GT ISYE 6230 - Game Theory and Military Decision Making

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1Game Theory and Military Decision Making:Then vs. NowISYE 6230 Economic Decision AnalysisApril 15, 2008Lee EvansOutline• Military Decision Making Process• Doctrine (minimax vs. maximin)• Battle of the Bismarck Sea• Applications for Personnel Recovery• Conclusions• Questions2Military Decision Making ProcessCurrent Doctrine:Receive the MissionMission AnalysisCourse of Action DevelopmentCourse of Action AnalysisCourse of Action ComparisonCourse of Action ApprovalOrders ProductionStrategiesUtility2-Person GameMinimax vs. Maximin• Capabilities vs. Intentions (EX: Pearl Harbor)• Doctrine of Decision is Conservative• Minimax/Maximin– Zero-Sum: Mixed Strategy: – Row player wants to maximize gains while column player wants to minimize the row player’s gains (Self Preservation)Solution:X = 0.2Y = 0.4UsThem3Battle of the Bismarck Sea• Situation:– Feb. 1943, struggle for New Guinea.– Japanese organizing resupply from Rabaul to Lae.– 2 Japanese courses of action (N or S routes)– 2 US courses of action (aircraft N or S)– Nature: Poor visibility to the NorthBattle of the Bismarck Sea4Battle of the Bismarck SeaBattle of the Bismarck Sea• What Happened?– General Kenney focused the aircraft to the north– Japanese sailed north– Ship convoy sighted 1 day after it sailed and was defeated after 2 days of bombing– Not a Japanese error…they did the same thing 2 months earlier with minor losses (importance of intelligence)– US had equipped airplanes for low-level bombing– “Matched Strategies” discovering other’s strategy would not change your own– Zero Sum5Current Game Theory Applications• Utility Theory and Ordinal Values:• EX: Cold War• Pareto Optimal?• EX: Iraq InvasionUnited StatesIraq“Setting credible patterns of cooperativerewards and noncooperative penalties is a way to ensure cooperation”-Ecklund, 2005EX: UN Resolutions 678 & 1441Cardinal vs. Ordinal Values• Ordinal Values may not accurately convey the relationships between preferences• Each player valuessimilar things differently• With any game requiring a mixed-strategy solution, cardinal values are essential to meaningful resultsUnited StatesIraq6Applications for Personnel Recovery• What is Personnel Recovery?“The aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated or missingpersonnel from uncertain or hostileenvironments and denied areas”Applications for Personnel Recovery• Traditionally, a recovery force was immediately assembled and launched to preclude the capture and exploitation of the isolated person(s).• In the contemporary operating environment, this is not always the best response.• Ordinal values, both attempting offensive operations.• Developing a quantitative scale of military worth that is the same for both players is the greatest challenge in determining using a mixed-strategy solution7Applications for Personnel Recovery• Assumptions:– Rescue only conducted by a conventional force– Adversaries fit into 7 categories:• First-Rate Adversaries• Second-Rate Adversaries• Third-Rate Adversary with poor popular support• Third-Rate Adversary with strong popular support• Locally Focused Insurgent Group• Globally Focused Insurgent Group• Criminal Element or OrganizationLocally Focused Insurgent Group• Insurgency is a strategy adopted by groups too weak to attain their locally focused political objectives through conventional means. • Employ tactics designed for self-protection• Locally focused insurgents may attempt to replace the existing government (revolutionary insurgency), or they may have more limited aims, such as autonomy• Avoid conventional battlespaces and focus in areas where they can operate on footing that is to their advantage.• Insurgents try to postpone decisive action, avoid defeat, sustain themselves, expand their support, and over time change the power balance in their favor.• The best strategy is to attack the U.S.’s alleged center of gravity--the will of its people. • Must appear strong while simultaneously attacking the U.S.’s legitimacy and credibility, and the perception that the U.S. is in control of the situation (for their information operations (IO) campaigns). • With at least some level of passive public support, and even minimal active support, there is a reasonable expectation that the local populace will give captured IP to the insurgents.8Locally Focused Insurgent GroupPopulace perception:Insurgents are weakPerception:Insurgents strongUS unable to protect itselfInsurgents have chance forpropaganda victory and chanceto inflict casualtiesInsurgents rely on populace for captureUS viewed as weak (strengthening IO campaign)Locally Focused Insurgent Group• Outcome using maximin: {Capture, Recover}• Pareto Efficient?• Unique Nash Equilibrium• “Highly Stable” outcome• What if Insurgents didn’t use Maximin anaylsis?9First-Rate Adversaries• There will be no guarantee, at least initially, that the U.S. will have either air superiority or freedom of maneuver.• Adversaries find few reasons not to capture US personnel• The propaganda value of a captured person would be less of a deciding factor, because such tactics would not be the primary focus of an enemy who has decided to fight the U.S. on the conventional battlefield.• Would require overwhelming aviation support packages to increase the probability of success to an acceptable level.• High probability of further losses• The risk would probably be such that recovery would be a feasible or acceptable option in only the rarest of cases. First-Rate AdversariesOpportunity for enemy to inflict further lossesUS personnel can evade and US can plana calculated recovery operationEnemy inflicts no further lossesUS personnel in enemy handsHigh probability of US lossesLow probability of recoveryEnemy inflicts no further lossesUS personnel have opportunity forevasion and eventual self recovery10First-Rate Adversaries• Outcome using maximin: {Capture, No Recover}• Pareto Efficient?• Unique Nash Equilibrium• “Highly Stable” outcome(dominant strategies)• Can the Pareto Efficient outcome be achieved?First-Rate Adversaries• The Normal Form game can be manipulated through the use of contracts (ie. the Third Geneva Convention, 1949)• Dictates treatment standards for Prisoners of War• 115 countries signed the treaty•


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