Short AbstractThis paper attempts to advance the issue, raised by Newell, of how cognitive science can avoid being trapped in the study of disconnected paradigms and mature to provide “the kind of encompassing of its subject matter – the behavior of man – that we all posit as characteristic of a mature science”. To this end we propose the Newell Test that involves measuring theories by how well they do on 12 diverse criteria from his 1980 paper. To illustrate, we evaluate classical connectionism and the ACT-R theory on the basis of these criteria and show how the criteria provide the direction for further development of each theory.AbstractNewell (1980, 1990) proposed that cognitive theories be developed trying to satisfy multiple criteria to avoid theoretical myopia. He provided two overlapping lists of 13 criteria that the human cognitive architecture would have to satisfy to be functional. We have distilled these into 12: flexible behavior, real-time performance, adaptive behavior, vast knowledge base, dynamic behavior, knowledge integration, natural language, learning, development, evolution, and brain realization. There would be greater theoretical progress if we evaluated theories by a broad set of criteria such as these and attended to the weaknesses such evaluations revealed. To illustrate how theories can be evaluated we apply them to both classical connectionism (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986) and the ACT-R theory (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998). The strengths of classical connectionism on this test derive from its intense effort in addressing empirical phenomena in domains like language and cognitive development. Its weaknesses derive from its failure to acknowledge a symbolic level to thought. In contrast, ACT-R includes both symbolic and subsymbolic components. The strengths of the ACT-R derive from its tight integration of the symbolic with the subsymbolic. Its weaknesses largely derive from its failure as yet to adequately engage in intensive analyses of issues related to certain criteria on Newell’s list.1. IntroductionAllen Newell, typically a cheery and optimistic man, often expressed frustration over the progress in Cognitive Science. He would point to such things as the "schools" of thought, the changes in fashion, the dominance of controversies, and the cyclical nature of theories. One of the problems he saw was that the field became too focused on specific issues and lost sight of the big picture needed to understand the human mind. He advocated a number of remedies for this problem. Twice, Newell (1980, 1990) offered slightly different sets of 13 criteria on the human mind, with the idea (more clearly stated in 1990) that the field would make progress if it tried to address all of these criteria. Table 1 gives the first 12 criteria from his 1980 list which were basically restated in the 1990 list. While the individual criteria may vary in their scope and in how compelling they are, none are trivial.So to repeat, we are not proposing that the criteria in Table 1 be the only ones by which a cognitive theory be judged. However, such functional criteria need to be given greater scientific prominence. To achieve this goal we propose to evaluate theories by how well they do at meeting these functional criteria. We suggest calling the evaluation of a theory by this set of criteria “The Newell Test.”This paper will review Newell’s criteria and then consider how they would apply to evaluating various approaches that have been taken to the study of human cognition. This paper will focus on evaluating in detail two approaches. 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Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.THE NEWELL TESTJanuary 15, 2019The Newell Test for a Theory of MindJohn R. Anderson and Christian LebiereCarnegie Mellon UniversityWord Count: Short Abstract: 105Abstract: 207Main Text: 13,058References: 2,961Entire Text: 16,703Key Words:Cognitive ArchitectureConnectionismHybrid SystemsLanguageLearningSymbolic SystemsAddress Correspondence to:John R. AndersonDepartment of Psychology – BH345DCarnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburgh, PA 15213-3890Email: [email protected]://act.psy.cmu.edu/ACT/people/ja.htmlChristian LebiereHuman Computer Interaction InstituteCarnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburgh, PA 15213-3890Email: [email protected]://www.andrew.cmu.edu/~cl1THE NEWELL TESTJanuary 15, 2019Short AbstractThis paper attempts to advance the issue, raised by Newell, of how cognitive science can avoid being trapped in the study of disconnected paradigms and mature to provide “the kind of encompassing of its