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Johns Hopkins EN 600 647 - Performance Analysis of the CONFIDANT Protocol

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Performance Analysis of the CONFIDANT Protocol(Cooperation Of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hocNeTworks)Sonja BucheggerIBM Zurich Research LaboratoryS¨aumerstrasse 4CH-8803 R¨uschlikon, [email protected] Le BoudecEPFL-IC-LCAEcublensCH-1015 Lausanne, [email protected] ad-hoc networking works properly only if the par-ticipating nodes cooperate in routing and forwarding. How-ever, it may be advantageous for individual nodes not tocooperate. We propose a protocol, called CONFIDANT,for making misbehavior unattractive; it is based on selec-tive altruism and utilitarianism. It aims at detecting andisolating misbehaving nodes, thus making it unattractive todeny cooperation. Trust relationships and routing decisionsare based on experienced, observed, or reported routing andforwarding behavior of other nodes. The detailed implemen-tation of CONFIDANT in this paper assumes that the net-work layer is based on the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)protocol. We present a performance analysis of DSR forti-fied by CONFIDANT and compare it to regular defenselessDSR. It shows that a network with CONFIDANT and upto 60% of misbehaving nodes behaves almost as well as abenign network, in sharp contrast to a defenseless network.All simulations have been implemented and performed inGloMoSim.Categories and Subject DescriptorsC.2.2 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer-Communication Networks—Network ProtocolsGeneral TermsAlgorithms, Performance, Economics, Reliability, Security,Human FactorsKeywordsrouting, cooperation, reputation, mobile ad-hoc networks,fairness, robustness, trustPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work forpersonal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies arenot made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copiesbear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, torepublish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specificpermission and/or a fee.MOBIHOC’02, June 9-11, 2002, EPFL Lausanne, Switzerland.Copyright 2002 ACM 1-58113-501-7/02/0006 ...$5.00.1. INTRODUCTIONThe CONFIDANT protocol works as an extension to areactive source-routing protocol for mobile ad-hoc networks.For the simulation implementation, we have chosen DynamicSource Routing (DSR) as the base protocol. In the followingsubsections we briefly describe what we need to know aboutDSR, describe the attacks we support, and specify how wewant to thwart them.1.1 Background: the DSR ProtocolDynamic Source Routing is a protocol developed for rout-ing in mobile ad-hoc networks and was proposed for MANETby Broch, Johnson, and Maltz [8]. In a nutshell, it worksas follows: Nodes send out a ROUTE REQUEST message,all nodes that receive this message put themselves into thesource route and forward it to their neighbors, unless theyhave received the same request before. If a receiving node isthe destination, or has a route to the destination, it does notforward the request, but sends a REPLY message contain-ing the full source route. It may send that reply along thesource route in reverse order or issue a ROUTE REQUESTincluding the route to get back to the source, if the formeris not possible due to asymmetric links. ROUTE REPLYmessages can be triggered by ROUTE REQUEST messagesor are gratuitous. After receiving one or several routes, thesource selects the best (by default the shortest), stores it,and sends messages along that path. The better the routemetrics (number of hops, delay, bandwidth, or other criteria)and the sooner the REPLY arrives at the source, the higherthe preference given to the route and the longer it will stayin the cache. When a ROUTE REPLY arrives very quicklyafter a ROUTE REQUEST has been sent out this is an in-dication of a short path, since the nodes are required to waitfor a time corresponding to the length of the route they canadvertise, before sending it. This is done in order to avoida storm of replies. In case of a link failure, the node thatcannot forward the packet to the next node sends an errormessage towards the source. Routes that contain a failedlink can be ‘salvaged’ by taking an alternate partial routethat does not contain the bad link.1.2 Attacks against routingThe lack of infrastructure and organizational environmentof mobile ad-hoc networks offer special opportunities to at-tackers. Without proper security it is possible to gain vari-226ous advantages by malicious behavior, such as• better service than cooperating nodes,• monetary benefits by exploiting incentive measures ortrading confidential information,• saving power by selfish behavior,• preventing someone else from obtaining proper service,• extracting data to get confidential information, and soon.Several routing and forwarding attacks on DSR have beendescribed in [3]. We aim at protection against the followingtypes of misbehavior.• No forwarding (of control messages or data).• Traffic deviation: unusual traffic attraction (adver-tises many excellent routes or advertises routes veryrapidly, so they are deemed good routes) or the oppo-site (claims to have only bad routes).• Route salvaging, i.e., rerouting to avoid a broken link,although no error has been observed.• Lack of error messages, although an error has beenobserved, or vice versa.• Unusually frequent route updates.• Silent route change (tampering with the message headerof either control or data packets).1.3 Thwarting AttacksA method for thwarting attacks is prevention. Accordingto Schneier [14], a prevention-only strategy only works if theprevention mechanisms are perfect; otherwise, someone willfind out how to get around them. Most of the attacks andvulnerabilities have been the result of bypassing preventionmechanisms. Given this reality, detection and response areessential (see also Section 2 for a discussion on strong pre-vention mechanisms such as [4]).In this paper, we propose a method based on detectionof misbehavior, followed by a reaction. We would like toachieve that only good behavior pay off in terms of serviceand reasonable power consumption.Thus, in our scheme detection has to trigger a response,i.e., a reaction of other nodes that results in a disadvantagefor the malicious node.We propose that packets of malicious nodes should, upondetection of the node’s malice, not be forwarded by normallybehaving nodes. If, however, a node was wrongly accusedof being


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Johns Hopkins EN 600 647 - Performance Analysis of the CONFIDANT Protocol

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