9/12/11%1%Geog%2412:%Wed%Sept%13,%2009%Ins7tu7ons%and%Tragedy%of%the%Commons%Announcement%%Conserva)on*&*Indigenous*Peoples*in*Tanzania*–*Global*Seminar*Study*Abroad*Program***Earn%3%upperDlevel%credits%in%a%3Dweek%summer%traveling%Global%Seminar.%Learn%more%details%at%the%following%info%sessions:%%%%Wednesday,%Sept%14,%5D6%PM,%Hale%450%%%%%Wednesday,%Oct.%12,%5D6pm,%UMC%382D386%%%For%ques7ons%feel%free%to%contact:%• EDmail:%[email protected]%• Phone:%(303)%938D0731%%cell%(720)%291D9301%%1. Ins7tu7ons%– Important%defini7ons%&%ques7ons%– Individual%vs%group%behavior%%2. Tragedy%of%the%Commons%Theory%(TOC)%– Assump7ons,%proposed%solu7ons%– Cri7que%of%TOC%– Different%kinds%of%‘commons’%%3. How%ins7tu7ons%can%work%– Common%property%theory%Key%words:%prisoners%dilemma,%Garret%Hardin,%common%Property,%collec7ve%ac7on,%open%access%An%Ins7tu7ons%Perspec7ve%9/12/11%2%Ins7tu7ons%• The%rules%and%norms%governing%our%interac7ons%with%nature%and%resources%• Ins7tu7onal%ways%of%thinking%about%the%Environment?%– TOC%as%s7ll%linked%to%Popula7on%and%Markets%• Carrying%Capacity,%private%property,%freeDriders%%– Using%Ins7tu7ons%for%sustainable%management%• Examples%of%common%property%management%Ins7tu7ons%&%Behavior%• How,%if%at%all,%can%rules%and%norms%of%behavior%be%fashioned%to%encourage%shared%costs%and%collec7ve%benefits?%%• At%what%scale%is%coopera7on%possible?%– Community?%Global?%• Assump7on%that%behavior%is%oeen%ruled%by%personal,%private%rewards%– Prisoner’s%Dilemma%– Game%Theory%– TOC%Tragedy%of%the%Commons%(TOC)%• Garref%Hardin%1968%• Popula7on%growth%%D%advantages%to%the%family%are%personal%and%immediate,%the%environmental%costs%are%diffuse%and%global.%%• Individual%behavior%will%destroy%the%global%commons%(all%ac7ng%for%personal%gain,%and%no%one%coopera7ng%for%the%good%of%all).%9/12/11%3%• Resources held in common (rivers, fisheries, oceans, air, parks, forests) are subject to massive degradation (free, unregulated). • Each individual will seek to maximize his/her gain (eg. more sheep), while the costs will be shared by all (degradation) • Solution: all resources (land, forests) should be under private or state ownership/management Tragedy of the Commons (TOC) Tragedy of the commons The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. .... As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks ‘What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?’ .... The rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another . . . but this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing the commons. Therein lies the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit -- in a world that is limited . . .. Freedom in a commons brings ruin for all.” (Hardin 1968, 1244) Assumptions!• People act as ‘rational economic ‘men’ (i.e. individual rationality) • Property rights are the only institutional force affecting resource use • Commonly held resources are not managed but are open access resources • Private property and state ownership are the only legitimate sources of management9/12/11%4%TOC: Why is it appealing? • If we start from the premise that nobody wants to damage or lower the productive potential of environment and that people are rational -- the Hardin model provides an explanation for why it occurs. • It’s elegant simplicity and intuitive logic. • Its explanatory power to explain over-use of common pool resources – atmosphere, oceans, rivers …etc… BUT…. What are the commons? • Forests (deforestation) • Rangelands (degradation, desertification) • Wildlife (over-hunting, extinction) • Water – rivers, oceans, ground water (pollution, depletion) • Air (pollution) Are all commons equal? • Community Forests: not open access, common property. • Community Rangelands: not open access, common property • Fisheries: often managed as common pool resources • Air, Water?9/12/11%5%Critiques 1. Questioning the assumptions of the model – Assumes superiority of private property - modern, and not universal – Assumes Common property = open access – Assumes that individual, economic, rational decision making always prevails – No room for collaboration or even discussion 2. Questioning the prescribed solutions - private or state property ownership 1. Community norms, responsibilities and shared values can override individual freedom/profit seeking 2. Rights to a resource may be linked to other rights. – control over water points in pastoral systems – rules/norms of extraction technology – control over access to marketing outlets within fishing and forest product communities – effort/benefit ratio may decline and reduce extraction prior to permanent resource decline. 3. Series of regulations, social norms, sanctions regulating resource use Critiquing the assumptions Land Tenure: Type of property institution related to the enforceable claims to the stream of benefits from the land Western (European) views of land tenure which allow for an individual to have full exclusive rights to all products of land, to buy and sell. Historically unique and revolutionary9/12/11%6%There are many different categories of ownership • Open-Access – absence of well-defined property rights (free, unregulated access to all) • Private Property – Rights to exclude others from resource and regulate use – Recognized and enforced by the state to be effective • Common Property – Resource managed by a recognizable community which regulated rights of access – e.g. fisheries, rangelands, forests. • Sate Property – Rights to resource vested exclusively with the state – Limited enforcement can lead to an ‘open access’ like situation