4 Theoretical Implications for MarriageThe general theory of marriage based on price theory that waspresented in Chapter 3 can be applied to the study of a variety ofaspects of marriage. This chapter develops some hypotheses regardingincidence of marriage and divorce, consensual unions, distribution ofpower in the house hold, and incidence of dowry and bride wealth. Italso summarizes other hypotheses regarding divorce, intermarriageand polygamy that are developed elsewhere in the book. This chapter starts by summarizing the theoretical frameworkfound in the previous chapter. The theory is then extended in waysamenable to the study of various aspects of marriage. Thecompensation for spousal labor, the quasi-wage w*, is decomposedinto components capturing various aspects of marriage. In thediscussion found at the end of this chapter one can find a partialcomparison between this theory of marriage and two alternativetheories widely used by social scientists who engage in the study ofmarriage: resource theory and sociobiological theory.This market theory of marriage is an expansion of laboreconomics. It views wives and husbands as performing a variety oflabor-services for each other in the framework of marriage or sexualcohabitation (we temporarilyignore formal and ceremonial distinctions). The term spousal labor isused to include any task people perform for the benefit of a spouse or partner Adapted from "A Market Theory of Marriage and Spouse Selection," a paper presented (inabsentia) at the Meetings of the Population Association of America, Washington, DC, March 1981. I wouldlike to thank Deborah Blackwell, Nancy Chodorow, Kingsley Davis, David Heer, Adam Kuper, andYohanan Peres for their comments; and the National Science Foundation for their financial support (#BNS76 22943 to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences).and beyond their own needs. Examples of such tasks include child-bearing, child-rearing, household chores, or spouse counseling.The exact composition of spousal labor varies from marriageto marriage and from culture to culture. Parenting services are animportant component, but they are by no means essential tomarriage.1 People with no intention to bear children marry in manysocieties. Some spousal labor is performed exclusively by women(childbearing, for example), and in most societies many other servicesare performed principally by women. Most people are ready to perform spousal labor. The amountof time they are willing to devote to such activity depends on thehourly compensation involved. The relationship between readiness towork as a spouse and compensation level for such work can bedepicted as a supply of spousal labor. A supply of spousal labordepicted in panel a of Figure 3.4 indicates how individual i is willing tosupply more hours of spousal labor at a higher compensation level w*.Most people are interested in obtaining spousal labor. Forinstance, a man's demand curve indicates how much female spousallabor he wants to obtain at different levels of compensation. Mostwomen are also interested in obtaining spousal labor from men. Awoman's demand curve indicates how much male spousal labor shewants to obtain at different levels of compensation. Generally, thecheaper a service, the more its users will rely on it, and thereforedemands for spousal labor are downward-sloping.Men and women involved or interested in marriage areinterrelated via markets for spousal labor. Markets for spousal labor(or marriage markets) are obtained when aggregate demand for spousallabor and supply of spousal labor are juxtaposed. In the marriagemarket for women, the demand for spousal labor is by men and thesupply of spousal labor by women, while in the marriage market formen the demand for spousal labor is by women and the supply ofspousal labor is by men.A market equilibrium is obtained at the intersection of demandand supply. In the markets for men's and women's spousal labordepicted in panels a and b of Figure 3.4, the equilibrium w*m and w*fstand respectively for the average compensation that men are willingto offer women and that women are willing to offer men in order toTheoretical Implications for Marriage 3have a spouse work for them.2 Marriage tends to occur betweenindividual men and women who satisfy each other's demand forspousal labor at the equilibrium w* levels. A net transfer occurs if thevalue of one spouse's labor, as valued in the relevant marriage market,exceeds the value of the other spouse's labor. As women typicallyengage in more spousal labor than men, such net transfer is typically"paid" by the husband to the wife. This transfer is termed thecompensation for women's spousal labor or women's spousal income.3The word "paid" has to be interpreted in a general way, forunlike compensations for other types of labor, the compensation forwomen's spousal labor is mainly non-monetary. In most societies, thiscompensation can be decomposed into the following elements: amaterial component consisting of goods and services consumed by thewife (including food and shelter), and a non-material componentconsisting e.g. of household services performed by the husband for thewife's benefit, expected stability of the relationship, or relative powerof the wife in the home. Market forces establish an equilibrium value of quasi-wage w*,but do not specify the form compensations for spousal labor maytake. Cultures vary widely in the rules, guidelines, and customs bywhich they regulate total compensation for spousal labor and itscomponents. In societies where marriage is basically the onlyhonorable way by which women can make a living, the materialcompensation for spousal labor takes on more relative importancethan in societies where women have other ways to supportthemselves materially. Laws can affect the size and composition ofcompensations for spousal labor, e.g., by determining how a husband'sproperty passes to his wife, by requiring that certain powers be givenor be taken away from women, or by punishing husbands who abusetheir wives.4Certain forms of compensation for spousal labor are foundonly within a particular cultural context, while other forms are foundin many cultures. Trade-offs tend to occur between the differentcomponents. The following aspects of marriage may be componentsof the compensation for spousal labor.Marriage