Final Exam Study Guide Thursday April 23 2015 12 32 PM Chayes Chayes Intro Realist arguments on State Compliance of Treaties Focuses on the assumption that national actions are governed by a calculation of interests In this view deliberate violations can lead to hostile reactions and jeopardize the possibility of cooperative relations It is however unlikely that states will devote the time and effort they do to creating treaties if they will just violate them Varieties of Non Complying Behavior States infrequently willfully violate international legal obligations 3 Unintentional Circumstances that lead to Violations Ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language Limitations on the capacities of parties to carry out their obligations The temporal dimension of the social and economic changes contemplated by treaties 1 2 3 Ambiguity Treaty language comes in varying degrees of specificity The broader and more general the language the more permissible legal interpretations it gives rise to However language can be left purposely vague in order to help build political consensus in favor of the treaty However even precisely written treaties generate loopholes Different valid interpretations by parties will create a range of acceptable behavior by states Capacity Particularly in regulatory treaties the object of the treaty is not to affect state behavior but to regulate the behavior of non state actors This binds states to establish and enforce full blown domestic regimes designed to regulate that behavior However the construction of an effective regulatory regime is not always a simple task Many states may struggle with domestic enforcement bureaucratic abilities that hinder them from being able to regulate such behavior The Temporal Dimension The social or economic changes mandates by regulatory regimes take time to accomplish This at one any moment many states may appear to be in full violation One solution has been for capable states to offer technical and financial assistance to the states unable to comply with the treaty Conclusion Noncompliance must be viewed as deviant rather than deliberate This leads to a de emphasis of formal enforcement measures Instead it shifts attention to the sources of noncompliance that can be managed by routine international political processes INR 3933 International Public Law Page 1 routine international political processes Downs Rocke and Barsoom Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation No Why The depth of the cooperation matters The level that a state differs from its prescribed course States have not signed on to treaties that differ that greatly from their status norm Therefore they do not necessarily comply because it is things that they would ve done regardless It was already in the states interest to act in that matter The Managerialists Chayes and Chayes are wrong They view compliance as a management problem rather than an enforcement problem States do not comply because Ambiguity Capacity Temporal Dimension Solutions Improve dispute resolution mechanism Solve ambiguity where disputes would normally occur Increase Transparency Solves the temporal dimension Increase technical and financial support Argument Depth of Cooperation Guzman Intro Extent to which a treaty requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence Reputation Judgements about an actor s past behavior to predict future behavior A state s reputation for compliance with legal obligations consists of judgements about the state s past behavior and predictions about future compliance based on that behavior Compliance Decision When a state makes a compliance decision it sends a signal about its willingness to honor international legal obligations Other states use this information to adjust their own behavior A good reputation is valuable because it makes promises more credible and future cooperation easier and less costly Reputation States are interested in reputation only to the extent that it can help one s standing within the international community and affects payoffs Reputational Sanction The passive cost imposed on a state when their reputation is damaged It is non costly to non violators States that comply with their obligations will develop a reputation for good compliance This makes it promises more credible and make future cooperation both easier and less costly INR 3933 International Public Law Page 2 Discount Rate What states are willing to discount from future benefits by gaining today States will violate international agreements when their discount rates are high States will estimate other state s discount rates to try to estimate a states likelihood of compliance Def Actions that will be taken without the intent to sanction a violator It is an adjustment in the state s behavior motivated by a desire to maximize Costly to violators Raises the cost of violations Not costly to the non violator Reciprocity Retaliation Def Explicit and costly punishments imposed by an aggrieved party towards a violating non compliance party Is also costly to the retaliating state But will only be undertaken when the payoffs exceed the costs The act of retaliating will enhance the retaliating state s reputation as one that punishes a violator The impact of such a reputation is to increase the expected cost of violating an agreement with that state By retaliating then the state hopes to generate its own reputational capital that will induce its partners to be more compliant with their legal obligations Solution Improve dispute resolution mechanism Solve ambiguity where disputes would normally occur Increase Transparency Solves the temporal dimension Increase technical and financial support Solves capacity issues Chp 17 Adjudication Adjudication Def A method that involves the use of an impartial third party tribunal that will result in a binding decision based upon law Advantages to States States see it as impartial impersonal principled and authoritative It may buy them time and defuse a situation Domestic Cover The ideas of impartiality and neutrality underlie all adjudication Disadvantages Lengthy Costly A lack of control to states Focus of Adjudication Maritime disputes Border disputes Two Types Arbitration Ad hoc panels that are created for each specific dispute through an agreement called a compromis States have a choice of designating panel members INR 3933 International Public Law Page 3 Once the panel completes its commission it is disbanded