Article Contentsp. [489]p. 490Issue Table of ContentsPolity, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Spring, 1993), pp. 329-495Front MatterThinking about Reform: The World View of Congressional Reformers [pp. 329 - 354]David Hume on the Philosophic Underpinnings of Interest Group Politics [pp. 355 - 374]The 1989 Basic Program of the German Social Democratic Party [pp. 375 - 399]Political Amateurism, Legislative Inexperience, & Incumbency Behavior: Southern Republican Senators, 1980-1986 [pp. 401 - 420]Private Conscience & Public Order: Hobbes & "The Federalist" [pp. 421 - 443]Beyond Instrumental Politics: The New Institutionalism, Legal Rhetoric, & Judicial Supremacy [pp. 445 - 459]CommentaryThe 1992 Elections & the Future of American Politics [pp. 461 - 474]Research NoteDivided We Govern? A Reassessment [pp. 475 - 484]Reply: Let's Stick with the Longer List [pp. 485 - 488]Response: Let's Stick with the Larger Question [pp. 489 - 490]CorrespondenceA Response to Mark P. Petracca's Article "Predisposed to Oppose: Political Scientists & Term Limitations" [pp. 491 - 493]Reply from Mark P. Petracca [pp. 493 - 495]Back MatterResponse: Let's Stick with the Larger QuestionAuthor(s): Sean Q. KellySource: Polity, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Spring, 1993), pp. 489-490Published by: Palgrave Macmillan JournalsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3234977Accessed: 24/08/2009 14:03Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. 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For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected] Macmillan Journals is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Polity.http://www.jstor.orgResearch Note 489 Response: Let's Stick With the Larger Question* Sean Q Kelly, East Carolina University David Mayhew's book Divided We Govern constitutes an important con- tribution to the study of policymaking in American national politics and will influence a generation of scholars. It represents an important chal- lenge to the conventional wisdom in political science, which holds that divided government results in fewer pieces of innovative legislation. Mayhew's response to my critique centers on a methodological issue: how best to generate a laundry list of innovative legislation. My chal- lenge to Mayhew is not primarily methodological, but theoretical and substantive in nature. The larger question revolves around what consti- tutes an innovative policy. Answering this question will dictate, a priori, how one's data are used. Mayhew's work fails to discuss in any signifi- cant detail what constitutes important policy. On the other hand, I have argued that innovative policy is both timely and enduring. To be con- sidered innovative, legislation must meet a need within the contemporary political context and should also have enduring consequences in a policy area. This definition provides us with a more rigorous method by which to distinguish innovative policy from legislation that is not particularly innovative. Professor Mayhew has two criticisms of my approach. First, he argues that retrospective judgments are not yet available for many policies for- mulated after 1982, and thus the relevant period for analysis is 1947 through 1982. He points out that when this period is examined the "divided-control variable does not perform spectacularly."2 On the con- trary, the analysis reported in footnote 27 indicates that, using the more conservative approach, periods of divided government result in less inno- *I would like to thank Larry Dodd, Vince McGuire, Sheen Rajmaira, Maury Simon, and Bob Thompson for their helpful comments. 1. He devotes only one sentence to his discussion of what constitutes important policy: "in principle, the term 'important' will connote both innovative and consequential-or if viewed from the time of passage, thought likely to be consequential." Mayhew, Divided We Govern, p. 37. See also, Nelson W. Polsby, Political Innovation in America: The Poli- tics of Policy Initiation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 7. 2. David R. Mayhew, "Let's Stick With the Longer List," Polity (Spring 1993): 486. Polity Volume XXV, Number 3 Spring 1993 Volume XXV, Number 3 Spring 1993 Polity490 Research Note vative policy.3 This is precisely the opposite of what Mayhew's results suggest. Mayhew also contends that it is necessary to include both contem- porary and retrospective judgments in the list of innovative policies to avoid possible bias. He suggests that contemporary sources may be biased upwards during periods of united government. By using the retro- spective sources to confirm the importance of legislation across time, as I have done, possible upward bias is "weeded out" of the data. If the media in fact over-reported on legislation during periods of united gov- ernment, as he suggests, my approach offers an opportunity to prune such bias from the data. Mayhew further argues that contemporary reports may suffer from downward bias during periods of divided government, as the media focuses on the "bloody confrontations" between Congress and the Pres- ident rather than the "substantial enactments that ... made it onto the books."4 A statute may have effects that are important in retrospect, but did not address an important contemporary policy problem. That is, legislation may have unintended consequences that result in post hoc assessments of the legislation as innovative. Policy innovation, however, hinges on both the promise and the performance of the legislation. By introducing