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Rahul Jain NetCon GroupA Brief History of Network Economics and GamesRahul JainNetwork Optimization & Control (NetCon) GroupMing Hsieh Department of Electrical EngineeringViterbi School of Engineering1Monday, February 22, 2010Rahul Jain NetCon GroupNetCon Group: Research Thrusts1. Network Economics & Game Theory★Network Market Design★Non-cooperative Multi-user Communication Theory★Queueing Game Models2. Stochastic Models in Networks: Control & Optimization★Markov Decision Processes★Multi-Armed Bandits★Stochastic Game Processes2Monday, February 22, 2010Rahul Jain NetCon GroupThe Internet is evolving but to what...?★A very large-scale complex network with distributed control among multitude of agents★The system has become difficult to manage★Distributed control has made it difficult provide Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees & ensure security★Energy consumption has increased rapidly★Wireless & Mobility introduce new problems★Internet is a commercial entity!3Monday, February 22, 2010Rahul Jain NetCon GroupThe Internet: A Personal Perspective★Capacity: Increasing wireless capacity through Multi-user cooperation★Manageability: Market-based Distributed Control of Networks★Reliability: Engineering Incentives for Quality of Service (QoS) provisioning & enhancing Security into Network Architectures★Economics: Markets for Network resources, bandwidth, spectrum, storage & computation4ECON LayerInternet as an economically-viable eco-systemNetwork Market Design Theory*SERV LayerNetwork Architectures for QoS-provisioning & SecurityIncentivized Network Architecture Designs*NET LayerDistributed Control of Large-Scale Networks Network Utility Maximization Theory+PHY LayerIncrease Capacity through Multi-user schemesNon-cooperative Multi-User Comm. Theory*Monday, February 22, 2010Rahul Jain NetCon GroupNetwork Management Through Shadow PricingInternet Congestion ControlResource Allocation at (Fine-grained) User-level:Pricing signals can be used to decompose Flow Optimization problem [Kelly’97]Primal-Dual decomposition: Users solve Primal problem, Network solves Dual problemFundamental understanding of TCP [Low’99, Walrand’00, Srikant’04, etc.]5Monday, February 22, 2010Rahul Jain NetCon GroupIncentive-Design in Network Markets★Efficient network utilization requires that resources be trade-able★Markets for bandwidth, network storage and computation have existed, spectrum is expected to be trade-able★Right market design is crucial★Example: Electricity markets★Network resources have non-standard attributes, e.g., combinatorial bundles of bandwidth★Prior work: Combinatorial Market Design [JaVa08], Network market designs [JaWa09]★New challenges: Dynamic markets for trading, Spectrum as a non-exclusive use good6BostonNYDCChicagoAustinSeattleSFEarthlink: v2(b,R)Prodigy: v3(b,R)AOL: v1(b,R)Sprint (2 Gbps, c3(b,i,j))MCI (2 Gbps, c2(b,i,j))AT&T (3 Gbps, c1(b,i,j))Monday, February 22, 2010Rahul Jain NetCon GroupNon-cooperative Multi-user Communication★Software-defined radios and cognitive radio paradigm★Flexible allocation and usage of spectrum★Comm. schemes for spectrum sharing in Gaussian Interference Channel [EtTsPa07] ★Efficient strategy-proof Contract designs for spectrum sharing [KaJa10a]★Wireless network capacity scaling with cooperative relaying [GuKu00] ★Users will not relay without additional incentives [KaJa10b, in progress]7Nash Eq. in GICGaussian Interference Channel Gaussian Relay NetworkMonday, February 22, 2010Rahul Jain NetCon GroupEconomics of Network QoS & Security★DiffServ technologies for QoS: Widespread deployment but not adoption★Economic impediments★Q. Does competition aid network utility with DiffServ? [JaDu09]: Price of Anarchy of 2/3★Q. What are suitable mechanisms for incentivizing QoS provisioning and alleviating efficiency loss?★Network Security: Moral hazard problem. Need economic solutions along with technological solutions8Monday, February 22, 2010Rahul Jain NetCon GroupEducational DevelopmentNew Courses:★EE 599/651: Network Economics & Games★General Equilibrium Theory, Static & Dynamic Game Theory ★Cooperative Games, Mechanism Design★EE/ISE 556: Stochastic Systems & Finance★Discrete-time stochastic control theory, Optimal Filtering & Estimation★(Continuous-time) Stochastic Calculus, Applications in Finance9Monday, February 22, 2010Rahul Jain NetCon GroupNetCon Group Members★Students:★Dileep Kalathil (Ph.D.)★Harsha Honnappa (Ph.D.)★Wenyuan Tang (MS)★Support:★National Science Foundation★Zumberge Grant 10Monday, February 22,


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