Stanford EDGE 297A - The North Korean Nuclear Crisis - Situational Awareness and a Proposed US

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The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Situational Awareness and a Proposed US ResponseThe Nuclear Crisis of 1993The question of a nuclear North Korea has roots dating back to the 1980’s. Initial concerns arose in the mid-1980’s, with intelligence reports proposing the potential for North Korean nuclear ambitions. Reports cite the construction of a nuclear reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium1. The reactor in question, located in Yongbyon, was the focus of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993. The Clinton administration proceeded with diplomatic efforts, forging an agreement by 1994 that effectually ended the crisis. Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to: (1) halt operation and construction of nuclear reactors, (2) freeze reprocessing of spent fuel (from which plutonium can be derived to make nuclear weapons), and (3) allow IAEA inspectors to monitor nuclear facilities. In return, the US agreed to: (1) lead an international consortium in the construction of two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors (LWR), and (2) supply fuel oil until the first reactor is deemed operational2. The Current Crisis in BriefThe current crisis officially began in October 2002, when a visiting US delegation, led by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, confronted North Korean officials with evidence of a nuclear weapons program (using enriched uranium, as opposed to the plutonium used in its first weapons program). Pyongyang admitted to the program’s existence, stating, “We will meet the sword with the sword. 3” The US, South Korea, and 1Japan subsequently halted all shipment of fuel oil to North Korea, in November, on the grounds that the once covert nuclear program was in violation of the Agreed Framework. In December, North Korea announced the reactivation of its nuclear reactors at Yongbyonand followed by kicking IAEA inspectors out of the country4. By January 2003, North Korea had withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.North Korea’s Cause for ConcernThe crisis has been largely framed as a bilateral dispute between the United States and North Korea. North Korea has repeatedly defended their nuclear weapons program, by claiming the need for “nuclear deterrence” is a result of the United State’s “hostile policy.”5 Pyongyang’s cause for concern can be seen upon consideration of the noticeable shift in US policy that took place when the Bush Administration took office.In reaction to the North Korea-Japan controversy in August 1998, when North Korea test-fired a missile over the main island of Japan, President Clinton sent Former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, to Pyongyang to deliver a US disarmament proposal. By September 1999, North Korea had agreed to stop conducting long-range missile tests, and, in turn, President Clinton eased economic sanctions on the country. The situation is used as an example of the Clinton administration’s approach to dealing with North Korea – a willingness to engage in dialogue that was presumably perceived by North Korea as a necessary step towards normalizing relations with the United States.2The Bush Administration sought to make their policy towards North Korea clear, even before taking office, as the foreign policy team “blasted the Clinton Administration for being soft on Pyongyang6” during the presidential campaign. North Korea’s disapproval of the new hard-line approach was made clear soon after the Bush Administration took office, with Pyongyang threatening to reconsider the freeze on long-range missile testing previously mentioned7.In contradiction to Secretary of State, Colon Powell’s assertions that the new Administration would be picking up where Clinton left off in relation to North Korea, President Bush set the new tone for dealing with North Korea, in March 2001, after visiting with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung. In a press conference, President Bush essentially condemned North Korean leader Kim Jong Il as untrustworthy, questioning whether Pyongyang was “keeping all terms of all agreements.8” The President told reporters that he “look[s] forward to, at some point in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any negotiation would require complete verification of the terms of a potential agreement.9”Pyongyang reacted to Bush’s statements by canceling scheduled meetings with South Korean officials, and claiming that the Bush Administration was attempting to disrupt dialogue between North and South Korea10. It was in this instance that North Korea initially described Washington’s policies as “hostile” – the claim that would later be the basis on which the country’s nuclear weapons program would be defended.3US-North Korea tensions steadily mounted during 2002, as the Bush Administration applied pressure on the country through a number of different means. On January 29, 2002, President Bush delivered the State of the Union Speech in which he labeled North Korea as a part of the “axis of evil” alongside Iraq and Iran. Pyongyang reacted to Bush’s remarks, arguing that they were “tantamount to a declaration of war.11” Around the same time, North Korea had more cause for concern after a leaked US document citedthe country as one against whom the United States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons. In addition, compounding US pressure on North Korea, the US Nuclear Posture Review indicated the possible development of new mini-nuclear weapons, with a feasibility study to be conducted over the next two to three years12.The US-led war in Iraq has also encouraged North Korea’s defensive posture. In December 2001, President Bush simultaneously warned Iraq and North Korea that they would be “held accountable” if they developed weapons of mass destruction13. The aggressive US policy towards Iraq, and subsequent invasion of the country, has been usedby Pyongyang as an example of what will not be tolerated by North Korea. In a statement issued by the Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang declared "The Iraqi war teaches a lesson that in order to prevent a war and defend the security of a country and the sovereignty of a nation, it is necessary to have a powerful physical deterrent forceonly.14" North Korean officials look at US policy towards Iraq as grounds on which their need for nuclear deterrence can be justified.4A nuclear North Korea: Implications for the US*John Cole, Durham NC, The


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Stanford EDGE 297A - The North Korean Nuclear Crisis - Situational Awareness and a Proposed US

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