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IUB SPH-M 333 - Moneyball

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Billy Beane, Moneyball, and an Unfair GameBilly Beane, Moneyball, and an Unfair GameDane Mehling Indiana University Author NoteDane Mehling, SPH-M333 History of Sport, Indiana UniversityCorrespondence concerningthis article should be addressed to Dane Mehling, Indiana University at [email protected] Beane, Moneyball, and an Unfair GameAbstractThis article examine the impact the Billy Beane and his front office management stylewith the Oakland A’s had on baseball. It will explore the scouting and development of athletes,financial inequalities in baseball, the use of statistical analysis, and the reception of the theory of“Moneyball” by other organizations. It suggests that Beane’s management theories exploited theflaws of the baseball labor market and proved success by competing with top market contenderswhile operating under a very limited budget. It also suggests that the theories of Billy Beanehave been well received and adopted by other major league teams. 2Billy Beane, Moneyball, and an Unfair GameBilly Beane, Moneyball, and an Unfair GameBilly Beane expected to make a difference in baseball. And he did…just not the way he planned. Despite an unsuccessful playing career, Beane made his impact on sports in the front office by changing how teams judge and buy, sell, and trade players. His approach was hard to understand for some and downright crazy for many others. But by showing the solutions to the financial inequalities that exist in baseball, Billy Beane was able to change how the game of baseball is managed. The game that has been around for 200 years was changed by a man in a way he never intended. BackgroundDrafted by the New York Mets in the first round of the 1980 major league draft, Billy Beane was a top prospect with top potential. He was judged a 5 tool player. The teenager grew up in San Diego and starred in baseball, football, and basketball in high school. After years in theminors with only occasional short stints in the majors, Billy Beane decided to give up his dream of the major leagues with the Oakland A’s and asked for a job as an advance scout in the organization in 1990 (Caron, 2004, 1484). This would be the beginning of the front office career for one of sport’s most successful General Managers. Beane went on to become General Manager of the Oakland A’s in 1997. The A’s were oneof the most successful teams in baseball throughout the 2000’s, going to the playoffs each year from 2000 to 2004 and reaching the ALCS in 2006, averaging 96 wins per year over that time (Cullen, 2009, 203). The A’s did this competing against rich teams such as the New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, and Los Angles Angels while having one of the lowest payrolls in baseball. Between 1997 and 2005, the Yankees spent $1.2 million dollars per win with the A’s spending $420,000 (Cullen, 2009, 203) . They were the most efficient team in baseball. This 3Billy Beane, Moneyball, and an Unfair Gamesuccess was due to new general managing approach unseen by baseball that would come to be known as “Moneyball.” Billy Beane believed that winning was “simply a matter of figuring out the odds, and exploiting the laws of probability (Caron, 2004, 1485).”Scouting and DevelopmentMoneyball was “evidence based baseball” that was centered on research, data, and statistics (Caron, 2004,1488). The small market of Oakland meant that the A’s didn’t have the resources to spend on getting best players. This meant that the Beane and the A’s could not affordsecond chances when scouting and purchasing players like other teams could. When the Yankees make a mistake acquiring a player, it was a disappointment but not a tragedy. But the problem forBilly Beane was how teams were scouting and purchasing players. The common sense rules of scouting baseball players had been around for hundreds of years. Players were judge on how hard they threw, how fast they could run, or how athletic they looked. Good players “look like a stud” and have a “face with character (Cullen, 2009, 205.)” Moneyball changed this. Billy Beane and Moneyball used sabermetrics and other more useful detailed statistics to judge players. The first use of these sabermetrics was from Bill James, a baseball mathematician,in the 1970’s but most well known from Billy Beane. While scouts preferred high batting averages and home runs, Beane looked at walks and on base percentage because a base is gained without the cost of an out. No game has more access to statistics and data than baseball, but so much of it went unused and under-appreciated. This statistical evidence took away bias “gut instincts” from the game so more accurate decisions could be made. Beane was heavily criticized, even by men in his own organization, for trying to change what had been around forever. But for a small payroll team like the Oakland A’s; statistical evidence was important for an industry with a “tight correspondence between pay and productivity (Cullen, 2009, 203).” 4Billy Beane, Moneyball, and an Unfair GameThis required Billy Beane to acquire new players after losing stars to free agency. The A’s remained successful despite losing stars like Johnny Damon, Jermaine Dye, Jason Giambi, Dan Haren, Tim Hudson, Mark Mulder, Barry Zito, and more. Statistical AnalysisFor years, the most common measure of hitting skill was batting average. But because it weights singles and homeruns as the same, it ignores the added value of hits of more than a single base. This is the benefit of using the sabermetric slugging percentage, which divides total bases instead of hits by at bats. But even slugging percentage ignores the values of sacrifices andwalks because they do not officially count as at bats. This leads to the importance of on base percentage which values a walk the same as a single because they both lead to one base. This is one of the biggest themes of sabermetrics, Moneyball, and Billy Beane’s general managing style:the ability to get on base was undervalued in the baseball labor market. The A’s emphasized walks, leading the American league in 2000, 2002, and 2004 (Hakes, 2009,182.) Third basemen Eric Chavez said, “The A’s started showing me these number…how guys’ on base percentages are important. It was like they didn’t want me to hit for average or for home runs, but walks would get me to the big leagues (Hakes, 2009, 182).” While other teams were looking at batting averages and home


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