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USC POSC 130g - POSC 130 2_4

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● Top hat question ○ Perceived diffused costs/benefits - majoritarian politics ○ Perceived concentrated costs/benefits - interests groups politics○ Perceived concentrated costs/diffused benefits - entrepreneurial ○ Perceived diffuse costs/concentrated - client politics ● Putting some pieces together○ Defines opportunity structure ■ Groups ● Startegics choices■ Fragmented political authority ● Creates choice of forum ■ Grievances● Creates imperatives to mobilize ● Brown as a political resources to shift perceptions about policy proposals ○ Interest groups politics: distribution of local benefits○ Brown creates a right to desegregation ○ Entrepreneurial politics: school desegregation is now a constitutional right being imposed on the south ○ Civil rights groups civil disobedience highlights southern resistance to the “law”○ Majoritarian politics: executive branch intervenes on the grounds that everyone benefits from the rule of law ■ Litigation as “constitutive” of policy perceptions and (as a result) of politics● Overview of the limits on law and courts: 3 ideal types ○ Doctrinal constraints: limits on the courts derived from statutes, court decisions, or administrative regulations ○ Institutional constraints: limits its on the courts that stem from ■ The way in which the courts are internally organized ■ The way in which courts interact with other (“external”) political actors ○ Cultural constraints: limits on courts that stem from elite or public opinion ○ NOTE: these are general descriptive categories not water tight compartments--some constraints fall into more than one category ● How do we know that law matters as a “constraint”○ Given the logic of the triad, we expect judges to say that law matters in all cases. So, how do we know that it does?○ Look at the type of signal (textual/content analysis) of the underlying law…○ Look at the voting patterns (bahvorial analysis) ● Some exapmles of doctrinal constraints in the US constitution●○ Some laws are vague■ Article I section 8--the “necessary and proper”■ 4th amendment--the right against “unreasonable search and seizures”■ 5th amendemtn and 14th--the right to due process■ 14th amendment--equal protection○ Some are more specific■ Article I, section 9--the appropriation clause■ 7th amendment--the right to a jury trial■ 22nd amendment--presidential term limits■ 26th amendment--right to vote for those 18 and above○ Ceteris paribus, the more specific the law, the stronger the constraint ● Behavioral analysis of doctrinal constraint○ Coleman v. tollesfson ■ 9-0 decision■ Ceteris paribus, if law was a strong constraint, ideologically diverse judges would vote the same● How do we know the law matters as a constraint?○ Look at the type of signal (text/content analysis)○ Looking at voting pattern (behavioral analysis) (revealed preference)○ Judicial cant (textual/content + behavioral analysis)■ Judges apply some laws even though the disagree with the underlying policies ● Fugitive slave act● Tax law■ Look at what judges don't decide (a variation on the “framing” theme)● Constraints of judicial power v. coercion ● Limits on the law and courts” definitions continued○ Constraints on judicial power: limits on the court's ability to act■ “Justiciability”○ Constraints on judicial coercion: limits on the court's ability to implement decisions ■ “Remedy” law● Politically katrina…● The storm created a large class of claimants seeking compensation for their losses○ They first turned to the elected branches○ Unlike desegregation, congress and president acted and passed legislation■ Passed a lot of laws○ Not that congress was unwilling to act, but it was ineffective, a different kind of political failure ● The promise of the courts ○ The promise■ When the elected branches respond has failed, what would happen?● The courts!● Class action lawsuit against the Army Corps of Engineers based on the design flaws of levee systems ○ The limits■ Judicial cant■ Under the flood control act, the army corps of engineers cannot be sued■ In 2008, judge duval upheld the limitation on judicial power even though the agency of gross


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USC POSC 130g - POSC 130 2_4

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