1 The Hart-Rawls Principle of Fairness-----Nozick's Chapter 5 Discussion Notes for Philosophy 13 Fall, 2008 Dick Arneson "This principle holds that when a number of persons engage in a just, mutually advantageous, cooperative venture according to rules and thus restrain their liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission" (p. 90, Anarchy, State, and Utopia). Example: Suppose the farmers in a valley are menaced by bandits. Some of the farmers organize a mutual defense scheme. The scheme provides that on a rotating basis, the farmers will take turns standing in sentry position at the borders of the valley. If a sentry raises an alarm upon seeing approaching bandits, all the farmers are to take up arms and defend the valley residents, until the bandits are killed or dispersed. Provided that almost all farmers in the valley participate in this scheme, each farmer's chances of avoiding premature death at the hands of the bandits and the loss of his possessions are significantly improved by the scheme. In this way all are significantly benefited by the scheme. Above some threshold level of participation, each farmer's net gains from the scheme increase as others participate. I shall suppose that the conditions of the Hart-Rawls principle are satisfied in this example as described, so if one or a few valley residents benefit from the mutual protection scheme but balk at doing their part, the cooperating participants have a right against these noncooperators, that they should do their assigned part under the scheme. In supposing this is so, I am construing the principle in particular ways. First, I am supposing the persons who engage in the scheme need not be identical to the "all" who benefit and are obliged to cooperate under the rules of the scheme. Suppose some number of the farmers living in the valley, not necessarily all of them, work out a scheme and post the rules. If the scheme gets off the ground, if valley residents comply to a sufficient degree, then those who benefit from the first compliers' behavior are obligated to reciprocate and do their turn. Second, I shall suppose that the Hart-Rawls principle applies when and if such a cooperative scheme is successfully initiated and is up and running. The principle does not purport to tell us what we ought to do if a cooperative scheme is proposed but it is not yet clear whether enough people will go along with the proposal and comply with its rules for the scheme to deliver its anticipated benefits. The Hart-Rawls principle specifies how one ought to behave when one is a beneficiary of an ongoing successful cooperative scheme. Third, I shall interpret the phrase "restrain their liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all" loosely. In the example, suppose that there are many mutual protection schemes, differing in design details, any of which would have gained roughly the same benefits that the scheme actually established yields. If the actually established scheme is one of the set of possible schemes, the implementation of one of which was necessary to secure the basic scheme benefits, and if the actually established scheme is not significantly inferior to another that might have been established instead, I shall suppose that the cooperators are restraining "their liberty in ways necessary to gain advantages for all." (This condition so interpreted would not be satisfied if merely placing a scarecrow at each access point to the valley would be sufficient to deter bandits at much lower cost than the actually established scheme involving sentries sounding a general alarm.) Nozick observes that if one supposes the right that the cooperating participants gain against benefiting noncooperators is an enforceable right, the Hart-Rawls principle then "seems to make unanimous consent to coercive government in a state of nature unnecessary!" (p. 90). A coercive government could arise legitimately without unanimous consent of the governed via the establishment of a cooperative scheme that satisfies the conditions of the Hart-Rawls principle of fairness. Nozick's objections: "The principle of fairness, as we stated it following Hart and Rawls, is objectionable and unacceptable."2 1. You might benefit from the operation of the cooperative scheme, but less overall than you would lose from compliance with the scheme's participation requirements. 2. Even if the operation of the scheme would benefit you more than compliance with its requirements would cost you, it still might be the case that the scheme barely benefits you overall, whereas others gain a lot. Requiring you to cooperate with others to keep the scheme going may be unfair, because you gain so much less on the whole than others would gain. 3. The institution of the actually established and ongoing scheme might have foreclosed the possibility of adopting instead a cooperative scheme more to your liking. You might decline to participate in the ongoing scheme as a part of a strategy of trying to persuade people to replace it with your preferred scheme instead. In any of cases 1-3, it would be unfair to demand that you contribute anything close to what other cooperators are paying to sustain the scheme. Nozick's objections to the claim that legitimately enforceable obligations arise according to the principle of fairness: 1. In general, just by showering on people benefits they have not requested on specified terms, you do not thereby generate in these people obligations to reciprocate, to benefit you in turn. At least, nothing approaching an enforceable obligation arises in this way. (If I invite you over to dinner, you don't thereby incur an enforceable obligation to invite me to dinner.) 2. In general, acting to pursue projects of your own choosing (for example, projects that benefit you) in ways that as a by-product confer benefits on others, you do not thereby generate in others any sort of enforceable obligation to act in ways that benefit you. 3. The situation is not altered if it is not worthwhile for you to engage in these activities that spread benefits on others as a side effect if one does not gain compensation from those who get side effect benefits. Nozick, p. 95: "One cannot, whatever one's purposes, just act so as to give people benefits and then demand ( or seize) payment."