NU MSIT 458 - Preventing Buffer Overflow Attacks

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Preventing Buffer Overflow AttacksSome unsafe C lib functionsPreventing buf overflow attacksMarking stack as non-executeStatic source code analysisRun time checking: StackGuardCanary TypesStackGuard (Cont.)Timing attacksSlide 10Timing attacks: exampleBackup SlidesSlide 13Buffer overflowsExploiting buffer overflowsCausing program to exec attack codeSlide 17Run time checking: LibsafeMore methods …Format string bugsFormat string problemHistoryVulnerable functionsExploitOverflow using format stringPreventing Buffer Overflow AttacksSome unsafe C lib functionsstrcpy (char *dest, const char *src)strcat (char *dest, const char *src)gets (char *s)scanf ( const char *format, … )printf (conts char *format, … )Preventing buf overflow attacks•Main problem:–strcpy(), strcat(), sprintf() have no range checking.–Use “safe” versions strncpy(), strncat() very carefully•Defenses:–Type safe languages (Java, ML). Legacy code?–Mark stack as non-execute.–Static source code analysis.–Run time checking: StackGuard, Libsafe, SafeC, (Purify).–Black box testing (e.g. eEye Retina, ISIC ).Marking stack as non-execute•Basic stack exploit can be prevented by marking stack segment as non-executable–Code patches exist for Linux and Solaris.• Problems:–Some apps need executable stack (e.g. LISP interpreters).–Does not block more general overflow exploits:•Overflow on heap: overflow buffer next to func pointer.•Cannot make all the data segment non-executable•More recent UNIX and MS windows emit dynamic code into program data for performance optimizationsStatic source code analysis•Statically check source to detect buffer overflows. –Several consulting companies.•Several tools exist to automate the review process: –Stanford: Engler, et al. Test trust inconsistency.–@stake.com (l0pht.com): SLINT (designed for UNIX)–Berkeley: Wagner, et al. Test constraint violations.•Find lots of bugs, but not all.Run time checking: StackGuard•Many many run-time checking techniques …•Solution: StackGuard (WireX)–Run time tests for stack integrity. –Enhance the code generator for emitting code to set up and tear down functions–Embeds “canaries” in stack frames and verify their integrity prior to function return.strretsfplocaltopofstackcanarystrretsfplocalcanaryFrame 1Frame 2Canary Types•Random canary: (used in Visual Studio 2003)–Choose random string at program startup.–Insert canary string into every stack frame.–Verify canary before returning from function.–To corrupt random canary, attacker must learn current random string.•Terminator canary:Canary = 0 (null), newline, linefeed, EOF–String functions will not copy beyond terminator.–Hence, attacker cannot use string functions to corrupt stack.StackGuard (Cont.)•StackGuard implemented as a GCC patch.–Program must be recompiled.•Minimal performance effects–Worst case: 8% for Apache.Timing attacksTiming attacks•Timing attacks extract secret information based on the time a device takes to respond.•Applicable to:–Smartcards.–Cell phones.–PCI cards.Timing attacks: example•Consider the following pwd checking code:int password-check( char *inp, char *pwd) if (strlen(inp) != strlen(pwd)) return 0; for( i=0; i < strlen(pwd); ++i) if ( *inp[i] != *pwd[i] ) return 0; return 1;•A simple timing attack will expose the password one character at a time.Backup SlidesPreventing buf overflow attacks•Main problem:–strcpy(), strcat(), sprintf() have no range checking.–“Safe” versions strncpy(), strncat() are misleading•strncpy() may leave buffer unterminated.•strncpy(), strncat() encourage off by 1 bugs.•Defenses:–Type safe languages (Java, ML). Legacy code?–Mark stack as non-execute. Random stack location.–Static source code analysis.–Run time checking: StackGuard, Libsafe, SafeC, (Purify).–Black box testing (e.g. eEye Retina, ISIC ).•Extremely common bug. –First major exploit: 1988 Internet Worm. fingerd.•10 years later: over 50% of all CERT advisories:–1997: 16 out of 28 CERT advisories.–1998: 9 out of 13 -”-–1999: 6 out of 12 -”-•Often leads to total compromise of host.–Fortunately: exploit requires expertise and patience –Two steps:•Locate buffer overflow within an application.•Design an exploit.Buffer overflowsExploiting buffer overflows•Suppose web server calls func() with given URL.•Attacker can create a 200 byte URL to obtain shell on web server.•Some complications:–Program P should not contain the ‘\0’ character.–Overflow should not crash program before func() exists.•Sample remote buffer overflows of this type:–Overflow in MIME type field in MS Outlook.–Overflow in Symantec Virus Detection (Free ActiveX) Set test = CreateObject("Symantec.SymVAFileQuery.1") test.GetPrivateProfileString "file", [long string]Causing program to exec attack code•Stack smashing attack:–Override return address in stack activation record by overflowing a local buffer variable.•Function pointers: (used in attack on Linux superprobe)–Overflowing buf will override function pointer.•Longjmp buffers: longjmp(pos) (used in attack on Perl 5.003)–Overflowing buf next to pos overrides value of pos.Heaporstack buf[128]FuncPtrStackGuard (Cont.)•StackGuard implemented as a GCC patch.–Program must be recompiled.•Minimal performance effects: 8% for Apache.•Newer version: PointGuard.–Protects function pointers and setjmp buffers by placing canaries next to them.–More noticeable performance effects.•Note: Canaries don’t offer fullproof protection.–Some stack smashing attacks can leave canaries untouched.Run time checking: Libsafe•Solutions 2: Libsafe (Avaya Labs)–Dynamically loaded library.–Intercepts calls to strcpy (dest, src)•Validates sufficient space in current stack frame:|frame-pointer – dest| > strlen(src)•If so, does strcpy. Otherwise, terminates application.destret-addrsfptopofstacksrc buf ret-addrsfplibsafemainMore methods …• Address obfuscation. (Stony Brook ’03)–Encrypt return address on stack by XORing with random string. Decrypt just before returning from function.–Attacker needs decryption key to set return address to desired value.• PaX ASLR: Randomize location of libc.–Attacker cannot jump directly to exec function.Format string bugsFormat string


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NU MSIT 458 - Preventing Buffer Overflow Attacks

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