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I. Conditions for Class CompromiseLecture 18 Sociology 621 November 16,2005 Class Struggle and Class Compromise If one holds to the emancipatory vision of a democratic socialist alternative to capitalism, then Adam Przeworski’s analysis of class formation paints a considerably more pessimistic picture than that of Offe and Weisenthal. (On the other hand, if one is only concerned with the prospects of improvements in conditions of life for ordinary people within capitalism, then in some ways Przeworski is quite optimistic). He sees no necessary cycle between militancy and opportunism, and certainly no spiral which impels workers towards waves of radicalization and rejection of economism/opportunism. Instead, at least for developed, industrial capitalism, Przeworski sees capitalism as firmly capable of creating the material basis for a more or less permanent class compromise between labor and capital. The issue of the possibilities for a rupture, therefore, become primarily concerned with the cultural contradictions of capitalism, with the ways in which ideological crises may be generated within those material conditions, but not because of any unraveling of the material base of consent itself. Przeworski’s analysis of class compromise focuses much less on the internal logic of organization-building or on the problem of getting rational individuals to join a collective action, and more on the dynamic relation between already collectively formed classes which defines the terrain on which class formation takes. He arrives at two fundamental theses which can be termed the class compromise thesis and the transition cost thesis: 1. Class compromise thesis: Under certain conditions, if workers and capitalists act rationally in the pursuit of economic interests, then they will converge on a class compromise form of class conflict in which (a) capitalists agree to return part of the fruits of accumulation to workers in the form of productivity-based wage increases, and (b) workers agree to moderate their wage demands to a level which does not threaten the rate of profit and to cooperate with capital within the labor process. Understood in this way, a class compromise is not simply a stalemate -- a balance of forces on a battleground. This might be called a “negative class compromise”; rather it is a situation where the possibility exists for some gains from cooperation between workers and capitalists, or what can be called “positive class compromise”. 2. Transition costs thesis: Once a class compromise is reached, then the transition costs involved in a socialist rupture will always be sufficiently high to make it economically irrational for workers (individually and collectively) to struggle for socialism. The struggle for socialism, therefore, can only be based on noneconomic criteria.Lecture 18. Class Compromise 2 I. Conditions for Class Compromise 1. Foundational Fact about capitalism: Przeworski’s basic argument for the possibility of class compromise is this: It is a fundamental fact of capitalism that economic growth and innovation comes out of private profits. This has profound implications for working-class class formation. Workers’ present welfare depends upon two central variables: 1) level of productivity 2) workers’ ability to resist exploitation (capture part of the surplus produced) Workers future welfare also depends upon two processes: 3) capitalists’ present investments out of the surplus they appropriate, 4) workers capacity to appropriate future stream of wages from productivity growth BUT this generates a dilemma: workers cannot maximize both #2 and #3. This generates a deep tension within working class struggles since workers face a potential trade-off between present and future income in their struggles with capitalists. This is like the perpetual trade-off inherent in every act of balancing present consumption against future consumption – you save from present consumption in order to consume more in the future – with the crucial added problem of struggle and uncertainty. Let us suppose that workers are insufficiently powerful to overthrow capitalism in their lifetime, but they are powerful enough that they could win very large wage increases through their struggles. Would it be rational for them to do so? Przeworski’s answer is that the rationality of particular wage-strategies of workers depends upon the likely response of capitalists to different levels of working class militancy. 2. Levels of Militancy & class compromise “Optimal militancy” = that level of militancy which generates the maximum sustainable positive trajectory in wages over time (assuming continuation of capitalism). “Maximal Militancy” = the maximum achievable level of antagonistic struggle against capital Let us suppose that no class compromise is possible, either because the economic conditions do not allow it or because the capitalist class is so short-sighted and selfish that they refuse to make any deal with workers. They prefer all-out class war. Under suchLecture 18. Class Compromise 3 conditions, Przeowrski argues, workers will do better by being maximally militant, by trying to obtain maximum wage increases at every point in time. Hyper-radicalism thesis: optimal militancy = maximal militancy: class compromise is always a sham. Class Compromise Thesis: under certain conditions optimal militancy is less intense than maximal militancy. A class compromise means that in exchange for workers moderating their militancy, capitalists agree to reinvest part of the surplus (profits) and to give workers some of the fruits of this reinvestment in the form of productivity based wage increases. Under such conditions, Przeworski argues, the optimal strategy for workers is to be moderately militant: sufficiently militant to ensure that capitalists abide to their side of the bargain, but not so militant as to threaten the compromise by squeezing the rate of profit. 3. Conditions for sustainable class compromise The critical issue is, then, what determines the feasibility of class compromise? Three issues are especially important: time horizons, trust, associational power. (1). Time horizons (2). Trust (3). working class associational power (1) Time horizons The problem of time horizons basically concerns how far in the future workers and capitalists make strategic calculations. The higher the degree of uncertainty about future


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UW-Madison SOC 621 - Class Struggle and Class Compromise

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