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Auctioning one item

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Auctioning one item PART 3Undesirable private information revelationUntruthful bidding with local uncertainty even in VickreyWasteful counterspeculationSnipingPowerPoint PresentationSniping… Amazon auctions give automatic extensions, eBay does not Antiques auctions have expertsSniping…Slide 10Mobile bidder agents in eMediatorSlide 12Mobile bidder agents in eMediator...Conclusions on 1-item auctionsAuctioning one itemPART 3 Tuomas SandholmComputer Science Department Carnegie Mellon UniversityUndesirable private information revelation•Agents strategic marginal cost information revealed because truthful bidding is a dominant strategy in Vickrey (and English)–Observed problems with subcontractors•First-price sealed-bid & Dutch may not reveal this info as accurately–Lying–No dominant strategy–Bidding decisions depend on beliefs about othersUntruthful bidding with local uncertainty even in Vickrey•Uncertainty (inherent or from computation limitations)•Many real-world parties are risk averse•Computational agents take on owners preferences•Thrm [Sandholm ICMAS-96]. It is not the case that in a private value Vickrey auction with uncertainty about an agent’s own valuation, it is a risk averse agent’s best (dominant or equilibrium) strategy to bid its expected value•Higher expected utility e.g. by bidding lowWasteful counterspeculationThrm [Sandholm ICMAS-96]. In a private value Vickrey auction with uncertainty about an agent’s own valuation, a risk neutral agent’s best (deliberation or information gathering) action can depend on others.E.g. two bidders (1 and 2) bid for a good.v1 uniform between 0 and 1; v2 deterministic, 0 ≤ v2 ≤ 0.5Agent 1 bids 0.5 and gets item at price v2:Say agent 1 has the choice of paying c to find out v1. Then agent 1 will bid v1 and get the item iff v1 ≥ v2 (no loss possibility, but c invested)E[1nopay]  v1 v2d01v112 v2v1pdfv2lossgain1E[1pay]  c  v1 v2dv21vE[1pay] E[1nopay]  v2 2cSniping= bidding very late in the auction in the hopes that other bidders do not have time to respondEspecially an issue in electronic auctions with network lag and lossy communication links[from Roth & Ockenfels]Sniping… Amazon auctions give automatic extensions, eBay does notAntiques auctions have experts[from Roth & Ockenfels]Sniping…[from Roth & Ockenfels]Mobile bidder agents in eMediator•Allow user to participate while disconnected•Avoid network lag•Put expert bidders and novices on an equal footing•Full flexibility of Java (Concordia)•Template agents through an HTML page for non-programmers–Information agent–Incrementor agent–N-agent–Control agent–Discover agentMobile bidder agents in eMediatorMobile bidder agents in eMediator...Conclusions on 1-item auctions•Nontrivial, but often analyzable with reasonable effort–Important to understand merits & limitations–Unintuitive protocols may have better properties•Vickrey auction induces truth-telling & avoids counterspeculation (in limited settings)•Choice of a good auction protocol depends on the setting in which the protocol is


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