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Security in Networks Part 2 CPSC 363 Computer Networks Ellen Walker Hiram College Includes figures from Computer Networking by Kurose Ross Addison Wesley 2002 Trusted Intermediaries How do 2 entities establish shared keys Trusted key distribution center Gives appropriate one time session key to each entity when a conversation is established No entity knows another s secret key except for a specific conversation How do I know the public key Alice sent me is really Alice s public key Trusted Certification Authority keeps list of all public keys issues certificates with ID public key encrypted with CA s private key so nonforgeable Key Distribution Center KDC generate s R1 KA KDC A B Alice knows R1 KA KDC R1 KB KDC A R1 KB KDC A R1 Bob knows to use R1 to communicat e with Alice Alice and Bob communicate using R1 as session key for shared symmetric encryption Certification Authority Binds key to entity E host or router Generates digitally signed certificate after receiving appropriate proof of identity and payment Bob s public key Bob s identifying informatio n KB digital signature encrypt CA private key K CA KB certificate for Bob s public key signed by CA Firewall Analogy brick wall between apartments to contain a fire In networking isolates internal net from larger Internet hopefully containing attacks public Internet administered network firewall What Can Firewall Prevent Denial of service attacks SYN flooding establishes bogus TCP connections preventing real users from establishing them Illegal access modification of internal data Access by unauthorized users hosts Types of Firewall Packet sniffing Each packet examined and allowed to pass or not based on a set of rules Application level All messages for a given application pass through a gateway Information such as username available at application level but not packet Packet Filtering Rules Packets can be determined to pass or not based on Source Destination IP address TCP UDP source destination port numbers ICMP message type TCP SYN and ACK bits E g TCP ACK 0 is new message originating from outside Ordering of rules is important and can get complex see Table 8 5 Application Gateway Filters packets on application data e g user E g only certain users can telnet Telnet connections through gateway allowed authentication at gateway All other direct telnet connections blocked host to gateway telnet session application gateway gateway to remote host telnet session router and filter Limitations of Firewalls and Gateways IP spoofing fake return address to get through Client needs to know how to access application gateway e g proxy server address configured in browser Tradeoff more communication vs more risk Even highly protected sites suffer attacks Arms race mentality hacker vs netadmins Attacks Mapping Ping port sniffing etc Packet Sniffing Interfaces in promiscuous mode look at every packet Spoofing From IP does not match IP of device Denial of service Hijacking next slides Countermeasures Mapping Record analyze traffic react to suspicious patterns e g update firewall rules Packet Sniffing Watch for hosts in promiscuous mode Avoid broadcast media e g use switch not hub Spoofing Stop bogus packet at outgoing router if not from that network but we can t control everyone else s router Denial of service Hijacking next slides Denial of Service Attacks SYN flooding Starts the TCP handshake but does not complete Server allocates data structures for partial connections until space runs out SMURF attack Convince many innocent hosts to send ICMP packets traceroute back to attacked host DDoS Distributed Denial of Service Many hosts act as slaves for the attacker due to prior compromise Denial of Service Countermeasures Filter out flooded packets at firewall loss of good packets too Traceback to source of floods Probably an innocent machine that has been compromised Hijacking Attack Bob is connected to Alice Trudy listening in Trudy gets seq num ack num etc from packets Trudy eliminates Alice s host DoS attack e g Trudy continues the conversation Spoof s Alice s host All header info is correct Data can be whatever Trudy wants Hijacking Countermeasures Application level Authentication protocols Encryption Trusted intermediaries Digital signatures Packet level Encryption of broadcast media e g wireless Protect physical media from tapping Security Across Layers Application Layer Secure e mail Transport Layer Secure sockets layer SSL Transport Layer security TLS Network Layer IPsec IP security Authentication Header Protocol AH Encapsulation Security Payload Protocol ESP Data Link Layer Wired Equivalence Privacy WEP on 802 11 What Security Provides review Confidentiality Message integrity Authentication Sender Receiver Secure Email Confidentiality Encryption options Private key key exchange problem Public key inefficient for long email Best of both worlds Alice chooses random session key Alice encrypts message using session key Alice encrypts session key using Bob s public key Recipient authentication as well as confidentiality why Confidential Email KS m KS K S K B KB KS m KS m KB KS Internet KS KB KS m KS KB KB Ks session key Kb and Kb are Bob s public and private keys Secure Email Message Integrity Use a hash function to compress the message H m Encrypt the hash using Alice s private key KA H m This is the signature Send m KA H m together Bob computes H m compares to KA Alice s sig If they re equal message is valid Also provides sender authentication why Pretty Good Privacy Provides all 4 aspects of security Note 3 keys m H KA KA KA H m KS m KS KS KB K B KB KS Internet Security for Internet Commerce Protect consumer from having credit card info stolen in transit Protect consumer from providing credit card etc information to spoofed site Secure Sockets Layer Data Encryption and Authentication Handshake Negotiate encryption algorithm and session keys Authenticate server to the client Transaction All data is encrypted using negotiated algorithm and session keys How It Works Almost SSL Client Server exchange TCP handshake SYN SYN ACK ACK Client establishes server s identity SSL hello certificate Master Secret to generate keys exchanged Client creates MS sends K MS K is public key from certificate How It Works Almost SSL From MS we generate 4 keys Eb session encryption key for Bob Alice Mb session MAC key for Bob Alice Ea Ma from Alice Bob Encryption keys encrypt data MAC keys verify data integrity Record data M key are hashed encrypted with E key


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Hiram CPSC 363 - Security in Networks (Part 2)

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