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The Political Economy

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The Political Economy of the UN Security CouncilSlide 2The question:Yes.PlanWhat is the UNSC?Accountability, the UNSC, & the Paradox of StabilityImportance of UNSC temporary members to the USWhy bribe/reward votes?Enter the IMF & the World BankKey point about the IMF & World BankIFI arrangements are a joint decisionMechanismEvidenceGulf War ExamplesSlide 16Counter examples?Slide 18Slide 19Slide 20A more historical example?IMF reply in the Washington Post (November 1, 2006):What do we observe systematically?Slide 24Slide 25A potential endogeneity problem?Estimated effectSystematic evidenceSlide 29Slide 30Slide 31See page 19 of Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland, 2006, Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF decisions? Evidence from panel data, KOF Working Paper 151, ETH Zurich.Further checks:Slide 34World Bank evidenceAverage # of World Bank projectsRegional differences?SummaryImplications for governance reform of the IMF:A SolutionIn the meantime:Snapshot of the book project: The Political Economy of the UN Security CouncilThank you 글로벌 KU 프론티어 스피릿!!!The Political Economy of theThe Political Economy of theUN Security CouncilUN Security CouncilPresentation byPresentation byJames Raymond VreelandJames Raymond VreelandGeorgetown UniversityGeorgetown UniversityCo-authors: Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm (ETH)Co-authors: Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm (ETH)UNSCIMF World BankIMF/WB project in GhanaThe question:The question:To gain leverage over one To gain leverage over one international institution can a international institution can a country use its power in another country use its power in another international institution?international institution?Yes.Yes.Why?Why?The US and other powerful countries, The US and other powerful countries, who virtually control the IMF & World who virtually control the IMF & World Bank, care about how the UNSC votes.Bank, care about how the UNSC votes.PlanPlanWhat is the UNSC?What is the UNSC?What is the IMF/World Bank?What is the IMF/World Bank?Why are they used to influence the UNSC & how?Why are they used to influence the UNSC & how?EvidenceEvidence–AnecdotesAnecdotes–Large-nLarge-nThe book projectThe book projectWhat is the UNSC?What is the UNSC?5 permanent members with veto power5 permanent members with veto power10 elected members (2 year term - limited)10 elected members (2 year term - limited)–Nominated by regional caucus, elected by GANominated by regional caucus, elected by GA–Africa (3), Asia (2), Latin America (2), Eastern Europe (1), Africa (3), Asia (2), Latin America (2), Eastern Europe (1), Western Europe+ (2)Western Europe+ (2)Decisions (open ballot) require 9 votes (5+4)Decisions (open ballot) require 9 votes (5+4)UNSC votes on UNSC votes on –UN UN military actionmilitary action against aggressors against aggressors–Economic sanctions & arms embargoesEconomic sanctions & arms embargoesElected members of the UNSC potentially will vote on Elected members of the UNSC potentially will vote on matters of extreme international importance.matters of extreme international importance.Accountability, the UNSC,Accountability, the UNSC,& the Paradox of Stability& the Paradox of StabilityProbability of reelectionAccountability Criteria are too high!Criteria are too low!Importance of Importance of UNSC temporary members to the USUNSC temporary members to the USKuziemko & Werker 2006:Kuziemko & Werker 2006:–average US aid increases 54%average US aid increases 54%–average UNDP aid increases 7%average UNDP aid increases 7%Particularly through UNICEF where the US Particularly through UNICEF where the US provides their largest-share contributionsprovides their largest-share contributionsWhy bribe/reward votes?Why bribe/reward votes?Voting power? Voting power? –Unlikely- O’Neill (1996) shows Unlikely- O’Neill (1996) shows totaltotal voting power of non-permanent voting power of non-permanent members is <2%.members is <2%.Supermajority?Supermajority?–Vote-buying literature shows that over-sized coalitions tend to be Vote-buying literature shows that over-sized coalitions tend to be established.established.–Pursuing unilateral action is more expensive than buying insurance Pursuing unilateral action is more expensive than buying insurance votes.votes.LegitimacyLegitimacy–There is a premium for getting (near) unanimous votes to win domestic There is a premium for getting (near) unanimous votes to win domestic public support (Voeten).public support (Voeten).–Chapman & Reiter (2004) find UNSC support significantly increases the Chapman & Reiter (2004) find UNSC support significantly increases the rally behind the president by as many as rally behind the president by as many as 9 points in presidential 9 points in presidential approval approval & the effect is & the effect is unique among international institutionsunique among international institutions other other actions by the UN or regional security organizations do not significantly actions by the UN or regional security organizations do not significantly affect rallies.affect rallies.Regional influenceRegional influence–Informational role of committeesInformational role of committees–Legitimacy in the region may come from accessLegitimacy in the region may come from accessEnter Enter the IMF & the World Bankthe IMF & the World BankKey point about the IMF & World BankKey point about the IMF & World BankInvolved with developing countries through Involved with developing countries through “programs”: loans+conditions.“programs”: loans+conditions.Influence over decisions pegged to economic Influence over decisions pegged to economic size.size.Growing evidence that the major Growing evidence that the major shareholders use their influence for political shareholders use their influence for political reasons (e.g. Stone, Reynaud, Momani, reasons (e.g. Stone, Reynaud, Momani, Kilby).Kilby).Especially when they agree (Copelovitch).Especially when they agree (Copelovitch).IFI arrangements are aIFI arrangements are ajoint decisionjoint decisionRecipient governments negotiate with the IFIs – Recipient governments negotiate with the IFIs – business as usual – but when on the UNSC can business as usual – but when on the UNSC can negotiate for better terms.negotiate for better terms.Why use IFIs to influence the UNSC?Why use IFIs to influence the UNSC?–Political benefitsPolitical benefits (for both


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