24.200: Ancient Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger October 27, 2004 Aristotle's Categories and Early Thoughts on Substance 1. Introduction to Aristotle Aristotle's works span a huge range of subjects. He wrote on astronomy, biology, physics, and logic, as well as on the soul, ethics, politics, and aesthetics. In short, he covered the whole works. In his biology he catalogued 600 species of animals, 60 species of insects, and 120 species of fish. There are two broad tendencies which are important to note about Aristotle's general methods of theorizing. First, like Plato, he was enamored of geometry and the systematicity of thought that one could achieve through seeking axioms, or first principles. Second, unlike Plato, Aristotle was very interested in observation. As is obvious from his biological catalogues and histories, he took seriously the project of coming to understand the world by observing it. He also felt it was important to take into account the views of others who had previously attempted to explain the phenomena in question. Thus he often begins a work by examining both common sense views on the subject, and the views of other theorizers. His attention to the variety and detail of phenomena, and to the disagreements of other theorizers on any given subject matter, resulted in someone who is concerned with fine distinctions and subtle nuances. More often than not, he is concerned to show that things are more complex than they might initially seem. Combining these two tendencies we find in Aristotle's work a commitment to the idea that the world, although highly complex, is intelligible; systematic knowledge of the world is possible. We then are led to ask how it is possible, what methods could lead us beyond catalogues of insects and fish to systematic understanding? What are the underlying principles and causes which explain the broad array of phenomena? We found in Plato an attempt to give a very very general answer to this kind of question. In order to explain why the chalk is white, or why Simmias is taller than Cebes, we bring in Forms. The chalk is white in virtue of participating in the Form White; Simmias is taller by virtue of participating in the Form Large. Aristotle is dissatisfied with this kind of explanation. First, we can't adequately explain why Socrates is a human being by talking of Socrates "participating" in the Form of Human Being (consider our discussion of the "Third Man"). Socrates doesn't merely "participate" in the Form of Human Being, Socrates is essentially a human being. In short, Aristotle is dissatisfied with Plato's talk of "participation". Second, Aristotle complains that if Forms are in a separate realm, then it's hard to see how they can be the kind of thing we look for in searching for causes. Causes function in this world; we rely upon them to explain change. The factors which explain this world ought to be part of this world. 2. Aristotle's Categories Aristotle's Categories is naturally viewed as part of his logical writings. In it he distinguishes various kinds of claims we make, and various relations we assert in making those claims. This leads him to a list of broad classification of things; it is plausible to take this set of categories to be the broadest classification of all the things that there are in terms of their highest genera. I.e., Aristotle is proposing that ultimately there are 10 fundamentally different kinds of things. This is his list, with some examples:substance: Socrates, human being, animal when: tomorrow, in October quality: pale, square, grammatical position: is lying, is sitting quantity: 6 ft. tall, 12 inches long having: has shoes on relation: half, larger doing: cutting, hitting where: in the marketplace being affected: being cut, being hit Overlaying this classification of things, there is a further fourfold distinction which relies on a distinction between two kinds of predication: being said of, and being present in. Animal is "said of" Socrates (think of this in terms of essential predication -- Socrates could not cease to be an animal and continue to exist); Pale is "present in" Socrates (think of this in terms of accidental predication -- Socrates could cease to be pale and continue to exist). This is the fourfold classification which further divides the items in the 10 categories: a) what is both said of and present in things (non-substance species and genera) b) what is said of but not present in things (species and genera of substance) c) what is present in but not said of things (non-substance individuals) d) what is neither present in nor said of things. (individual substances) In addition to classifying the things that exist, Aristotle is concerned to ask whether there are some sorts of things which should have a privileged status in our theorizing. Are there some sorts of things which are more significant than others, e.g., some sorts of things which are ontologically or epistemologically basic? We can rephrase this question more simply by dividing it into two issues: Are there some sorts of things on which the existence of everything else depends, i.e., things such that if they failed to exist, nothing else would exist? Are there some sorts of things which are required for systematic understanding of the world, i.e., things such that if they failed to exist we couldn't have such knowledge? In the Categories, Aristotle claims that substantial individuals such as Socrates are such privileged items; they are the primary substances. We will find that Aristotle revises this choice by the time he writes the Metaphysics. However, Aristotle's view in the Categories that primary substances are ordinary concrete individuals depended on his acceptance of what we called the subject criterion. I.e., primary substances are the primary logical subjects, i.e., they are that in which properties (qualities, quantities, etc.) inhere, and which are themselves the members of kinds (species). "A substance --that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all-- is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject." (Cat. 2a11, see also 2a34-2b7) Primary substances are also the subjects of change: "It seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries [i.e., contrary properties]." (Cat. 4a10) (E.g., a single individual may become hot, having been cold, or may change from