Lecture 10 POLS 207Outline of Last Lecture:Counterexamples to CentralizationI. AbortionA. Roe v. Wade (1973) – not a counterexampleB. Webster (1989)C. Planned Parenthood (1992)II. WelfareOutline of Current Lecture:Welfare Reform as a Counter-example to CentralizationI. Welfare reform starting in 1996A. Expanding caseloadsB. Work disincentivesC. Social dependencyD. Dysfunctional family effectsCurrent Lecture:Welfare reform as a counter-example to “centralizing” trendIn 1996 reform: significant increase in state-local freedom to design own “welfare” program. AFDC became TANF.TANF = “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families” mostly being paid for by the national government. Welfare reform is a clear counter-example to the national government’s centralizing trend we’ve been talking about over the past few weeks.1935-96 – AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) with roots in states back in 1911Initially a program for “white widows” with children. By 1970s it had become a “minorities” program with unmarried mothers. The number of caseloads expanded exponentially – 1960 – 787,000 families1970 – 2.208 million1980 – 3.712 million1995 – 4.963 millionThis increase in welfare caseloads had nothing to do with the economy! It didn’t correlate to thecountry’s overall degree of prosperity. In this context, by the 1990s a “consensus” had developed about what the problem was. The dollar value of welfare “package” discouraged recipients from taking low-wage jobs. Why work when you could live comparably well for free on welfare? About one-half of welfare users were short-term users. But for the other half, it became a “way of life” with some intergenerational usage.See D&M 17:569 for a conventional “critique” of “welfare,” work disincentives, long-term (social) dependency, and dysfunctional family effects.TANF/AFDC Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“Welfare reform”)- 16.5 billion in federal dollars- Wide discretion to states in designing- Federal time limits (2 years/5 years lifetime)- Caseload “work” targets (25% - 50%) SEE POWERPOINT FOR THE RESTTANF caseloads1995 – 4,963,000 (AFDC) families2008 – 1,633,000 families2011 – 1,846,000 (TANF) familiesWhy have these caseloads been declining? - Some moms were already working (secretly)- “Time limits” v. “benefit manipulation” – Manipulating the benefit structure is not as effective as telling people to just go get a job. The “tough love” of time limits on benefits seems to be more effective- Growing economy (until late ’08) – Even after the Recession began, caseloads did not dramatically rise. This has to do at least partially with whom the financial crisis affected – for themost part the poor were not significantly affected.- Changed “culture” within welfare depts. (especially since 2008, state tightening of eligibility and