DOC PREVIEW
MSU EC 201 - Chapter 5

This preview shows page 1-2-3-27-28-29 out of 29 pages.

Save
View full document
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 29 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 29 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 29 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 29 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 29 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 29 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 29 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience

Unformatted text preview:

Krugman and Wells Chapter 5OverviewRent control: Santa Monica 1998Price controlsPrice ceiling example: rent controlPrice ceiling example: rent controlPrice ceiling example: rent controlPrice ceiling example: rent control Price ceiling example: rent controlPrice ceiling example: rent controlPrice ceiling example: rent controlSo why price ceilings/rent controls?Rent control: Santa Monica 1998Price floor example: butterPrice floor example: butterPrice floor example: butterAnd just to be clearPrice floor example: butterSo why price floors?And to explain it one last way…Quantity ControlsSlide Number 22Quantity ControlsQuantity control: taxi medallionsQuantity control: taxi medallionsQuantity control: taxi medallionsSo why quantity controls?Applying this to liquor licensesSummaryKrugman and Wells Chapter 5 Steven J. Haider EC201 Spring 2015p2 Overview  Chap. 3: how competitive markets work  Chap. 4: measuring the benefits from markets  This chapter: we examine two types of market interventions  Price controls (floors and ceilings)  Quantity controls  Both will lead to reductions in surplus/inefficient outcomes Caution: we’re now using chapters 3 and 4 material. Please keep up with the homework problems or the lectures will not make sense!p3  Rent controls  Location, location, location  $700/month, but worth $1400/month  Other facts  $2000 showing fee  Changes in 1/99, and 2 available in 6/98  3 interviews  Neighbors  Keep apartment when moving?  Long-term elderly occupants Rent control: Santa Monica 1998p4 Price controls  Price ceiling: a restriction on the maximum price allowed  Example: rent control Example: wage controls during WW II (gave rise to firm-provided health insurance)  Price floor: a restriction on the minimum price allowed  Example: minimum wage (the price of labor in the labor market) Example: some agricultural programs (guaranteed price on a commodity) Both of these actions are market interventions, perhaps with certain intended consequences. With our models, we can predict consequences more generally…p5 Price ceiling example: rent control  If the market were competitive, we would expect the equilibrium price/quantity: $1000/month and 2.0m unitsp6 Price ceiling example: rent control  Suppose price ceiling of $800/month  At $800/month, quantity supplied is 1.8m and the quantity demanded is 2.2m  Although there is excess demand at this price, the price cannot increase because of the price ceiling  Predicted outcome: $800/month and 1.8m units transacted  There is housing shortage of 400,000 (not 200,000)  Outcome is determined by the supply curvep7 Price ceiling example: rent control  Suppose a price ceiling of $1200/month  Predicted outcome: $1000/month and 2.0m units  Why? Price wants to be where S=D, and the ceiling doesn’t keep us from there  This price ceiling is not bindingp8 Price ceiling example: rent control  Other effects: inefficiently low quantity  Competitive equilibrium is efficient—so price ceiling causes too few apartments to be transacted Deadweight loss: the loss of total surplus due to a market intervention  Deadweight loss is the yellow trianglep9 Price ceiling example: rent control  Other effects: inefficient allocation to consumers  There may be someone holding on to an $800 apartment who values the apartment at $850, with someone not in an apartment (the shortage) who would value it at $1100p10 Price ceiling example: rent control  Other effects: other distributional issues  Winner: individuals who pay $800 rather than $1000  Losers: (a) sellers who receive $800 rather than $1000; (b) seller who receive zero/don’t produce rather than $1000; (c) buyers who don’t rent rather than rent at $1000p11 Price ceiling example: rent control  Other effects: wasted resources  There are 400,000 extra people chasing the apartments: how are they allocated? Standing in line?  Other effects: inefficiently low quality  With such excess demand, little incentive to upkeep the apartment  (Incentive is there, but a little outside our model)  Other effects: black markets  Side payments / “finders fees”  Other effects: reduced costs to discrimination  In equilibrium, it can be costly to withhold apartment from “the wrong type”  With a waiting line of 400,000, one can be choosy….p12 So why price ceilings/rent controls?  We’ve discussed a lot of potential negative effects  Persistent shortage  Inefficiencies  Black market/illegal activities/wasted activities  Possible explanations  People do not understand economics (“unintended” vs. “unexpected” consequences)  Perhaps there are strong beliefs that the market is not competitive  Example: maybe there are few landlords who control market  “Insiders”, who benefit from the low rents, have political power  People who already live in the area pay low rents and vote  The lower rent for “insiders” is seen as fair  Imagine someone who has lived someplace for 30 years—cannot afford to stay with rents sky-rocketing  The policy might promote a more diverse community  A community might want to retain lower-income individuals (diversity in race, diversity in occupation) Constructing “appropriate” policy requires the consideration of all these factorsp13  Rent controls  Location, location, location  $700/month, but worth $1400/month  Other facts  $2000 showing fee  Changes January 1999  2 apartments available in June 1998  3 interviews  Neighbors  Keep apartment?  Long-term elderly occupants Rent control: Santa Monica 1998 Below market price Discrimination? Shortage Waste/illegal Illegally sublet? Waste/illegal Fairnessp14 Price floor example: butter  If the market were competitive, we would expect the equilibrium price/quantity: $1.00/lb and 10.0m lbsp15 Price floor example: butter  Suppose price floor of $1.20/lb  Predicted outcome: $1.20/lb and 9m lbs  Supply is 12m lbs, implying a butter surplus of 3m lbs  Would a price floor of $0.80 lead to a surplus? No…  The price floor would not be binding  What happens to surpluses?  Could it sit on shelves?  Gov’t may get it: stores it, throws it away, school lunches…p16 Price floor example: butter  Other effects: inefficiently low quantity 


View Full Document

MSU EC 201 - Chapter 5

Download Chapter 5
Our administrator received your request to download this document. We will send you the file to your email shortly.
Loading Unlocking...
Login

Join to view Chapter 5 and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or
We will never post anything without your permission.
Don't have an account?
Sign Up

Join to view Chapter 5 2 2 and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or

By creating an account you agree to our Privacy Policy and Terms Of Use

Already a member?