Brandom09/09/09SRLG Passages1. [Regulism] It seems plausible to say that a language is a system of expressions the use of whichis subject to certain rules. It would seem, thus, that learning to use a language is learning to obey the rules for the use of its expressions. However, taken as it stands, this thesis is subject toan obvious and devastating refutation. After formulating this refutation, I shall turn to the constructive task of attempting to restate the thesis in a way which avoids it. In doing so, I shall draw certain distinctions the theoretical elaboration of which will, I believe, yield new insight into the psychology of language and of what might be called “norm conforming behavior” generally. The present paper contains an initial attempt along these lines. 2. The refutation runs as follows: Thesis. Learning to use a language (L) is learning to obey the rules of L. But, a rule which enjoins the doing of an action (A) is a sentence in a language which contains an expression for A. Hence, a rule which enjoins the using of a linguistic expression (E) is a sentence in a language which contains an expression for E,—in other words a sentence in a metalanguage. Consequently, learning to obey the rules for L presupposes the ability to use the metalanguage (ML) in which the rules for L are formulated. So that learning to use a language (L) presupposes having learned to use a language (ML). And by the same token, having learned to use ML presupposes having learned to use a meta-meta-language (MML) and so on. But this is impossible (a vicious regress). Therefore, the thesis is absurd and must be rejected. 1,2-28]2. [Regularism] 3. Now, at first sight there is a simple and straightforward way of preserving the essential claim of the thesis while freeing it from, the refutation. It consists in substituting the phrase ‘learning to conform to the rules . . .’ for ‘learning to obey the rules . . .’ where ‘conforming to a rule enjoining the doing of A in circumstances C’ is to be equated simply with ‘doing A when the circumstances are C’—regardless of how one comes to do it. [It is granted that ‘conforming to’ is often used in the sense of ‘obeying’ so that this distinction involves an element of stipulation.] A person who has the habit of doing A in C would then be conforming to the above rule even though the idea that he was to do A in C had never occurred to him, and even though he had no language for referring to either A or C. 3. [A good thought that lies behind the inadequate suggeston that mere conformity to rules is enough.] What is denied is that playing a game logically involves obedience to the rules of the game, and hence the ability to use the language (play the language game) in which the rules are formulated. [5-29]4. Sections 6-9 give “Metaphysicus”’ view: there is a prelinguistic awareness of the rules, or of thenormative demands they make, couched in prelinguistic awareness of various universals.5. Unfortunately, a closer examination of this “solution” reveals it to be a sham. More precisely, it turns out, on analysis, to be in all respects identical with the original thesis, and to be subject to 1Brandomthe same refutation. The issue turns on what is to be understood by the term ‘awareness’ in the phrase ‘becoming aware of a set of demands and permissions’. It is clear that if Metaphysicus isto succeed, becoming aware of something cannot be to make a move in a game, for then learning a game would involve playing a game, and we are off on our regress. Yet when we reflect on the notion of being aware of propositions, properties, relations, demands, etc., it strikes us at once that these awarenesses are exactly positions in the “game” of reasoning. It may be an over-simplification to identify reasoning, thinking, being aware of possibilities, connections, etc., with playing a language game (e.g. French, German), but that it is playing a game is indicated by the use of such terms as ‘correct’, ‘mistake’, etc., in commenting on them. [10-31]6. [The good idea in the vicinity is:] Metaphysicus sought to offer us an account in which learning a game involves learning to do what one does because doing these things is making moves in the game (let us abbreviate this to ‘because of the moves (of the game)’) where doing what one does because of the moves need not involve using language about themoves. Where he went astray was in holding that while doing what one does because of the moves need not involve using language about the moves, it does involve being aware of the moves demanded and permitted by the game, for it was this which led to the regress. [11-32]7. [W]e have tacitly accepted a dichotomy between (a) merely conforming to rules: doing A in C, A′ in C′ etc. where these doings “just happen” to contribute to the realization of a complex pattern. (b) obeying rules: doing A in C, A′ in C′ etc., with the intention of fulfilling the demands of an envisaged system of rules. But surely this is a false dichotomy! ! For it required us to suppose that the only way in which acomplex system of activity can be involved in the explanation of the occurrence of a particular act, is by the agent envisaging the system and intending its realization. This is as much as to saythat unless the agent conceives of the system, the conformity of his behavior to the system must be “accidental”. [12-32] [So what is needed is a conception according to which it is not accidental, but not consciously conceived by the agent as according to rule.]8. What would it mean to say of a bee returning from a clover field that its turnings and wigglings occur because they are part of a complex dance? [14-33]9. . Roughly, the interpretation would contain such sentences as the following: (a) The pattern (dance) is first exemplified by particular bees in a way which is not appropriately described by saying that the successive acts by which the pattern is realized occur because of the pattern. (b) Having a “wiring diagram” which expresses itself in this pattern has survival value. (c) Through the mechanisms of heredity and natural selection it comes about that all bees have this “wiring diagram”. It is by a mention of these items that we would justify saying of the contemporary population ofbees that each step in their dance behavior occurs because of its role in the dance as a whole. [15-33]2Brandom10. we