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UB PHI 237 - Kant's Moral Theory

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PHI 237 1st Edition Lecture 155. An intrinsic value, a value in someone but not for someone is the basis of Kant’s moral theory. Onecan’t treat a being with value as a mere means to one’s interest fulfillment. - Kants moral theory  impressed with conscious- Good in itself called this property humanity- Value in us but not for us  does not depends us caring about us  values lies in us- Morality grounding6. Since all rational people have dignity, it is not a value in which any individual is an expert and whosejudgment should be deferred to because it is his value. This person is valuable only because he shares avalue common to all who possess the property of humanity (i.e. rationality).- What makes me think different than your happiness is on interest  value is same- Dignity doesn’t have a price- Your value is same as mine- Doesn’t fulfill dignity, cant be compared to anything- Dignity belongs to all persons - Dignity never be given up7 Respect for a person’s autonomy or self-determination does not mean deferring to him on questions ofhis dignity as it does on questions of his good. 8. We respect a person’s autonomy only because he has value. If he insists he doesn’t have value, thenhis autonomy (like his interests) doesn’t matter and he can’t expect us to defer to his judgment that hislife is not worth respecting. These notes represent a detailed interpretation of the professor’s lecture. GradeBuddy is best used as a supplement to your own notes, not as a substitute.II. Velleman’s Defense of Kantian Suicide for the Sake of our Dignity9. Velleman thinks what is missing in debates about PAS and E is an appreciation of the distinctionbetween interests and value. Each of us possess a value that is greater than ourselves. It is a value thatwe must live up to.10. Velleman doesn’t deny that there are situations where someone should be helped to die. Vellemanjust objects to a person doing a cost/benefit analysis and declaring it is in his interest to die.- Takes insult11. Velleman insists that it is a form of practical irrationality to pursue what is derivative value (interests) in a way that destroys or frustrates the very end it serves and that ultimately gives it value. - Practical irrationality morally wrong- Pursue interest at great value  irrational o Way you show character for value, showing people of great - Pursue means further end  irrational -12. Velleman insists that respect for person’s dignity doesn’t rule out physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. It just excludes certain arguments in favor of hastening death. 13. But if one can no longer live with dignity, then the death of such a person would not offend against his value. It wouldn’t involve weighing his interests against his value. 14. Velleman points out that we often destroy objects of value or dignity when their value is under attack. Tattered flags and books are destroyed or buried rather than allowed to continue to deteriorate. 15. Velleman writes that “dignity can require not only the preservation of what possesses it, but also the destruction of what is losing it, if this destruction is irretrievable.” 16. Velleman stresses that a patient should die for the sake of his dignity, not because it is in his interest to be relieved of pain. He claims there’s a difference between pain & suffering. The distress ofdisintegrating, as a person is what he means by “suffering” and that, not pain, “necessarily touches one’sdignity.” - Be distressed and suffer because you realize you cant do what you used to be able to do - Sometimes we destroy objects for what they dignify- Pain touches dignity - People disintegrate pain may not be morally significant- In between voluntary and involuntary17. Velleman believes that a person’s decision to die would be premature if he possessed all his rationality and just wanted to avoid a future in which it would decline. It is only when the dignity is under attack by the disease that death is not an affront to one’s dignity. Velleman describes patients in the earlier stages of dementia as being in the “Twilight of Autonomy.” - Sake of dignity- Reason to die no longer fully appreciate lose reason and drives- Twilight of Autonomy  early is disease when person but not fully rational not autonomy - To early to do twilight between day and


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