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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULLETIN

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULLETINNews, Background and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare IssuesISSUE NO. 32 JUNE 1996Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms LimitationGuest Article by Graham Pearson 1–6Guest Article by Stephen Black 1, 7–8Progress in The Hague: 14th Quarterly Review 9–15US Senate Action Soon? 15News Chronology: February–May 1996 16–39CWC Ratifications 37Forthcoming Events 38Recent Publications 39–40IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE X OF THE BTWC:AVOIDING DUPLICATIONGraham S PearsonHSP Advisory BoardThe Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC) was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 andentered into force on 26 March 1975 with the United King-dom, the United States and the former Soviet Union as thedepositary governments. The Convention is to eliminatebiological weapons and prohibit their development, produc-tion, stockpiling, acquisition and retention. It has 15 arti-cles. The initial ones address the prohibition. Article Xaddresses the peaceful uses of biology and the minimizingof the impact of the Convention on peaceful activities.It is apparent that whilst the purpose of the Conventionis to eliminate and prohibit biological weapons, the Con-vention was drafted so as to strike a balance between theeffective elimination of biological weapons on the one handand avoiding the hampering of peaceful activities in biol-ogy on the other. There is consequently an undertaking inArticle III to do nothing to aid the proliferation of biologicalweapons:Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to trans-fer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, andnot in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State,group of States or international organizations to manufac-ture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weap-ons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article Iof the ConventionThis is balanced by the undertakings of Article X toavoid hampering and, indeed, to facilitate the peaceful usesof biology:(1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to fa-cilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest pos-sible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific andtechnological information for the use of bacteriological (bi-ological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Partiesto the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperatein contributing individually or together with other States orinternational organisations to the further development andapplication of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteri-ology (biology) for the prevention of disease, or for otherpeaceful purposes.THE UN SPECIAL COMMISSION ANDCBW VERIFICATIONStephen Black*Historian at UNSCOMThe United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM),established as part of the cease-fire following the Gulf warto monitor the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass de-struction and long range ballistic missiles, has seen greatsuccesses in its investigation. Undisclosed weapons pro-grammes have been discovered, chemical and biologicalweapons production sites have been destroyed and renderedharmless, and thousands of proscribed weapons destroyed.But more than five years into its work, the Commission isstill chasing the Iraqi weapons programmes. Even nowafter more than 150 on-site inspections, several hundred U-2 surveillance flights, countless meetings with supportinggovernments and supplier companies, and a host of otherinvestigative efforts, UNSCOM cannot certify that Iraq hascomplied with its obligations with regard to the disar-mament requirements of the cease-fire agreement — Secu-rity Council resolution 687 (1991).Council resolutions make it clear that the burden of re-sponsibility for disclosing and eliminating its chemical andbiological weapons programmes rests on Iraq. This is anunyielding requirement, and one that the Security Counciland Special Commission are always mindful of. For thearms control community, however, the greatest interest liesin the ability of the Commission to uncover information,without direct Iraqi support, and to verify Iraqi statementsand declarations.Continued on page 2Continued on page 7(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner de-signed to avoid hampering the economic or technologicaldevelopment of States Parties to the Convention or interna-tional cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological(biological) activities, including the international exchangeof bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equip-ment for the processing, use or production of bacteriologi-cal (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes inaccordance with the provisions of the Convention.Third Review ConferenceThe BTWC has review conferences at five year intervalsat which the operation of the Convention is reviewed with aview to assuring that the purpose of the preamble and theprovisions of the Convention are being realised. In theseReview Conferences, each article of the Convention is con-sidered in turn and the final document agreed by consensusat the end of the Conference contains language on the stateof realisation of each article.At the Third Review Conference, in September 1991,the conclusions in respect of Article X were that:The Conference emphasise the increasing importance of theprovisions of Article X, especially in the light of recent sci-entific and technological developments ... which havevastly increased the potential for cooperation betweenStates to help promote economic and social development,and scientific and technological progress, particularly in thedeveloping countries, in conformity with their interests,needs and priorities.The Conference, while acknowledging what has alreadybeen done towards this end, notes with concern the increas-ing gap between the developed and the developing coun-tries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering,microbiology and other related areas. The Conferenceurges all States Parties actively to promote international co-operation and exchange with States Parties in the peacefuluses of biotechnology, and urges the developed countriespossessing advanced biotechnology to adopt positive mea-sures to promote technology transfer and international co-operation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, inparticular with the developing countries, for the benefit ofall mankind.The Conference also called upon “the Secretary Generalof the United Nations to propose for inclusion on the agendaof a relevant United


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