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Mexican Common Property Forestry

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OutlineData CollectionModels usedSeparation of Ownership and ControlConstitutional Choice TheoryHypothesesData Summary and ResultsGovernance CharacteristicsChoice AssignmentsMeasured OutcomesConclusionsConclusionsFuture workOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsMexican Common Property Forestry: CollectiveChoice Rules and OutcomesCamille Antinori and Gordon RausserMarch 23, 2009Camille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsCamille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsFigure: Forests in MexicoCamille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsCamille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsTable: Forest Cover by Vertical IntegrationType Mean SD Nforest ha. (linearized)No sale 3377 351 1994Stumpage 4820 359 483Roundwood 6574 592 309Lumber 16944 2396 126Total 4543 281 2912Source: Permit and NFI DataCamille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsFocus of talkIInternal organization and decisionmaking variables patternsother than VIIApply theory to explain internal organization anddecisionmaking patterns across a number of decisions integralto community forestry.IExamine relationships between internal productionorganization and economic and environmental and socialmeasures.Camille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsFocus of talkIInternal organization and decisionmaking variables patternsother than VIIApply theory to explain internal organization anddecisionmaking patterns across a number of decisions integralto community forestry.IExamine relationships between internal productionorganization and economic and environmental and socialmeasures.Camille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsFocus of talkIInternal organization and decisionmaking variables patternsother than VIIApply theory to explain internal organization anddecisionmaking patterns across a number of decisions integralto community forestry.IExamine relationships between internal productionorganization and economic and environmental and socialmeasures.Camille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsFocus of talkIInternal organization and decisionmaking variables patternsother than VIIApply theory to explain internal organization anddecisionmaking patterns across a number of decisions integralto community forestry.IExamine relationships between internal productionorganization and economic and environmental and socialmeasures.Camille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsData CollectionModels usedSeparation of Ownership and ControlConstitutional Choice TheoryHypothesesData Summary and ResultsGovernance CharacteristicsChoice AssignmentsMeasured OutcomesLocal public goodsReinvestment in forestryInstitutional measureEnvironmentConclusionsConclusionsFuture workCamille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsOrigin of projectIPhase 1IMotivation: Lack of data on CP forestry in MexicoIMethod: Permit data from 10 states in MexicoIPhase 2IMotivation: Role of CP forestry institutions in market,economic development and environmental protection.IAgrarian sector symbolic of sovereignty and powerIPolitical, social and economic role of forest tenureIMethod: Survey data with institutional economics approachCamille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsOrigin of projectIPhase 1IMotivation: Lack of data on CP forestry in MexicoIMethod: Permit data from 10 states in MexicoIPhase 2IMotivation: Role of CP forestry institutions in market,economic development and environmental protection.IAgrarian sector symbolic of sovereignty and powerIPolitical, social and economic role of forest tenureIMethod: Survey data with institutional economics approachCamille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsOrigin of projectIPhase 1IMotivation: Lack of data on CP forestry in MexicoIMethod: Permit data from 10 states in MexicoIPhase 2IMotivation: Role of CP forestry institutions in market,economic development and environmental protection.IAgrarian sector symbolic of sovereignty and powerIPolitical, social and economic role of forest tenureIMethod: Survey data with institutional economics approachCamille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsFundamental questions of survey1. Q1: What explains vertical integration (VI) of communitieswith commercially valuable forestland in the formal woodproducts markets?2. Q2: What are the internal community governance (IG)characteristics?3. Q3: Do VI and IG affect the generation and distribution ofecological, social and economic forest benefits?Camille Antinori and Gordon Rausser Mexican Common Property Forestry: Collective Choice Rules and OutcomesOutlineData CollectionModels usedData Summary and ResultsConclusionsFundamental questions of survey1. Q1: What explains vertical integration (VI) of communitieswith commercially valuable forestland in the formal woodproducts markets?2. Q2: What are the internal community governance (IG)characteristics?3. Q3: Do VI and IG affect the


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