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BU PHIL 202 - Mind, Body and Imagination
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Phil 202 1st EditionLecture 7Outline of Last Lecture I. Descartes’ Views on Philosophy TopicsII. Meditation 4: God and UnderstandingIII. Meditation 4: God and WillIV. Meditation 5Outline of Current Lecture I. Meditation 6: Mind, Body and ImaginationII. Who is Leibniz?III. Monads and Background on Leibniz PhilosophyIV. The Two Great PrinciplesV. The Two Types of Truths Current LectureI. Meditation 6: Mind, Body and ImaginationWe leave of ∙ Meditation 5 with the famous ontological proof: God’s existence is proved by God’s essenceThe ∙ self as a thinking thing is my essence. ∙ Imagination, ex: unicorn, is not part of my essence.Thought = substance; Imagination = ∙ mode of substanceEx: Chair = substance; Its purple color = modeObjects are either:∙1) Obscure and Confused (Sensation)These notes represent a detailed interpretation of the professor’s lecture. GradeBuddy is best used as a supplement to your own notes, not as a substitute.a. All perception is imagination2) Clear and Distinct (Intellect; ex: math)Similar to the imagination, the body is a mode of the mind.∙ (Dualism)Note: Descartes’ views on mind and body are more suggestive than concrete.Descartes concludes Meditation 6 by explaining that of course we know the diference ∙between out wake and dream states, going against what he said in Meditation 1.II. Who is Leibniz?Born 1646, Died 1716∙Developed Calculus same time as Newton∙Mathematically brilliant, high IQ∙Not a mechanist, criticizes Descartes’ mechanistic view∙Wants to go back to using teleological explanation for existence∙III. Monads and Background on Leibniz PhilosophyMind/body problem: says it’s only mind∙∙Monads: Self-contained, indestructible units that cannot be altered by anything else; think: nowindows analogy∙Identity of Indiscernibles – no two things/monads are exactly the same.Humans are monads in that the soul is a monad. (the body = composite)∙Monads change because of perceptions; we call perceptions ∙ predicates.1∙st: Monads; 2nd: Space (emerges from predicates, emerges from properties of things, and thenharmonizes.)Appetitions∙ – make perceptions changeEntelechy∙ - goal, from appetition, perception is not mechanistic (see par. #17 in monads)Appetitions:∙1) Self-conscious2) Humans, maybe animalsPerceptions:∙1) Everything inanimate objects do2) Ex: The chair perceives that it is purple3 types of things:∙1) Humans – have reason2) Animals – have memory3) Inanimate objectsIV. The Two Great Principles1) Contradiction: a. x = xb. x ≠ -xc. Contradictory things are false.2) Sufficient Reasona. Everything has a reason.b. Logical and Rationalistic philosophyc. Even God has a reason; world made by GodV. The Two Types of Truths1) Truth of Reasoning a. Necessary, ex: mathb. We can figure these out, can come to an end2) Truth of facta. Contingent, ex: The chair is purple. Leibniz thinks all truths are ∙ analytic and that we could know things if we thought about them hard enough. However, he says we are not smart enough.All knowledge is a priori.∙Action = clear; Passive = Confused (No reasons for


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