Lecture 10 POLS 207 Outline of Last Lecture Counterexamples to Centralization I Abortion A Roe v Wade 1973 not a counterexample B Webster 1989 C Planned Parenthood 1992 II Welfare Outline of Current Lecture Welfare Reform as a Counter example to Centralization I Welfare reform starting in 1996 A Expanding caseloads B Work disincentives C Social dependency D Dysfunctional family effects Current Lecture Welfare reform as a counter example to centralizing trend In 1996 reform significant increase in state local freedom to design own welfare program AFDC became TANF TANF Temporary Assistance for Needy Families mostly being paid for by the national government Welfare reform is a clear counter example to the national government s centralizing trend we ve been talking about over the past few weeks 1935 96 AFDC Aid to Families with Dependent Children with roots in states back in 1911 Initially a program for white widows with children By 1970s it had become a minorities program with unmarried mothers The number of caseloads expanded exponentially 1960 787 000 families 1970 2 208 million 1980 3 712 million 1995 4 963 million This increase in welfare caseloads had nothing to do with the economy It didn t correlate to the country s overall degree of prosperity In this context by the 1990s a consensus had developed about what the problem was The dollar value of welfare package discouraged recipients from taking low wage jobs Why work when you could live comparably well for free on welfare About one half of welfare users were short term users But for the other half it became a way of life with some intergenerational usage See D M 17 569 for a conventional critique of welfare work disincentives long term social dependency and dysfunctional family effects TANF AFDC Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act Welfare reform 16 5 billion in federal dollars Wide discretion to states in designing Federal time limits 2 years 5 years lifetime Caseload work targets 25 50 SEE POWERPOINT FOR THE REST TANF caseloads 1995 4 963 000 AFDC families 2008 1 633 000 families 2011 1 846 000 TANF families Why have these caseloads been declining Some moms were already working secretly Time limits v benefit manipulation Manipulating the benefit structure is not as effective as telling people to just go get a job The tough love of time limits on benefits seems to be more effective Growing economy until late 08 Even after the Recession began caseloads did not dramatically rise This has to do at least partially with whom the financial crisis affected for the most part the poor were not significantly affected Changed culture within welfare depts especially since 2008 state tightening of eligibility and funding