),