I ImplicatureConversational ImplicatureSome Types of InferencesDistinctionsSome of Grice’s ExamplesGrice's SystemSome web destinations about GriceScalar ImplicatureThe PhenomenonThe challenge for Gricean pragmaticsQuantity implicatures and their derivationThe Symmetry Problem24.954 Pragmatics in Linguistic TheoryLecture Notes∗Kai von FintelMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyFall 2002∗These notes were developed by Irene Heim and myself over the last few years. Becausethis version of the notes has not been seen by my co-a uth or, I alone am responsible for anydefects.Language in ContextPragmatics is concerned with many aspects of how people use language, toomany for us to look at in this course. We will concentrate on some of theways language use in context interacts with the structure of language and thuson some of the ways that language use in context impacts on the concerns oftheoretical linguistics.The Pragmatic WastebasketVagaries of language use and of language processing are often use d to explainaway recalcitrant data, in essence they serve as the “friction” of linguistics, orto put it less politely as a “wastebasket” (Bar-Hillel 1971). But such maneuversare of course dubious. One might as well blame data one can’t explain on theinfluence of the stars. Using a pragmatic theory as an explanatory tool onlyworks as long as one actually has such a theory. We’ll try to develop the basicsof one.Here are some of the phenomena we’ll be dealing with.Contextual Inferences, ImplicaturesTogether with assumptions in the context, people make inferences that a se-manticist will want to be distinguished from the “hard-wired” content of thesentences that are uttered. This becomes especially hard when the assumptionsthat drive the inferences are natural and common ones.Context-DependencyThere are many expressions that have context-dependent meanings. An obviousexample are free pronouns whose reference can only be determined in a “live”context.24.954.tex; September 13, 2002; 12:14pm; p.2Page 3 24.954 Lecture NotesContext Appropriateness, PresuppositionMany expressions require the context to be a certain way. They are only felic-itous/appropriate/usable in certain contexts. An obvious example comes fromcontext-dependent expressions which require the context to supply (some partof) their meaning.Another example are expressions that carry presuppositions, which again can bethought of as requirements imposed on the context. There arises an interestinghypothesis: that the main or only source of presuppositions is anaphoricity orcontext-dependency (see van der Sandt & Geurts 1991; van der Sandt 1992;Geurts 1995, 1999; Peter 2001).Context ChangeOnce language is used, the context (which in a certain sense is just everythingthat is the case) is thereby changed. Since language depends or interacts withcontext in many ways (see above), one bit of language changes the environmentfor the next. This creates all kinds of intricate feedback situations, some ofwhich are explored in Dynamic Semantics.ConclusionAll of these interactions are intertwined with each other, so unravelling what’sgoing on is not going to be easy. But fun.24.954.tex; September 13, 2002; 12:14pm; p.3Part IImplicature24.954.tex; September 13, 2002; 12:14pm; p.4Chapter 1Conversational Implicature1.1 Some Types of Inferences“Semantically valid” inferences based solely on the assumed truth of the sentencetogether with facts about semantic values and about principles of logic. Theseare the only inferences that our semantic theory needs to directly account for allby itself. The methodological problem is to distinguish these s em antic inferencesfrom the other kinds of inferences.(1) John had dinner with some MIT students last night.⇒ John had dinner with some students last night.Inferences from the assumed truth of the sentence together with other facts andassumptions. Particular assumptions:(2) John had dinner with some MIT students last night.⇒ John has come home early from his field trip into the rainforest.1General assumptions:(3) John had dinner with some MIT students last night.⇒ John didn’t have dinner with all the MIT students last night.Inferences from the fact that the speaker asserted the sentence s/he assertedand not some other sentence.(4) John had dinner with some MIT students last night.⇒ The speaker thinks this is interesting/relevant.⇒ The speaker thinks I don’t know this.etc.1We leave it to you to guess which assumptions this hearer is using in this inference.24.954.tex; September 13, 2002; 12:14pm; p.5Page 6 24.954 Lecture Notes1.2 DistinctionsThere is quite a bit of taxonomic exub e rance in the literature.Within the inferences that go beyond the truth-conditional entailments of asentence, scholars have been careful to carve out a set that is characterized bythe speaker bearing responsibility for the hearer drawing the inference. Theseare roughly the ones where the speaker knows that the hearer can draw oncertain additional assumptions and where the speaker knows that the hearerknows that the speaker knows about that, and so on. In short, the assumptionsdriving these inferences are mutually obvious, are common knowledge. Onlythese inferences, it is felt, deserve to be taken to be part of the full meaningof the sentence uttered in the context it was uttered in (utterance meaning,speaker meaning, what is meant by the sentence).2Of course, the hearers maymake further inferences, based on their own private information state, but thosethe speaker bears no responsibility for and they are not felt to be part of themeaning of the utterance. The inferences that are blessed by mutuality and arenot truth-conditional entailments are called implicatures.WHAT IS MEANT – WHAT IS SAID = WHAT IS IMPLICATED“An implicature is a proposition that is implied by the utterance of a sentencein a context even though that proposition is not a part of nor an entailment ofwhat was actually said.” (Gazdar 1979, p. 38).Within implicatures, there are inferences that seem somehow to be part of thespecifically encoded linguistic meaning of the se ntence but are still somewhatseparate from truth-conditions. Grice discusses two pertinent examples in hislecture (“He hasn’t been to prison yet”, “He is an Englishman, therefore brave”).These elements of meaning are called conventional implicatures, and we have lit-tle to say about them (although they may be related to presuppositions, whichwe