17 42 8 page paper 2 The influence of nuclear weapons on the intensity of World War II in Scandinavia In this paper I argue that nuclear weapons would have decreased the intensity of World War II in Scandinavia The British government would have protected Norway with nuclear weapons and allowed the Soviet government to invade Finland The Soviet government would have intimidated the Finnish government to expand Soviet territory and used a conventional military force against the Finnish defensive line at the Soviet Finnish border By allowing the Soviet government to expand its territory into Finland the British government would have refrained from giving material support to the Finnish military In addition the British protection of Norway with nuclear weapons would have deterred a German conventional military invasion in Norway We base these conclusions on the assumption that Germany Britain France the Soviet Union and the United States have second strike countervalue nuclear capability Therefore we should first understand the world in which nuclear weapons would change the intensity of World War II in Scandinavia A World of Mutually Assured Destruction We need two conditions in order to understand the how nuclear weapons could have influenced World War II First we assume that each country has second strike countervalue capabilities Second we assume flat of the curve dynamics regarding changes in nuclear stockpiles between countries First let us assume that Germany Britain France the Soviet Union and the United States have large nuclear second strike countervalue capabilities by which each country has the 1 ability to absorb a full scale attack on its nuclear arsenal and to launch a full scale counterforce on the attacker However this comes at a cost of destroying unguarded cities the values of the respective country Specifically assume that each country contains its nuclear arsenal in the form of inter continental ballistic missiles hidden and protected inside missile silos so that each country can protect its nuclear arsenal from a full scale nuclear attack and then launch a large counter attack anywhere in the world In other words let us assume that each country does not have the capability to protect its cities from a large nuclear attack In short every country can absorb a large nuclear attack from any country on its nuclear arsenal and launch a large counter nuclear attack on any country but no country can protect its cities Second let us assume flat of the curve dynamics explained with a simple example Consider country A and country B that have hostile relations Let country A build up its nuclear stockpile with the goal of destroying country B s cities If we plot the number of nuclear missiles added to country A s arsenal with the percentage of cities that country A can destroy in country B the graph increases sharply from its starting point then begins to level off asymptotically to a specific percentage This implies that if country A keeps building up its nuclear arsenal eventually its capacity to destroy country B s cities reaches a threshold This occurs because cities in country B center around major metropolises then scatter out as we move further from a metropolis These two conditions present a world of Mutually Assured Destruction MAD in which Germany Britain France the Soviet Union and the United States have the capacity to absorb large attacks on their nuclear arsenals and destroy designated cities anywhere in the world If a government of one of these countries planned to attack another country with nuclear weapons that government would attack with a nuclear force large enough to decimate the threshold 2 population governed by flat of the curve dynamics However the government cannot destroy the other country s nuclear force Therefore if a nuclear power can decimate a large portion of a country s cities that government would fear a similar attack on its cities Extending this dynamic across each nuclear power implies that a MAD world prevents preventive war A MAD world prevents preventive war for two reasons explained with a simple example First if the government of country A declares war with the government of country B then the government of country A would launch a large nuclear attack on the military force of country B in an attempt to end the war quickly The government of country A would call the skirmish a preventive war by which the government of country A prevents the military of country B from attacking country A However a large portion of country B s military power lies in the form of nuclear weapons hidden and protected inside missile silos Therefore the government of country A cannot destroy country B s nuclear weapons and the plan of preventive war fails Second if the government of country A decides to launch a nuclear attack on cities inside country B the government of country A should fear a retaliatory nuclear attack on its cities from the military of country B This second reason is more conditional than the first because the second reason depends on whether the government of either country cares for its population as opposed to only caring for its nuclear weapons stockpile In other words if a government cared for its population in a MAD world it would not start a nuclear war with another power If the government did not care for its nuclear weapons stockpile it would remain defenseless Thus the second reason depends more on the civility of the government than the first reason Therefore a MAD world prevents preventive war at least on the safety of a country s nuclear stockpile and conditioned on the government s concern for the safety of its population 3 The same dynamic applies to the use of nonnuclear weapons which I describe as conventional military If the government of country A launches a conventional military attack on country B for preventive war reasons the government of country A cannot expect the government of country B to defend itself with similar weapons The government of country B could find nuclear weapons cheaper and more effective than a conventional military attack In other words the government of country B would decimate the conventional military attack force of country A with nuclear weapons without the expense of country B s conventional military Furthermore country B may retaliate on country A with a disproportionate use of force most likely in the form of nuclear weapons Thus a MAD world not only prevents a preventive war but