DOC PREVIEW
On some implications of evolutionary psychology for the study of preferences and institutions

This preview shows page 1-2-3 out of 9 pages.

Save
View full document
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 9 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 9 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 9 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 9 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience

Unformatted text preview:

Journal of Economic Behavior & OrganizationVol. 43 (2000) 91–99On some implications of evolutionary psychologyfor the study of preferences and institutions夽Avner Ben-Nera, Louis Puttermanb,∗aIndustrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USAbDepartment of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USAReceived 8 April 1997; received in revised form 19 January 2000; accepted 9 February 2000AbstractIn many economic interactions, for instance in firms, the standard approximation of strict self-interest is inadequate to modeling human behavior. A scientific theory of preferences, groundedin evolutionary psychological and biological theory, can avoid resort to ad hoc assumptions. Evo-lutionary theory is supported by a growing body of data including new results in experimentaleconomics. It holds that the evolved human nature includes an ability to solve social dilemma prob-lems through reciprocity and punishment of cheaters. Treating realized preferences as phenotypicexpressions with both environmental and genetic causes will also allow economists to study theimpact of institutions on preferences. © 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.JEL classification: D00; C91; C72Keywords: Evolution; Preferences; Evolutionary psychology; Altruism; Reciprocity1. IntroductionDarwinism was once taken to imply that the process of biological competition canspare no sentimentality for unselfishness or indeed, for sentiment itself. The most ruthless,self-seeking, and rational organisms will survive, while weaker members of their specieswill fall by the wayside. Darwinism and the economics of the century that followed TheOrigin of Species appeared to entail kindred social theories, in which human moral pre-tensions were set aside and the natural competitiveness of the species claimed its full due.夽We would like to thank Herbert Gintis, Robert Wright, and three anonymous referees and the editor for helpfulcomments on earlier drafts.∗Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-401-863-3836; fax: +1-401-863-1970.0167-2681/00/$ – see front matter © 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.PII: S0167-2681(00)00110-492 A. Ben-Ner, L. Putterman /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 43 (2000) 91–99Edgeworth’s dictum that “The first principle of economics is that every agent is actuatedonly by self-interest”1was thought by many to be Darwin’s as well.Darwin (1871) himself had been interested in both sentiment and altruism. But whilethis fact was known to some careful readers, it took many decades before the cooperativedimension of social interaction emerged as a central focus of biology and allied socialsciences. This new focus is exemplified by the work of biologist Robert Trivers in the1970s, political scientist Robert Axelrod and biologist William Hamilton in the 1980s,and psychologist Leda Cosmides and anthropologist John Tooby in the 1990s, althoughother important contributors could be cited.2Theorists of sociobiology and evolutionarypsychology take as their starting point the idea that it is genes, rather than the organisms thatbear them, thatengage in the struggle forsurvival. Froman evolutionarystandpoint, survivalofseveral replicasisbetter than survivalof anyonecopy.Organismsnot predisposed bytheirgenes to invest resources in bearing and (where immaturity at birth requires it) nurturingoffspring will make poor agents for “replication-minded” genes. Any undue propensity toshirk on investments in reproduction and nurturing, should it appear by the serendipity ofmutation, will be selected against, since the genes in which the new propensity is encodedwill leave fewer copies in future generations. More broadly, propensities to invest resourcesin helping close kin, who share a significant fraction of one’s own genes, will pay off inevolutionary terms.31.1. Altruism and reciprocity: not all is self-interestThe universality of maternal and, more broadly, of kin altruism across human culturesis an illustration of the fact that organic evolution can produce organisms that are notstrictly self-interested. But more remarkable and of at least equal importance to economicsand other social sciences is the phenomenon of reciprocal cooperation among nonkin.Sympathies among nonkin are arguably rare or shallow, or where they exist, they mightbe supposed to arise through a “misplaced” diffusion of kin altruism. Yet in the smallband-like societies that are believed to have constituted the environment of most of humanevolution, propensities to cooperate with other group members and to react with anger to-ward nonreciprocators of cooperation may have been genetically favored. Large-brainedhominids who repeatedly interacted would have learned to recognize one another’s behav-iors and to seek out others known to behave cooperatively when engaging in interactionswith positive sum payoffs (for instance, sharing meat from hunting excursions character-1Edgeworth (1881).2See Trivers (1971), Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). In this note, we concentrate especially on the field calledevolutionary psychology. See Barkow et al. (1992), Buss (1995), and for an accessible popular treatment andfurther references, see Wright (1994). Evolutionary psychology forms part of a broader set of evolutionary ap-proaches that includes the well-known work of Dawkins (1989), the sociobiological approach of Wilson (1978),and the coevolutionary approaches of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), Lumsden and Wilson (1983), Boydand Richerson (1999), and Durham (1991). We also mention in a later note but do not discuss at length the groupselectionist variant represented by Sober and Wilson (1998). Finally, we do not attempt to review exhaustivelypast discussions of sociobiology by economists; for a wide-ranging treatment, see Hirshleifer (1977).3The mathematics of selection for kin altruism was first developed by biologist Hamilton (1964); a discussionwith applications for economics is provided by Bergstrom (1996, pp. 1905–1908).A. Ben-Ner, L. Putterman / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 43 (2000) 91–99 93ized by high variance of amounts procured). The presence within a human population offeelings of anger against noncooperators, fueling acts of costly punishment that appearirrational from the standpoint of individual interest, would have helped to deter cheatingand to raise the evolutionary payoff of bearing the genetic inclination to cooperate. In-creases in: (a) the strength of the


On some implications of evolutionary psychology for the study of preferences and institutions

Download On some implications of evolutionary psychology for the study of preferences and institutions
Our administrator received your request to download this document. We will send you the file to your email shortly.
Loading Unlocking...
Login

Join to view On some implications of evolutionary psychology for the study of preferences and institutions and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or
We will never post anything without your permission.
Don't have an account?
Sign Up

Join to view On some implications of evolutionary psychology for the study of preferences and institutions 2 2 and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or

By creating an account you agree to our Privacy Policy and Terms Of Use

Already a member?