Unformatted text preview:

Denial of Service in Sensor NetworksWhy Security?THE DENIAL OF SERVICE THREATAdversary CapabilityAttacks on Physical LayerLink Layer AttacksNetwork and Routing AttacksNeglect and GreedHomingMisdirectionBlack HolesTransport Layer DoSPROTOCOL VULNERABILITIESAdaptive Rate Control – MAC Protocol by Woo & CullRAPRAP VulnerabilityDenial of Service inDenial of Service inSensor NetworksSensor NetworksAnthony D. WoodAnthony D. Woodand John A. Stankovicand John A. StankovicWhy Security?Why Security?•BattlefieldBattlefield•DisastersDisasters–Protect the location and status of casualties from unauthorized disclosure, Protect the location and status of casualties from unauthorized disclosure, particularly if the disaster relates to ongoing terrorist activitiesparticularly if the disaster relates to ongoing terrorist activities•Public safetyPublic safety–False alarms about chemical, biological, or environmental threats could False alarms about chemical, biological, or environmental threats could cause panic or disregard for warning systems. An attack on the system’s cause panic or disregard for warning systems. An attack on the system’s availability could precede a real attack on the protected resource.availability could precede a real attack on the protected resource.•Home healthcare Home healthcare –Because protecting privacy is paramount, only authorized users can query Because protecting privacy is paramount, only authorized users can query or monitor the network. These networks can also form critical pieces of an or monitor the network. These networks can also form critical pieces of an accident-notification chain, thus they must be protected from failure.accident-notification chain, thus they must be protected from failure.THE DENIAL OF SERVICE THE DENIAL OF SERVICE THREATTHREATA DoS attack is any event that A DoS attack is any event that diminishes or eliminates a network’s diminishes or eliminates a network’s capacity to perform its expected capacity to perform its expected function.function.•Hardware failures, software bugs, Hardware failures, software bugs, resource exhaustion, environmental resource exhaustion, environmental conditions, or their combinationconditions, or their combination•Intentional AttackIntentional AttackAdversary CapabilityAdversary Capability•Physically damaged or manipulated node Physically damaged or manipulated node –May be less powerful than a normally May be less powerful than a normally functioning node. functioning node. •Subverted nodes (or added ones)Subverted nodes (or added ones)–Interact with the network only through softwareInteract with the network only through software–As powerful as other nodesAs powerful as other nodes•Immensely more powerful adversariesImmensely more powerful adversaries–Existing wired network with virtually unlimited Existing wired network with virtually unlimited computational and energy resources possible.computational and energy resources possible.Attacks on Physical LayerAttacks on Physical Layer•JammingJamming–Defenses Defenses •Spread-spectrumSpread-spectrum•Region mapping Region mapping –Lower duty cycleLower duty cycle•TamperingTampering–Defenses: Tamper-proofing, hidingDefenses: Tamper-proofing, hidingLink Layer AttacksLink Layer Attacks•Collision Collision –Use error-correcting codesUse error-correcting codes•Exhaustion Exhaustion –Rate limitationRate limitation•Unfairness Unfairness –Small framesSmall framesNetwork and Routing Network and Routing AttacksAttacks•Neglect and greed Neglect and greed –Redundancy, probingRedundancy, probing•Homing/traffic analysis Homing/traffic analysis –Encryption: enough?Encryption: enough?•Misdirection Misdirection –Egress filtering, authorization, monitoringEgress filtering, authorization, monitoring•Black holes Black holes –Authorization, monitoring, probing, Authorization, monitoring, probing, redundancyredundancyNeglect and GreedNeglect and Greed•NeglectNeglect–Drops packets arbitrarilyDrops packets arbitrarily•GreedGreed–Gives undue priority to it’s own messagesGives undue priority to it’s own messages•Use multiple paths and/or redundant Use multiple paths and/or redundant messages to mitigate these effects.messages to mitigate these effects.HomingHoming•Geographic forwarding allows Geographic forwarding allows attacker to figure out where attacker to figure out where important nodes are.important nodes are.•Encrypting headers as well as Encrypting headers as well as content might alleviate this issue.content might alleviate this issue.MisdirectionMisdirection•Diverting traffic away from intended Diverting traffic away from intended destinationdestination– targets the sender targets the sender •Misdirecting many flows in one directionMisdirecting many flows in one direction– targets an arbitrary victim (receiver)targets an arbitrary victim (receiver)• DefenseDefense–Egress FilteringEgress Filtering•Verification of source addressesVerification of source addresses•Legitimately generated from below?Legitimately generated from below?Black HolesBlack Holes•Distance-vector-based protocol weaknessDistance-vector-based protocol weakness•Nodes advertise zero-cost routes to every Nodes advertise zero-cost routes to every other node.other node.•Fixes:Fixes:–AuthorizationAuthorization–Monitoring Monitoring •watchdog the next hop transmission of your packets by watchdog the next hop transmission of your packets by neighborsneighbors–ProbingProbing•Send periodic messages across topology to test for Send periodic messages across topology to test for blackout regionsblackout regions–RedundancyRedundancyTransport Layer DoSTransport Layer DoS•Flooding Flooding –Client puzzles Client puzzles •Make the adversary commit resourcesMake the adversary commit resources•Only useful if the adversary has limited Only useful if the adversary has limited resourcesresources•Desynchronization Desynchronization –AuthenticationAuthenticationPROTOCOL PROTOCOL VULNERABILITIESVULNERABILITIESAnalyzing these vulnerabilities Analyzing these vulnerabilities helps show why developers should helps show why developers should consider DoS susceptibility at consider DoS susceptibility at design time.design time.Adaptive Rate Control Adaptive Rate Control –– MAC Protocol by Woo & CullMAC Protocol by Woo & Cull•Give preference to route-through traffic Give preference


View Full Document

BU CS 580S - Denial of Service

Download Denial of Service
Our administrator received your request to download this document. We will send you the file to your email shortly.
Loading Unlocking...
Login

Join to view Denial of Service and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or
We will never post anything without your permission.
Don't have an account?
Sign Up

Join to view Denial of Service 2 2 and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or

By creating an account you agree to our Privacy Policy and Terms Of Use

Already a member?