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UCSD PHIL 166 - LOCKE ON PROPERTY

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1 LOCKE ON PROPERTY CHAPTER 5, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT Notes for Philosophy 166 Locke wants to argue that individuals can acquire full property rights over moveable and nonmoveable parts of the earth in a state of nature, absent government. Our natural rights include the right legitimately to acquire property, and any government must respect natural rights including rights to property. Property rights are rights in things. Full ownership of something includes the right to use it as one wishes (so long as one does not thereby harm others in ways that violate their rights), to exclude others from its use, to allow another person to use it on any mutually agreed terms, to waive or renounce one’s rights in the thing, and to transfer this entire package of rights to another person. Against Robert Filmer, who held that God gave the earth to Adam and that Adam passed dominion over the earth to a succession of absolute monarchs down to the Stuart Kings and other kings of other lands, Locke wants to urge that God gave the earth to men in common in such a way that individuals can acquire private ownership of parcels of it. That God gave the earth to men in common means for Locke that initially land is unowned and no one has any more rights to any bit of it than anyone else. What follows from the premise of initial common ownership? Locke proceeds on the assumption that the rules must make sense—God would not have established rules for us that require us to starve in the midst of plenty. So one can use unowned land without getting the permission of all other people. Initially then we have free use—anyone may use any bit of the earth, and no one has any more rights to any bit of the earth greater than anyone else. LABOR-MIXING. One strand of thought in chapter 5 starts with the idea that we acquire private ownership of unowned land by laboring on it or as Locke says mixing our labor with bit. Locke seemws to be reasoning as follows: 1. If one mixes what one owns with something that is unowned, one thereby comes to own the unowned thing. 2. Each person owns her own labor. 3. If one mixes one’s labor with unowned land, one thereby comes to own the land. There may be something to this idea, but as stated it seems vulnerable to objections. Objection: It is not true in general that mixing what one owns with what one does not own expands one’s ownership. Premise 1 looks to be false. Objection: What determines the extent of what one comes to own via labor-mixing? If I labor on a tree in North America, when it is entirely unowned, do I come to own the bark my fingers touch, the tree, the land under the tree, the surrounding land, or all of North America? If you answer, it depends on what we intend, then someone with grand intentions will come to own a huge property with a little labor. LIBERTY. There is another strand in Locke’s thinking here that is implicit if not completely explicit. We start with the general statement of one’s natural rights: A. Each person has the natural right to do whatever she chooses (to live as she chooses) with whatever she legitimately owns so long as she does not harm other people (in ways that violate their rights). Each person also has the corresponding natural right not to be harmed by anyone else (in any way that violates her rights). B. Each person is the full owner of herself. Call B the self-ownership principle. Locke cannot mean that we have full self-ownership, because he does not believe the individual has the right to sell herself into slavery. But we can transfer to2 others part of our self-ownership. We do this, for example, when we agree to marriage contracts or wage-labor contracts. Under free use, and given self-ownership, Locke thinks each person may use the earth in ways that confer ownership of bits of it. For example, one can come to own the acorns and fruit that one gathers from unowned land, and when one begins to hunt a rabbit, one acquires ownership rights to that rabbit (others may not interfere with one’s hunt). We are reasoning here from the premise that God has designed rules for us, the natural laws, in order to best preserve and enhance human life. Locke offers, as a further interpretive gloss that explains the meaning of the “right to do what one chooses so long as one does not violate the rights of others” in A, that at least under conditions of nonscarcity, one who appropriates a particular parcel of unowned land as her private property thereby comes to have ownership rights over it. This means that from now on others are no longer free to use the land as they were before. Are they not then harmed by the private appropriation? No, says Locke. Each is free to appropriate land in just the same way and gain an equivalent benefit. C. Each person has equal opportunity to appropriate land and gain roughly the same benefit from it by the expenditure of comparable laboring efforts. Condition C, equal opportunity to appropriate, obtains when land is nonscarce in the sense that the total amount of claims to appropriate land that anyone might care to make (that satisfy the No-Waste rule) is in the aggregate less than the available land. Locke seems to have something like condition C in mind in paragraph 33, where he states “he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all.” Locke gives the example of taking a drink of water from a steadily flowing river. One’s drink does not prevent anyone else from drinking as much as he likes, for there is plenty of water flowing. In paragraph 36 Locke observes “it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or acquire himself a property to the prejudice of his neighbour, who would still have room for as good, and as large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated.” Locke also stipulates in paragraph 31 that the right to appropriate and use the things of the earth does not include a right to “spoil or destroy” or let things go to waste. Locke does not elaborate, but we might wonder: if there is nonscarcity, and condition C holds, why should not my liberty to live as I choose include a liberty to appropriate land and leave it in its natural state? Maybe I just like to watch leaves and fruit rot and fall. One might also wonder what limits the stringency of the No-Waste rule. Locke seems to have in mind that if


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UCSD PHIL 166 - LOCKE ON PROPERTY

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