Page 1Page 2Page 3Page 4Page 5Page 6Page 7Page 8Page 9Page 10Page 11Page 12Page 13Page 14Page 15Page 16Page 17Page 18Page 19Page 20Page 21Page 22Page 23Page 24Page 25CHAPTER FIVECommittees and Policy Making inCritical ErasCOMMITTEES ARE more than just a part of the pol-icy process in the U.S. House of Representatives. Since WorldWar II they have effectively made policy, according to suchseminal works as those of Charles 0. Jones (on the Agriculture Com-mittee), Richard Fenno (Appropriations), John Manley (Ways andMeans), and Nelson Polsby and Joseph Cooper (the seniority system).In general the historical picture these authors paint shows why com-mittees' structure, norms, and rules encouraged policy incremen-talism.' House committees were hierarchical; Ways and Means, Rules,and Appropriations were exclusive and powerful. Membership onthese committees was earned: members first had to serve on less im-portant committees, where their performance could be evaluated bythe leadership, before being appointed to one of the major ones.'Turnover on the major committees was relatively slow, which served toinculcate new members with existing norms and rules.' Add to thisportrait the selection of committee assignments by members seekinginfluence in areas relevant to their policy interests, and one recognizesthat preferences and institutional structure combined to yield com-mittees that were, in William Riker's term, sets of preferences.'Although the 1974 congressional reforms changed some aspects ofthe committee system, the basic point still holds today—committeestructure, norms, and rules promote policy incrementalism. To besure, we may now speak more commonly of a "subcommittee govern-ment" that has brought more participants into the process; and therehave been alterations in the referral process and other parts of thesystem. But despite these changes, Steven Smith and ChristopherDeering conclude that the fragmentation of the pre-reform commit-tee system is compatible with members' goals of reelection and per-sonal power. "Jurisdictional fragmentation certainly helps. Membersrepresenting similar constituencies can join together to determine116 Committees and Policy Making in Critical ErasCommittees and Policy Making inCritical Eras 117policy affecting those constituencies with minimal interference fromdisinterested members; . . . members with particular policy interestsare given an opportunity to focus on and have a major influence overpolicy decisions in those areas." 5 Thus it is fair to say the post-reformHouse maintains the essence of the pre-reform arrangements, andthough in the discussion that follows, I focus on committee studies inthe pre-1974 period, I shall stick to the present tense.This is not to say that different committees all use similar decisionstrategies except insofar as the strategy in every case favors incremen-tal policy choices. Fenno's comparative study of congressional commit-tees shows how the system works.6 He classifies committees by thegoals of their members and by their major constituencies—factorsthat together yield problems unique to each committee. The goal ofthe members of the Appropriations Committee, for example, is influ-ence, and their primary constituency is the House itself, whose mem-bers desire funding for the various programs of interest to them.Since the Appropriations Committee's way to attain influence is tocut the President's budget requests, thus diminishing funding theHouse members desire, a strategic dilemma ensues. This dilemma hasbeen resolved by the development of a committee bill strategy. TheAppropriations Committee is made up of liberals and conservatives,Soutlernersand Noltlie- friers, Democrats and Republicans. Fiscal dif-ferences are expected to be compromised and ironed out first in sub-committee and then by the full committee. The final bill or bills arethen supported by the entire committee on the floor. Fenno refers tothis as an integrative strategy, and the mode is clearly consensual.' Re-porting out a bill supported by all of the committee's disparate fac-tions leaves the whole House with little alternative but to support it,especially since bills are normally reported with a special rule pro-hibiting amendments. 'On specific items the President's budget requestis reduced, ttiiii-ensuring the committee's influence. As Fenno hasshown, however, if one takes an over-time series of appropriationbills, the amount appropriated tends to rise, thus satisfying the Housemembers' desire to fund programs. Moreover, the rate of increase isrelatively stable. In sum, the over-time decisions are incremental, withfunding roughly following the pattern$xt; t2 = $xt. + .05; t3 = $2c,2 + .05; etc.The Interior Committee, by contrast, is characterized by memberswhose principal goal is reelection and a constituency composed ofWestern mining, timber, and ranching interests.8 The committee's di-lemma is how to support the differing, sometimes conflicting, inter-ests of its members' constituencies. It has resolved the problem byadopting a logrolling strategy and a policy of multiple use. That is, thecommittee reports out a bill that satisfies the members' goal of reelec-tion by allowing the different constituent interests to use federal landsfor different purposes. A representative from east Texas gets timber-cutting rights for his constituents, a member from Colorado gets graz-ing rights at reduced prices for his constituents, and a representativefrom Montana gets mining rights. Each supports the others' policyproposals, and the result is universal pork-barrel legislation.Ways and Means Committee members also have influence as theirgoal, but their constituency differs from the Appropriations Commit-tee's; the constituency of Ways and Means is led by the President andby business interests seeking tax breaks." In addition, unlike Appro-priations, Ways and Means is not required to report out a timely yearlybill. The strategic result is that the committee is more partisan thanAppropriations; the usual policy result is the granting of special taxbreaks.° Neither the President nor the committee members want tocampaign for office on a record of increasing taxes, and business andindustrial interests usually present to the committee tightly reasonedpackages showing how tax breaks will hey them without diminishingoverall revenues. Manley shows how, during a 1960's session, the com-mittee heard testimony favoring a tax-cutting package proposed byLyndon