1 LECTURE 1------PHILOSOPHY 13 "Abortion is morally wrong." "Abortion is not morally wrong." --What sort of disagreement is this? When we speak of ethical or moral claims, what are we talking about? This question could prompt an empirical inquiry. A social scientist might observe what ethical and moral claims people make in various circumstances and the degree to which their behavior conforms to the norms they profess. She could try to figure out what causes people to exhibit these verbal behavior and conduct. These are perfectly reasonable questions, but in this class we are not seeking empirical description or explanation. Moral claims belong in the category of evaluations, which are distinct and separate from the category of empirical (factual) claims. Empirical claims, from common sense judgments such as "there is a crow now on the roof" to sophisticated assertions of theoretical science, are confirmed by observation. They rest on the evidence of our senses. Evaluations are different. The category of evaluations includes aesthetic judgments and judgments about what is good and bad, desirable and undesirable, and much else. An empirical claim like "the cat is on the mat" is true just in case the cat is on the mat, but what in the world would make it true or false that abortion is morally OK? Two views about evaluations, morals included: Noncognitivism: Evaluative claims are not genuine assertions, they cannot be true or false, correct or incorrect. Cognitivism: Evaluations are genuine assertions, they can be true or false, correct or incorrect. (Our main course authors, Mill and Locke, go for cognitivism.) (On their face, evaluative claims have the form of assertions. But someone might hold this is systematically misleading. Our ordinary language of moral talk contains the assumption that moral claims are genuine assertions, but this assumption is systematically false. No moral claim can be shown to be true or false. On this view, when people use ordinary moral concepts and make ordinary moral claims, they are massively in error. This “error theory” about moral claims does not fit into either the cognitivist or the noncognitivist category as characterized in the preceding paragraph.) One example of a noncognitivist view about ethics: emotivism. The emotivist holds that ethical judgments don't make assertions but instead express the pro and con attitudes of the speaker. Thus, saying "abortion is wrong" is roughly equivalent to "Boo on abortion!" and "abortion is morally OK" is roughly equivalent to "Yeah for abortion!"--this is according to the emotivist. Another noncognitivist view: prescriptivism: moral evaluations are in the same category as orders and commands. A moral evaluation expresses the speaker’s demand that something be done. So, “you ought to shut the door” might be paraphrased as, “Let it be the case that you shut the door!”. This is close to “Shut the door!”. (Some identify moral claims with universal prescriptions—prescriptions that the speaker wills for everyone in like circumstances. So, “You ought to shut the door” on this account is tantamount to “let it be the case that you shut the door and that everyone else in exactly similar circumstances should do the same!”.)2 Turn to the question, what distinguishes moral/ethical claims from the rest of the broader category of evaluations? Suppose your toe is infected and sensitive and I stand on your foot to gain elevation to get a better view of a passing parade. What does it mean to say it's wrong for me to do this and to continue standing on your toe, which is causing you excruciating pain? Like most questions about ethics, the answers to this are controversial. Some might identify morality with God's commands. The thought might be that God rewards those who obey these commands with huge pay-offs in an afterlife and punishes those who disobey. On this view, there is egoistic reason to be moral—doing what God commands is always in your long-term interest. But if we doubted God’s existence, or doubt that God provides rewards and punishments in an afterlife, should we then think there is no reason to be moral? Also, a question arises as to the status of God’s commands. If God commands X, is what makes X morally right the fact that God commands it, or is it the other way round—God commands X because X is independently morally right? If the former, morality may seem arbitrary, and if the latter, we are back to the question, what is it that makes morally right acts right (required or permissible) and wrong acts wrong. (In course readings, John Locke holds a divine command view and Robert Adams explores it.) The suggestion this course explores is that the basis of morality is a belief that good and harm to particular people (or animals) is good or bad not just from their point of view, but from a more general (impartial) point of view, which every thinking person can understand. Good and harm to particular individuals matter from an impartial point of view, which regards all people's comparable harms as comparably important. (Notice that from this impartial standpoint, it might be the case that some kinds of partiality toward some people is justifiable. Perhaps an impartial norm says parents ought to favor their own children and friends ought to favor their own friends.) A big question arises here: what reasons for choice emerge when we look at our decision problems from an impartial standpoint rather than from the standpoint of our own interests, or the interests of those near and dear to us. Reasons generated from this impartial point of view are general at least in the sense that if it's wrong for me to step on your infected toe in these circumstances, it would be wrong for anyone else to do the same in relevantly similar circumstances. Many hold that if there are such things as moral reasons, they must be general in a more robust sense. If it is wrong for me to step on your toe, causing you pain, the idea goes, there must be some general moral reason or principle that makes it wrong, for example, It’s always wrong to cause gratuitous pain to others. What sorts of things are moral reasons? What if I am just not motivated by the thought that my standing on your toe is causing you pain, or the thought that I am violating your rights, or the like? If I say, "I don't care," we may want to reply, "Nevertheless, you should care"--but