Why Aren't WeWhy Aren't WeLaughing?: GrammaticalLaughing?: GrammaticalInvestigations in WorldInvestigations in WorldPoliticsPoliticsVeÂronique Pin-Fat1This paper argues that the later Wittgenstein'snotion of the autonomy of grammar opensup critical space for thinking about worldpolitics. The claim that philosophy should be a`grammatical investigation' involves con-sidering how particular pictures, as repre-sentations of reality, hold us captive. Althoughthe `deep disquietudes' that are expressed inworld politic s may have similarities with thedepth of a grammatical joke, I will look at afew reasons why we aren't laughing.The problems arising through a mis-interpretation of our forms of languagehave the character of depth. They are deepdisquietudes; their roots are as deep in usas the forms of our language and their sig-ni®cance is as great as the importance ofour language. Let us ask ourse lves: why dowe feel a grammatical joke to be deep?(And that is what the depth of philosophyis.) (Wit tgenstein, 1953, §111)IntroductionDoes consideration of the relationshipbetween language and reality bear any rele-vance to world politics? It is argued that thephilosophy of the later Wittge nstein indicatesa way in which it does. In what can only be apreliminary sketch, I endeavour to show thathis work suggests a project of emancipationfrom the captivating in¯uence of pictures ofrepresentation; a project that attempts toexpose what has been rendered invisiblethrough familiarity. In order to elucidate whatis involved in this approach and its relevanceto world politics I brie¯y discuss the relation-ship between language and reality and thenturn to Wittgenstein's understanding of pic-tures and grammatical investigations.Language and realityMuch of the later Wittgenstein's work wasdirected against the view that language andthought represent reality, a view which hehad held earlier in the Tractatus as the `pic-ture theory' of meaning. In the Tractatus,Wittgenstein had believed that `To give theessence of a proposition means to give theessence of all description, and thus theessence of the world' (Wittgenstein, 1922,5.4711). On this view names name objectsPolitics (1997) 17(2) pp. 79±86# Political Studies Association 1997. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UKand 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.79Ve ronique Pin-Fat, University of Wales.and con®gurations of names depict possiblecon®gurations of objects in the world. In thisway, language can represent possible statesof aairs because it shares the same struc-ture. Thus, the truth or falsity of a proposi-tion depends on whether it agrees ordisagrees with reality (Wittgenstein, 1922,2.223, 4.05).However, in his later work, Wittgensteinbelieved that the Tractarian view was an illu-sion that generated the idea that there mustbe a super-order between super-concepts ± a`hard' connection between the order of pos-sibilities common to both thought and world(Wittgenstein, 1953, §97). It is in the contextof breaking down the seduction of the Trac-tarian picture of language that Wittgensteinintroduces the notion of language-games anda grammatical investigation. The metaphor ofgames is constructed to break the captivatingin¯uence of the idea that the meaning of aword is the object that for which it stands(names) (Wittgenstein, 1953,§1). By ske tch-ing various language-games, he tries to showthat there are many other ways in whichwords are meaning ful which do not rely onthe word-object naming relation. For exam-ple, giving orders and obeying them, makinga joke, forming and testing a hypothesis,praying etc. (Wittgenstein, 1953,§23). Further-more, the metaphor of a game is also meantto bring to view the idea that there are notonly many dierent types of game (board-games, ball-games, Olympic Games and soon) but that the meaning of the word `game'is not dependent on naming an elementwhich is common to all instances of its use.He says, `I can think of no better expressionto characterise the se similarities than ``familyresemblance'' . . . And I shall say: ``games''form a family' (Wittgenstein, 1953,§67). Theimportance of this move is that the notion offamily resemblance `replaces explanation interms of category and essence' (Staten, 1985,p.96). The search for the essence of propo-sitions as the essence of reality is thereforeoverthrown by the idea that language can bemeaningful without reference to commonelements (objects) of reality. So, if thenaming of objects does not provide themeaning of a word then what might? `For alarge class of cases ± though not for all ± inwhich we employ the word ``meaning'' it canbe de®ned thus: the meaning of a word is itsuse in the language' (Wittgenstein, 1953,§43).Meaning then, comes from the way in whicha word is used in particular contexts or asWittgenstein sometimes put it, `our talk getsits meaning from the rest of our proceed-ings'' ' (Wittgenstein, 1969,§229). The `rest ofour proceedings' are our practices. He says,`The word ``language-game'' is here meant toemphasise that the speaking of language ispart of an activity or a form of life' (Wittgen-stein, 1953,§23). Language games are not justwhat we say but what we do. Words areDeeds (Wittgenstein, 1981b, p.46). Most rele-vant in this context is that language gamesare not primarily the representation of thesuper-order of reality but are the particularpractices of ways of life, including wor ld pol-itics.In the sections below I shall examine howWittgenstein understands pictures, includingthose of world politics, to hold us captive. Itis argued that pictures seem to locate per-ennial problems thereby creating `deep dis-quietudes'. Although Wittgenstein says thatgrammatical jokes also seem deep, I shallargue that many of the pictures that hold uscaptive in world politics are not a laughingmatter. Indeed, it is through grammaticalinvestigations that the reasons wh y we aren'tlaughing can be exposed and a critical andemancipatory approach to world politics con-structed.Grammatical picturesFor Wittgenstein , pictures hold us capt ive(Wittgenstein, 1953,§115). He gives variousexamples; `The picture that men have souls'(Wittgenstein, 1953,§422), `The religious pic-ture of the all-seeing eye of God' (Wittgen-stein, 1970, p.71), `The picture that thinkingGrammatical investigations in World Politics . Pin-Fat Politics (1997) 17(2) pp. 79±86# Political Studies Association 199780goes on in the head'