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UW-Madison ECON 522 - Lecture 6

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Econ 522 Economics of LawLogisticsLast week…Slide 4That answered first of four questions we need to addressPublic versus Private GoodsSlide 7Slide 8Slide 9Slide 10A different view: transaction costsSlide 11What can an owner do with his property?So, what does an efficient property law system look like?Slide 14But first: dynamic games and sequential rationalityDynamic gamesWe can put payoffs from this game into a payoff matrix…Slide 19The key assumption behind subgame perfect equilibrium: common knowledge of rationalitySlide 20Intellectual PropertyInformation: costly to generate, easy to imitateInformation: costly to generate, easy to imitatePatents: one way to solve the problemBUT… patents solve one inefficiency by introducing anotherPatents: a bit of historyTwo variables in patent law: how broad patents are, and how long they lastSlide 29Slide 30Slide 31Slide 32Slide 33Slide 33CopyrightSlide 36Slide 37Slide 38Slide 38TrademarksSlide 41Slide 42Slide 42Trade SecretsSlide 44Wednesday…Econ 522Economics of LawDan QuintSpring 2010Lecture 62HW1 online, due next Friday (2/19)Pretty long – don’t wait till last minute to start!If you can’t attend section, can hand in to my mailbox (Social Sciences), or by emailFirst midterm Wednesday 2/24Logistics3Coase: in the absence of transaction costs, if property rights are complete and tradeable, voluntary negotiations will lead to efficiencySo initial allocation of rights doesn’t matter for efficiency if there are no transaction costsBut if there are transaction costs, the initial allocation of rights does impact efficiencySources of transaction costsSearch costs, bargaining costs, enforcement costsWhat to do about transaction costsNormative Coase: design law to minimize transaction costsNormative Hobbes: design law to minimize harm done by failures in bargainingLast week…4How to choose between two normative approaches?When transaction costs are low and information costs high, design law to minimize transaction costsWhat transaction costs are high and information costs are low, design law to allocate rights efficientlyApplication of this: choosing a remedy (Calabresi/Melamed)When transaction costs are low, use injunctions (property rules)When transaction costs are high, use damages (liability rules)C&U: this is what actually happens in many settingsLast week…5what can be privately owned?what can an owner do?how are property rights established?what remedies are given?That answered first of four questions we need to address6Public versus Private GoodsPrivate Goodsrivalrous – one’s consumption precludes anotherexcludable – technologically possible to prevent consumptionexample: applePublic Goodsnon-rivalrousnon-excludableexamples: defense against nuclear attackinfrastructure (roads, bridges)parks, clean air, large fireworks displays7When private goods are owned publicly, they tend to be overutilized/overexploitedPublic versus Private Goods8When private goods are owned publicly, they tend to be overutilized/overexploitedWhen public goods are privately owned, they tend to be underprovided/undersuppliedPublic versus Private Goods9When private goods are owned publicly, they tend to be overutilized/overexploitedWhen public goods are privately owned, they tend to be underprovided/undersuppliedEfficiency suggests private goods should be privately owned, and public goods should be publicly provided/regulatedPublic versus Private Goods10When private goods are owned publicly, they tend to be overutilized/overexploitedWhen public goods are privately owned, they tend to be underprovided/undersuppliedEfficiency suggests private goods should be privately owned, and public goods should be publicly provided/regulatedPublic versus Private Goods11Clean airLarge number of people affected  transaction costs high injunctive relief unlikely to work wellStill two optionsOne: give property owners right to clean air, protected by damagesTwo: public regulationArgue for one or the other by comparing costs of eachDamages: costs are legal cost of lawsuits or pretrial negotiationsRegulation: administrative costs, error costs if level is not chosen correctlyA different view: transaction costs12what can be privately owned?what can an owner do?how are property rights established?what remedies are given?13Priniciple of maximum libertyOwners can do whatever they like with their property, provided it does not interfere with other’ property or rightsThat is, you can do anything you like so long as it doesn’t impose an externality (nuisance) on anyone elseWhat can an owner do with his property?14What things can be privately owned?Private goods are privately owned, public goods are publicly providedWhat can owners do with their property?Maximum libertyHow are property rights established?(Examples to come)What remedies are given?Injunctions when transaction costs are low; damages when transaction costs are highSo, what does an efficient property law system look like?15Up next:applications16Game theory we’ve seen so far: static games“everything happens at once”(nobody observes another player’s move before deciding how to act)Dynamic gamesone player moves firstsecond player learns what first player did, and then movesBut first: dynamic games and sequential rationality17Dynamic gamesFIRM 1 (entrant)Enter Don’t EnterFIRM 2(incumbent)Accommodate Fight(10, 10) (-10, -10)(0, 30)A strategy is one player’s plan for what to do at each decision point he/she acts atIn this case: player 1’s possible strategies are “enter” and “don’t”, player 2’s are “accommodate” and “fight”1818We can look for equilibria like beforewe find two: (Enter, Accommodate), and (Don’t Enter, Fight)question: are both equilibria plausible?sequential rationalityWe can put payoffs from this game into a payoff matrix…10, 10 -10, -100, 30 0, 30Accommodate FightEnterDon’t EnterFirm 2’s ActionFirm 1’s Action19Dynamic gamesFIRM 1 (entrant)Enter Don’t EnterFIRM 2(incumbent)Accommodate Fight(10, 10) (-10, -10)(0, 30)In dynamic games, we look for Subgame Perfect Equilibriaplayers play best-responses in the game as a whole, but also in every branch of the game treeWe find Subgame Perfect Equilibria by backward inductionstart at the bottom of the


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UW-Madison ECON 522 - Lecture 6

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