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UNT PSCI 3810 - Exam 2 Study Guide
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PSCI 3810 1st EditionExam # 2 Study Guide Lectures: 1 - 12Lecture 1 (March 2nd)I. Armed ConflictA. Conflict (of interest)1. Currently no crisis/war between these states but it is possible; disagree on important issues.B. Crisis/ “Militarized Interstate Dispute”1. One or both sides threatens to use military force.2. War becomes a realistic possibility.C. War1. Sustained combat between regular armed forces - Correlates of War (COW) Interstate War: 1000+ battle deaths- Also civil/interstate wars, extra-systemic/extra-stateD. Peace1. Unstable/Negative Peace: no current crisis/war, i.e. absence of war2. Stable/Positive Peace: not preparing for crisis/warE. Purpose1. “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” (War is a political tool.) - Carl von Clausewitza) Happens for a political reason (contentious issues)b) Acquire territory, overthrow regime, trade, environment, drugs, immigration, treatment of minorities. 2. Military force is only one of many policy tools.a. Force, negotiations, sanctions, World CourtII. Patterns in Armed ConflictA. Conflict of Interest1. Thousands exist around the world at any time.a. Territorial Claims (over territory, sovereignty): 1816-2001 around 850b. Maritime Claims (fishing oil, navigation): 1900-2001 around 200-250c. River claims: (dams, irrigation)B.Militarized Interstate Disputes1. 1816-2001: 2332 (4.6% escalate to war)C.Interstate Wars1. 1816-2001: 79;2. Less frequent over time, but deadlier.3. No wars between major power since WWII or Korea.D. Intrastate Civil Wars1. 1816-2001: 2132. Mostly in the developing world.3. More than interstate wars in every era. (especially since the Cold War)III. Anarchy & The Security DilemmaA. Review of International Anarchy1. No sovereign authority above the states.2. No way to guarantee what others intentions are now or in future.3. Major obstacle to cooperation.4. Self help must assume and prepare for the worst.B.Realist Response: “Para Bellum” Doctrine1. Vegetius (Roman general)a. Si vis pacem, para bellum (if you seek peace, prepare for war)b. “To secure peace is to prepare for war.” - Metallica, “Don’t Tread On Me”c. “Because any state may at any time use force. All states must constantly be ready to either counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness.” - Kenneth WaltzC.Security Dilemma1. Dilemma: complete security unattainablea. Actions to increase A’s security may decrease B’s security;b. B’s response may decrease A’s securityc. Can lead to arms race of conflict-- even if neither has aggressive intentions.2. Why are they building up their military?a. Offense or defense between A or B, or offense/defense on another state (C or D), domestici. can’t be sure; self-fulfillingii. ex. China missiles, US missile defenseIV. The Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) Game TheoryA. “Game Theory” (method, not a theory)1. Simplified model of interactions: to help understand actors’ motivations for conflict/cooperation under anarchy.2. Rationality: each actor chooses best option to pursue its one’s self-interest.3. Strategic interaction: outcomes results from both actors’ choices.B. The Prisoner’s Dilemma GameC. Insight into cooperation1. Best Joint Solution = neither confesses (CC)2. No way for both to do better at the same time3. So states in IR have incentive to cooperate 4. But with anarchy, no guarantees/no trust 5. Best individual solution: more rational to defect, no matter what opponent doesD. Applications to International Relations1. Protectionism vs. free tradea. Outcomes: CC= free trade, DD= trade war, CD/DC= uneven tariffs/subsidiesb. Best: uneven benefits for you (DC)c. 2nd best: free trade (CC)d. 3rd best: trade war (DD) both sides suffere. Worst: lose (CD): you suffer, opponent gainsi. DC > CC > DD> CPii. Cooperation good but difficult (cheating is best)2. Nuclear proliferation between rivals (e.g. India vs. Pakistan)a. CC desirable = no costs/risks from acquiring nukes3. Prisoner’s Dilemma captures the realist view well1.But not every situation is Prisoner’s Dilemma.Lecture 2 (March 6th) I. Studying Causes of ConflictA. J. David Singer’s First Law1. Nothing in IR happens for one reason alone2. Most wars have numerous causes (at multiple levels of analyses)a) The contentious issues at stakeb) Factors that may make leaders choose war.B. Not meaningfulC. Why fight?1. Costly -at least 1 peaceful solution that both would have preferred to war in retrospect:a) Maybe same outcome/distribution, but lower costs 2. James Fearon’s 2 Main answers:a. Information problems (incentive to bluff, lie, hide, private info)b. Commitment problems (anarchy = no trust can’t credibly commit to keep their word.)II. Individual-Level CausesA. The Basic IdeaB. Human Nature1. Realism (Hobbes, Morgenthau)2. Feminism only b/c men have made the rules.a) might be difficult to achieve. C. Misperception & deviations from rationality1. Bad perceptions, high stress, other psychological limitations can cause bad decisions;2. Bad decisions can cause war or prevent peaceful solutions. III. Domestic Level CausesA. The Basic IdeaB. Decision-Making Group Dynamics1. Can reduce misperceptiona) “Groupthink” : cohesive, similar backgrounds. strong loyaltyb) Often quick consensus, won’t challenge each other.c) So complete rational evaluation less likely.2. Hard to measure + predict C. Diversionary Theory: “Wag the Dog Theory”1. Rally-round-the-flag-effect: (temporary) rise in support for leader facing foreign threat:2. Diversion: response to domestic policy/economic crises (try to take advantage of rally effect)a. Ex. Argentina: 1982 Falkland War (economic crisis) 3. Details vary, but some support in political science research.D. Standard Operating Procedures (military doctrines = war plans)1. War plan may not be right or every situation (may lead to an unwanted war.) 2. “Cult of the offensive” (esp. under anarchy)a. Schlieffen Plan (war plan devised by Germany against France and Russia)E. State Characteristics1. Democratic Peace: cause of peace, not wa2. National Attributes (economy, demographic, cultural, political instability)IV. Interstate Level CausesA. Consequences of Security Dilemma1. Arms Races: consequence of Para Belluma) Rapid mutual buildup (each responds to the rival)b) Risks: increase tension & distrust - make crisis/war more likely)c) Evidence: crisis/war more likely to start, escalate during an arms race. 2. Crisis


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UNT PSCI 3810 - Exam 2 Study Guide

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