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ECON 1116 14 NovemberWelfare Theorem- The societal value of the marginal unit is equal to the marginal price- The societal cost of the marginal unit is equal to the marginal price- MCsoc = MVsoc when in market is in equilibriumExternalities- An external cost (or negative externality or spillover cost) is a cost that accrues to a party outside the market transaction- An external benefit (or positive externality or spillover benefit) is a benefit that accrues to a party outside the market transaction- Implications:o The parties transacting do not consider externalities when making their decisionso Market prices will not reflect the full social costs or benefits at the margino Inefficient allocation of resources Too much provision of a good that provides an external cost Too little provision of a good that provides an external benefit- There is a missing “externalities market”o This market would feasibly “internalize the externality”- Two means by which to account for externalities:1. Private solutionsa. Agents voluntarily participateb. Akin to providing missing market2. Imposed solutions a. Government interventionb. Impose taxes and subsidies- Example: every citizen has the right not to consume pollutiono If production generates pollution, then to sell a unit the producer must Bear the production cost Buy the right not to consume pollution from the public The market price of the right not to consume pollution will be the marginal value of that right: i.e. the marginal pollution costo Thus, the producer now faces the full social cost of producing (including pollution)- Example: producers have the right to generate pollutiono If production generates pollution, then the producer  Bears the production cost Forgoes the opportunity to sell the pollution right to the general public (an opportunity cost)- Private solutionso The efficient outcome will be obtained if Property rights are defined and enforced over the right to benefit from or impose the costs of an externalityECON 1116 14 November Agents are free to trade efficiently in these rights (i.e., no transaction costs)o The initial allocation of the property rights is not important for obtaining the efficient outcome The allocation only affects the final distribution of wealth- If citizens hold the right not to consume pollution, they will have feasibly sold this right to producers, and thus they gain the permit-selling wealth- If producers hold the right to pollute, they will have feasibly sold this right to the public, and thus they gain the permit-selling wealth Coase Theorem- Private arrangements will be negotiated to ensure that externalities are internalizedo Efficiency will be secured through private bargaining over rights to impose externalitieso If there is a social surplus available, private parties will find a way to attain ito Property rights Cost of identifying and enforcing property rights is often a large impediment to private agreementso Transactions and bargaining Costs will also provide barrier to efficiency  People don’t have good valuation of pollution (they don’t reallyknow how to gauge how much its presence or absence means to them) There is little incentive for the individual to act, and must act as a group—which can often be quite difficulto Successful private solutions? Cap and trade agreements- Companies are given the right to produce a certain amount of pollution, and may sell the right to produce a unit of pollution to other companies- Technically, there is government involvement in these solutions, but only insofar as they define the market- Alternatives to private solutionso Regulation by command Legislate technology to be used Legislate caps on output of products Unfortunately, there is no way to ensure that the “cheap” method of abatement is usedo Regulation by taxation Impose a tax equal to the marginal external damage from pollution at the efficient quantity of the good’s productionECON 1116 14 November- Pigouvian tax—need to know about private costs and benefits; cannot measure pollution directly, can only manipulate the output of a good - Production and tax costs- Redetermine optimal output given new


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NU ECON 1116 - Welfare Theorem6

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