Lecture 10 31 11 Wednesday November 02 2011 12 33 PM UN Peacekeeping A What is peacekeeping Dag Hammerskjold Lester Peason i ii i ii b The tenets Consent Impartiality 1 Don t take sides Minimum use of force iii a Doctrine developed during the Suez Crisis in 1956 c These three elements complement each other i Ie reputation for impartiality and min force means easier consent d In wars that are a good fit this peacekeeping is effective i ii Stalemate Effective in that period of peace after is prolonged B Consent a b Takes time so this can create frustration The UN provides a policy instrument consent based impartial postwar periods of peace i ii Effective at low cost when combatants are willing to stop fighting and consent to the intervention States have difficult time playing a peace keeping role Intl Politics lectures Page 1 Lecture 11 2 11 Wednesday November 02 2011 12 34 PM A Where do the peacekeepers go a b c d e UN responds appropriately to the number of deaths in a conflict Causalities UN likely to intervene in a conflict the longer it lasts No evidence that UN intervention is neo imperialism in disguise Strong evidence for regional bias Worst bias is not against africa but against asia Regional Avoid interventions in countries where state had large military presence measured by of troops in army Terminology Hazard rate probability of an event occurring at a particular time given it had not occurred up to that point Peacekeeping length of time that war starts the hazard that the UN will intervene Function of bullets under A B The UN seems to respond appropriately to the number of deaths in a conflict a Example of Baseline case i ii iii Average size army causalities etc Conflict in africa Graph showing UN probability of intervention after years of conflict b If change the causalities from Baseline case increase by one standard deviation 1 2 3 4 X years Y probability of UN intervention After 10 years like 3 After 30 years 12 i Increases exponentially If change the location to Asia c Almost no chance of UN intervention d If change to Europe Increase more after 10 years 10 i i C The UN seems to avoid interventions in countries where the state had a large limitary presence a b Baseline If size of army is 1 standard deviation less than sample mean Almost with certainty UN intervenes after 7 years i D NO evidence that UN intervention is neo imperialism in disguise a b UN no more likely to intervene in countries that were former colonies UN no more likely to intervene in country w lots raw materials E UN more likely to intervene in a conflict the longer it lasts Counterfactuals about the Cambodian civil war a Factual 13 years Predicted by the Model 13 1 years b If 1 m deaths rather than 3m 130 years Africa rather than asia Europe rather than asia 8 years 3 years a b c UN responds appropriately to human toll of the conflict UN does not shy away from long lasting intractable conflicts No evidence that Security Council motivated by grubby imperialistic motives F Good News G Bad News a Regional Bias i More people have to die in Africa or Asia than Europe before UN intervenes Is Peacekeeping Effective Previous quantitative studies established correlation between UN peacekeeping and post conflict peace A a Studies i ii iii Doyle and Sambanis 2000 Hartzel Hoddie and Rothchild Etc B Problem with studies a treatment UN intervention is not randomly assigned i ii iii Intervention based on the factors listed above region casualties etc Cannot determine if estimated effects of UN intervention is due to other factors Selection Bias Extreme counterfactuals b i Example 1 2 3 4 Scatterplot Y months of post war peace X casualties Negative correlation Intl Politics lectures Page 2 4 5 6 7 Negative correlation Black dots UN intervention greater Red dots without UN intervention Line of fit for both set of dots a Non UN higher more months of peace per casualties i Might lead to na ve assumption that UN doing shit job b But really comparing and oranges i ii iii Assumption that the relation of causalities and post war peace is a straight line Cannot infer what UN intervention would look like with low casualties if it never happened Solution One Compare vertically Intl Politics lectures Page 3 For Against Lecture 11 9 11 Wednesday November 09 2011 12 34 PM Domestic Origins of Foreign Policy Maoz and Russett Competing hypothesis A The Puzzle a Democratic peace theory i ii Democracies not less probability to go to war Democracies not likely to war with each other b Purpose of Domestic Origins of Foreign Policy Presumes that democratic peace theory keeps up Look at WHY democratic peace theory keeps up i ii Objections B a b So few wars the prob of two democracies going to war is low anyways Militarized interstate dispute MID i ii iii Less than a thousand people die Near miss at a war Democratic peace theory fails if MID considered a war C Most reasonable explanation for Democratic Peace Theory a Two categories i Structural Explanations 1 Checks and balances a Yet shouldn t this prevent war with both democratic and non ii Normative Explanations 1 2 3 4 The norm for Democratic society is negotiation and compromise rather than war If other country is like that you are more likely to do the shared norm of negotiation rather than war In non democracy Anarchy conflict with non democracy an emergency to avoid being swallowed up No world gov to prevent you from being swallowed up Controls iii Similarities Differences D E a Norms will not emerge immediately after a country becomes a democracy i ii The longer you ve been a democracy the longer negotiations take Type of democracy does not matter Structural Checks and balances kick in right away Structural implies differences in each democracy b c i The extent of checks and balances differ for different democracies F G Operationalizing norms and structural The critical test Norms Level of Constraints Prediction of normative model Prediction of structural model a Intl Politics lectures Page 4 High Conflict Low conflict Low Conflict High Conflict a Low High High Low H Construction of the paper a Motivation i ii The puzzle How to advance the literature b Normative assumptions Power Like money in economics Defining power A a b a b B New Definition Ability to make someone do something that they would otherwise not do Problems i ii Impute the counterfactual Definition is not very compelling Relative GDP weapons Problems i ii iii iv Motivation of the other side How to quantify